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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Supreme Court No.
PlaintifflRespondent,

40135
JUAN L. JUAREZ,
Defendant/Appellant.

RECORD ON APPEAL
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine.

HONORABLE ROBERT J. ELGEE, DISTRICT JUDGE
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*****

IDAHO STATE APPELLATE
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3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, 10 83703

STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL APPEALS
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, 10 83720-0010

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)

Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

)
)
)

Supreme Court No.

40135

)

JUAN L. JUAREZ,
Defe nda ntlAppellant.

)
)
)
)

-------------------------)
RECORD ON APPEAL
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine.

HONORABLE ROBERT J. ELGEE, DISTRICT JUDGE

************

IDAHO STATE APPELLATE
PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, ID 83703

STATE ATIORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL APPEALS
P. O. Box 83720
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Attorney for DefendantiAppeliant

Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent
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User ANDREA

Judicial District Court - Blaine Cou

ROA Report
Case CR-2011-0002386 Current Judge Robert J. Elgee
Defendant Juarez, Juan Leon

State of Idaho vs. Juan Leon Juarez

Felony
Judge

Date
6/20/2011

New Case Filed - Felony

R. Ted Israel

Prosecutor assigned Jim Thomas

R. Ted Israel
R. Ted Israel

Affidavit Of Probable Cause
Notice of suspension/fail evidentiary test
Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 06/20/2011 01 :30 PM)
Amended Criminal Complaint

R. Ted Israel
R. Ted Israel
R. Ted Israel

Hearing result for Arraignment held on 06/20/2011 01 :30 PM: Arraignment R. Ted Israel
/ First Appearance

R. Ted Israel

Application For Appointment Of Attorney - GRANTED
Document sealed
Court Minutes

R. Ted Israel

Order Setting Preliminary Hearing and Bond

R. Ted Israel

Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary 07/05/2011 10:00 AM)

Jason Walker

Defendant: Juarez, Juan L Order Appointing Public Defender Public

R. Ted Israel

defunderDan~IM.Do~n

R. Ted Israel

Conditions of Release
6/22/2011

Order Appointing Public Defender

R. Ted Israel

6/28/2011

Notice Of Appearance

R. Ted Israel

Defendants Request For Discovery

R. Ted Israel

Notice Of Appearance plea of not guilty jury request

R. Ted Israel

States Response To Request For Discovery

R. Ted Israel

State's Request For Discovery/demand For Alibi

R. Ted Israel

Waiver Of Time for Preliminary Hearing

R. Ted Israel

Stipulation for continuance of preliminary hearing
Stipulated bail reduction

R. Ted Israel
R. Ted Israel

Bond Posted - Surety (Amount 2500.00 )

R. Ted Israel

Hearing result for Preliminary scheduled on 07/05/2011 10:00 AM
Continued

Jason Walker

Order continuing preliminary hearing

R. Ted Israel

7/6/2011

Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary 08/10/2011 09:00 AM)

R. Ted Israel

8/9/2011

State's First Supplemental Response To Discovery

R. Ted Israel

8/10/2011

Continued (Preliminary 09/14/2011 09:00 AM)

R. Ted Israel

6/30/2011
7/1/2011

7/5/2011

9/12/2011

Notice Of Hearing

R. Ted Israel

Motion to Revoke Bond

R. Ted Israel

Order to Revoke bond

R. Ted Israel

Warrant Issued - Bench Bond amount .00
Release Defendant Juarez. Juan L
STA,TUS CHANGED Inactive

Violation of Conditions of

R. Ted Israel
R. Ted Israel

-1
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Case CR-2011-0002386 Current Judge: Robert J. Elgee
Defendant Juarez, Juan Leon

State of Idaho vs. Juan Leon Juarez

Felony
Judge

Date

9/14/2011

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Preliminary
Hearing date: 9/14/2011
Time 9:15 am
Courtroom Magistrate Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter
Minutes Clerk KATE
Tape Number MC
Defense Attorney Daniel Dolan
Prosecutor Matthew Fredback

R. Ted Israel

Warrant Quashed Violation of Conditions of Release Defendant Juarez, R. Ted Israel
Juan L
STATUS CHANGED: Pending

R. Ted Israel

Warrant Recall Notice Sent

R. Ted Israel

Order Binding Over

R. Ted Israel

Hearing result for Preliminary scheduled on 09/14/2011 09:00 AM:
Bound Over (after Prelim)

R. Ted Israel

Information

Robert J. Eigee

Notice of District Court Arraignment

Robert J, Eigee

9/22/2011

Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 09/26/2011 10:00 AM)

Robert J, Elgee

9/26/2011

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Arraignment
Hearing date 9/2612011
Time: 10:05 am
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk Crystal Rigby
Tape Number DC
Defense Attorney Daniel Dolan
Prosecutor Jim Thomas

Robert J. Elgee

Hearing result for Arraignment scheduled on 09/26/2011 10:00 AM
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:Susan Israel
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing less 100

Robert J. Elgee

p, Plea is entered for charge - NG (118-8004 {F} Driving Under the
Influence-(Two or More Offenses))

Robert J. Elgee

A Plea is entered for charge - NG (118-8001 (3) {M} Driving Without
Privileges)

Robert J. Eigee

District Court Arraignment

Robert J. Elgee

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 12/19/2011 09:00 AM)

Robert J Elgee

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 01/10/201209:00 AM) 3 day

Robert J. Eigee

Notice of Trial Setting. Pretrial Conference and Order Governing Further
Proceedings

Robert J Eigee

Amended Information

Robert J Eigee

9/20/2011

9/28/2011

-2
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User ANDREA

Case CR-2011-0002386 Current Judge Robert J. Elgee
Defendant: Juarez, Juan Leon

State of Idaho vs. Juan Leon Juarez

Felony
Judge

Date
Court Minutes
Hearing type: Pretrial Conference
Hearing date: 12/19/2011
Time 8:59 am
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Defense Attorney: Daniel Dolan
Prosecutor: Jim Thomas

Robert J. Elgee

Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Terri Smith Receipt number 0009181 Dated:
12/19/2011 Amount: $6.00 (Cash)

Robert J. Elgee

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled on 12/19/2011 09:00 AM
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:Susan Israel
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing less 100

Robert J. Elgee

12/20/2011

Continued (Court Trial 01/10/201201 :30 PM) 3 day

Robert J. Elgee

12/29/2011

States motion in limine

Robert J. Elgee

111012012

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Court Trial
Hearing date: 1/10/2012
Time: 1:28 pm
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicia! Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: MC
Defense Attorney: Daniel Dolan
Prosecutor: Jim Thomas

Robert J. Elgee

Hearing result for Court Triall Motion in Limine scheduled on 01/10/2012
01 :30 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter Susan Israel
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 3 day less 100

Robert J. Elgee

Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 03/09/2012 09:00 AM) 112 day

Robert J. Eigee

Notice Of Hearing

Robert J Eigee

State's Second Supplemental Response To Discovery

Robert J. Eigee

State's Motion to Dismiss Count Two

Robert J. Eigee

Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Count Two

Robert J. Eigee

Dismissed by Motion of the Prosecutor with hearing (118-8001 (3) {M}
Driving Without Privileges)

Robert J Eigee

1/30/2012

Defendants Memorandum

Robert J. Elgee

2/13/2012

States Memorandum in support of motion in limine

Robert J Elgee

12/19/2011

1/12/2012
1/17/2012
1/19/2012

-3
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Case CR-2011-0002386 Current Judge Robert J. Elgee
Defendant: Juarez. Juan Leon

State of Idaho

VS.

Juan Leon Juarez

Felony
Judge

Date
3/9/2012

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Court Trial
Hearing date: 3/912012
Time 8:58 am
Courtroom District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk Crystal Rigby
Tape Number. DC
Defense Attorney: Daniel Dolan
Prosecutor: Jim Thomas

Robert J. Elgee

Found Guilty After Court Trial

Robert J. Elgee

Hearing result for Court Trial scheduled on 03/09/2012 09:00 AM: District Robert J. Elgee
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:Susan Israel
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 1/2 day more than
100
Hearing result for Court Trial scheduled on 03/09/2012 09:00 AM: Court
Trial Started 1/2 day

Robert J. Elgee

Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 05/21/201210:30 AM)

Robert J. Elgee

Notice Of Hearing

Robert J. Elgee

Order for Presentence Investigation Report and Substance Abuse
Assessment

Robert J. Elgee

p, Plea is entered for charge: - GT (118-8004 {F} Driving Under the

Robert J. Elgee

Influence-(Two or More Offenses))
3/12/2012

Miscellaneous Payment For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: terry smith Receipt number: 0002085 Dated:
3/12/2012 Amount $7.00 (Cash)

Robert J. Elgee

5/21/2012

Court Minutes
Hearing type Sentencing
Hearing date: 5/21/2012
Time 10:54 am
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk ANDREA
Tape Number DC
Defense Attorney Daniel Dolan
Prosecutor Matthew Fredback

Robert J. Elgee

Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 05/21/2012 1030 AM District Robert J Elgee
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Susan Israel
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing less 100 pages
Hearing resultror Sentencing scheduled on 05/21/201210:30 AM
Sentencing

Robert J. Elgee

Sentenced To Incarceration (118-8004 {F} Driving Under the Influence-(Two Robert J. Elgee
or More Offenses)) Confmement terms Jail 60 days. Credited time 14
days. Penitentiary determinate 3 years Penitentiary indeterminate 2
years
Court Accepts Guilty Plea 1118-8004 {F} Driving Under the I nfluence-(Two
or More Offenses))

Robert J. Elgee

-4

Date

9/6/2012

Page 5 of 6

User ANDREA

Judicial District Court - Blaine Cou

Time: 02:37 PM

ROA Report
Case CR-2011-0002386 Current Judge Robert J. Elgee
Defendant Juarez, Juan Leon

State of Idaho vs. Juan Leon Juarez

Felony
Judge

Date

5/21/2012

Probation Ordered (118-8004 {F} Driving Under the Influence-(Two or More Robert J. Elgee
Offenses)) Probation term: 3 years. (Supervised)

5/22/2012

Judgment Of Conviction Upon a Plea of Guilty to One Felony County,
Suspending Sentence & Order Of Supervised Probation

Robert J. Eigee

Order on Restitution

Robert J. Eigee

Surety Bond Exonerated (Amount 2,500.00)

Robert J. Elgee

State's Motion to Dismiss Count Three

Robert J. Eigee

Order Granting Motion to Dismiss count Three

Robert J. Eigee

Addendum to Probation Condition Re: Ignition Interlock Device

Robert J. Eigee

Dismissed by Motion of the Prosecutor with hearing (123-505 Alcoholic
Beverage-Unlawful Transport or Open Container Violation)

Robert J. Eigee

Notice Of Appeal

Robert J. Eigee

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Robert J. Eigee

STATUS CHANGED: Inactive

Robert J. Eigee

Ex Parte Motion to : Appoint counsel on appeal; waive fees and costs of
appeal; prepare the transcript and clerk's record at public expense

Robert J. Eigee

Motion to proceed in forma pauperis & supporting affidavit

Robert J. Eigee

5/30/2012

7/212012

7/10/2012

Order: appointing attorney; waiving all fees; for preparation of transcript and Robert J. Eigee
clerk's record at public expense

7/26/2012

Petition to Revoke Probation

7/27/2012

Warrant Issued - Bench Bond amount: 5000.00
Defendant: Juarez, Juan L

7/31/2012

Warrant Returned

Robert J. Eigee

Probation Violation Defendant: Juarez, Juan L

Robert J. Eigee
Robert J. Eigee

STATUS CHANGED: Pending

Robert J. Eigee

Bond Posted - Surety (Amount 5000.00 )

Robert J. Eigee

Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 08/20/201209:00 AM)

Robert J. Eigee

Amended Petition to Revoke Probation

Robert J. Eigee

Warrant Issued - Bench Bond amount: 100000.00
Defendant: Juarez, Juan L

8/312012

Probation Violation

Probation Violation

Robert J. Eigee

STATUS CHANGED: Inactive

Robert J. Eigee

Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 08/03/2012 0130 PM) on PV

Robert J Eigee

STATUS CHANGED Reopened

Robert J. Eigee

Court Minutes
Hearing type. Arraignment on PV
Hearing date 8/3/2012
Time 147 pm
Minutes Clerk Heidi Schiers
Tape Number MAG
Defense Attorney Daniel Dolan
Prosecutor Tim Graves

Robert J. Eigee

Warrant Returned

Probation Violation

Defendant Juarez. Juan Leon

Hearing result for Arraignment on PV scheduled on 08/03/2012 01.30 PM
Hearing Held

Robert J. Eigee
Robert J Eigee
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User ANDREA

Judicial District Court - Blaine Coun

ROA Report
Case CR-2011-0002386 Current Judge Robert J. Eigee
Defendant Juarez, Juan Leon

State of Idaho vs. Juan Leon Juarez

Felony
Judge

Date
8/3/2012

8/6/2012

Hearing result for Arraignment on PV scheduled on 08/03/2012 01:30 PM
Continued

Robert J. Eigee

Hearing Scheduled (Admit/Deny Hearing 08/06/2012 11 :00 AM)

Robert J. Eigee

Court Minutes
Hearing type Admit/Deny Hearing
Hearing date: 8/6/2012
Time: 4:02 pm
Courtroom Magistrate Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: SUES
Tape Number DC
Defense Attorney: Daniel Dolan
Prosecutor: Jim Thomas

Robert J. Eigee

Hearing result for Arraignment scheduled on 08/20/2012 09:00 AM:
Hearing Vacated

Robert J. Eigee

Hearing result for Admit/Deny Hearing scheduled on 08/06/2012 11 :00
AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:Susan Israel

Robert J. Elgee

Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing:less 100

8/7/2012

8/8/2012

8/13/2012

8/21/2012

A Plea is entered for charge: - NG (120-222 Probation Violation)

Robert J. Elgee

Hearing Scheduled (Evidentiary 08/20/2012 03:30 PM)

Robert J. Elgee

Notice Of Hearing

Robert J. Elgee

Order reducing bond

Robert J. Elgee

Letter from Bondsman stateting bond is still in effect

Robert J. Elgee

Notice Of Appearance

Robert J. Elgee

Defendants Request For Discovery

Robert J. Eigee

State's Request For Discovery/demand FOI Alibi

Robert J. Elgee

States Response To Request For Discovery

Robert J. Eigee

State's Motion to Continue

Robert J. Eigee

Continued (Evidentiary 10/01/201209:00 AM)

Robert J. Eigee

Notice Of Hearing

Robert J. Eigee

Order Granting Continuance

Robert J. Eigee

Amended Notice Of Hearing

Robert J. Eigee

State's Third Supplemental Response To Discovery

Robert J Eigee
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Jim J. Thomas, ISBN 4415
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
201 2nd Avenue S., Suite 100
Hailey, Idaho 83333
Telephone: (208) 788-5545
Fax: (208) 788-5554
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CR-11-

~"7 ~ '---<

CRIMINAL COMPLAINT

vs.
JUAN L. JUAREZ,
Defendant.

COMES NOW, Matthew Fredback, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, who hereby
submits the following criminal complaint based upon the sworn affidavit of Joshua
Pritchard, a duly appointed peace officer, and charges the defendant with the following
criminal offense:
COUNT ONE
Part One
That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, on or about the 18th day of June, 2011, in
the County of Blaine, State of Idaho, did drive or was in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private property open
to the public, to-wit: a 2000 Chevrolet Blazer bearing Idaho license plate E103010, at or
near milepost 104 on State Highway 75 in Blaine County Idaho, while under the

CRIMINAL COMPLAINT - Page 1
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..
influence of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances to a degree which impaired
her ability to operate a motor vehicle and/or was driving with an alcohol concentration of
.08 or more as determined by analysis of blood, urine or breath, in violation of Idaho
Code §§ 18-8004(1 )(a), DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE.
COUNT ONE
Part Two
That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, did unlawfully commit those acts set forth
in Count One, Part One, of this Complaint at a time when the Defendant had pled guilty
to or was found guilty of, within the previous ten (10) years, at least two violations of a
substantially conforming foreign criminal violation, to-wit:
1.

That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, on or about the 11 th

of July, 2007, was found guilty of or pled guilty to DRIVING UNDER THE
INFLUENCE, in violation of Nevada Revised Statutes § 484C, a
MISDEMEANOR, in the State of Nevada;
2.

That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, on or about the 17'h

of September, 2007, was found guilty of or pled guilty to DRIVING UNDER
THE INFLUENCE, a MISDEMEANOR, in violation of California Vehicle
Code § 23152, in the State of California;
in violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-8004,18-8005(6),18-8005(10), DRIVING UNDER THE
INFLUENCE (THIRD OFFENSE WITHIN TEN (10) YEARS), a FELONY.

All of which is contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and
provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Idaho.
Wherefore, Plaintiff State of Idaho prays that the defendant be brought before the
Court and dealt with according to law.

Matthew Fredb c , ISBN 7262
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

CRIMINAL COMPLAINT - Page 2
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Subscribed and sworn to before me this

""20

day of June, 2011.

Magistrate

CRIMINAL COMPLAINT - Page 3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1 U
day of June, 2011, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the withih and foregoing document by the method
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
Blaine County Prosecuting
Attorney's Office
201 2nd Avenue S., Suite 100
Hailey, Idaho 83333

_
~

_
_

Deputy

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

eyer(

CRIMINAL COMPLAINT - Page 4
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I FILED~~~
i JUN 2 0 2011 ISI

Jim J. Thomas. ISBN 4415
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
201 2nd Avenue S., Suite 100
Hailey, Idaho 83333
Telephone: (208) 788-5545
Fax: (208) 788-5554

Jolynn Drage, Clerk District
Court Blaine County, Idaho

!
I

-------'-'--.,- - - - '

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

Case No. CR-11- ;23 b~

STATE OF IDAHO,

AMENDED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs.
JUAN L. JUAREZ,
Defendant.

COMES NOW, Matthew Fredback, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, who hereby
submits the following criminal complaint based upon the sworn affidavit of Joshua
Pritchard, a duly appointed peace officer, and charges the defendant with the following
criminal offense:
COUNT ONE
Part One
That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, on or about the 18th day of June, 2011, in
the County of Blaine, State of Idaho, did drive or was in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private property open
to the public, to-wit: a 2000 Chevrolet Blazer bearing Idaho license plate E1 03010, at or
near milepost 104 on State Highway 75 in Blaine County Idaho, while under the

AMENDED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT - Page 1
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influence of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances to a degree which impaired
his ability to operate a motor vehicle and/or was driving with an alcohol concentration of
.08 or more as determined by analysis of blood, urine or breath, in violation of Idaho
Code §§ 18-8004(1 )(a), DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE.
COUNT ONE
Part Two
That the Defendant, JUAN L JUAREZ, did unlawfully commit those acts set forth
in Count One, Part One, of this Complaint at a time when the Defendant had pled guilty
to or was found guilty of, within the previous ten (10) years, at least two violations of a
substantially conforming foreign criminal violation, to-wit:
1.

That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, on or about the 11 th

of July, 2007, was found guilty of or pled guilty to DRIVING UNDER THE
INFLUENCE, in violation of Nevada Revised Statutes § 484C, a
MISDEMEANOR, in the State of Nevada;
2.

That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, on or about the 1ih

of September, 2007, was found guilty of or pled guilty to DRIVING UNDER
THE INFLUENCE, a MISDEMEANOR, in violation of California Vehicle
Code § 23152, in the State of California;
in violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-8004, 18-8005(6),18-8005(10), DRIVING UNDER THE
INFLUENCE (THIRD OFFENSE WITHIN TEN (10) YEARS), a FELONY.

COUNT TWO
That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, on or about the 18th day of June, 2011, in
the County of Blaine, State of Idaho, did drive and/or was in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle; to-wit: a 2000 Chevrolet Blazer bearing Idaho license plate E1 0301 0, at
or near milepost 104 on State Highway 75 in Blaine County Idaho, knowing his driver's
license was suspended in Idaho, in violation of Idaho Code § 18-8001, DRIVING
WITHOUT PRIVILEGES, a MISDEMEANOR.

AMENDED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT - Page 2
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COUNT THREE
That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, on or about the 18th day of June, 2011, in
the County of Blaine, State of Idaho, did willfully and unlawfully possess an open
container of alcohol in a motor vehicle located on or at or near milepost 104 on State
Highway 75 in Blaine County Idaho, in violation of Idaho Code § 23-505(2),
POSSESSION OF AN OPEN CONTAINER OF ALCOHOL IN A MOTOR VEHICLE, a
MISDEMEANOR.

All of which is contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and
provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Idaho.
Wherefore, Plaintiff State of Idaho prays that the defendant be brought before the
Court and dealt with according to law.

v
Matthew Fredback, ISBN 7262
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

Subscribed and sworn to before me this [0

day of June, 2011.

Magistrate

AMENDED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT - Page 3

---------------------------------------------
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
;;2.011- day of June, 2011, I caused to be
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:

Blaine County Prosecuting
Attorney's Office
201 2nd Avenue S., Suite 100
Hailey, Idaho 83333

_
~
_
_

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

Deputy Clerk

AMENDED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT - Page 4

---------------

~~-~~---~-~~~-~
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OR\G\\'~AL
Department Report:# BCSOI106-OO32

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 5TH JUDICIAL DIS .
STATE OF IDAHO, IN A..l\ffi FOR THE COUNTY 0

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

{(

JUN 1..0 2011

Plaintiff,

Jolynn Drage,

District

COURT CASE NUMBER
Court Blaine County, Idaho
PROBABLE CAUSE AFFIDAVIT, IN" SUPPORT
OF ARREST AND/OR REFUSAL TO TAKE TEST

v.
Juan L. Juarez
Defendant,.

DOB:
SSN:
DL#:
State: CA
State of Idaho,

ss

County of Blaine
I, Joshua Pritchard, the undersigned, being fIrSt duly sworn on oath, deposes and says that:
1.

I am a peace officer employed by The Blaine County Sheriff s Office

2.

The defendant was arrested on 6/18/2011 at 10: 11
AM L8J PM for the crime of driving while under 1i
influence of alcohol, drugs or any other intoxicating substance pursuant to section.18-8004 Idaho Code.
Seoond or more DUJ offense in the last five years?
YES r8J NO
FELONY
MlSDEM:EANOJ

0
0

0

0

3. Location of Occurrence: Highway 75 , Milepost 104, Blaine County, Idaho.
4.

5.

Identified the defendant as: Juan L Juarez By: (Check Box)
Military ID
State ID Card
r8J Drivers License
OPaperwork found
Verbal ID by defendant
Witness:
identified defendant.
[81 Other: International Drivers License

o
o

Actual physical control established by:
Admission of Defendant to
,
Other

o

o

6.

0
0

0

Credit Cards

(2J Observation by affiant 0 Observation by Officer

0

Statement of Witness;

I believe 1hat there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed such crime because oftbe
following facts:
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PROBABLE CAUSE FOR STOP AND ARREST:
On June 18, 2011 at approximately 20:00 hours while on patrol on State Highway 7S near milepost 103 I

observed is a 2000 Chevrolet Blazer bearing Idaho license plate E103010 traveling northbound. I observed tID;
vehicle cross the center line once and the fog line three times in approx:i.mately a 60 second period. I activated
my over head emergency lights and initiated.a traffic stop on the vehicle at State Highway 75 and milepost lo.
for failure to maintain lane pursuant to Idaho Code 49-637.

I approached the vehicle and spoke with the driver who was identified by his international driver's license as
Juan L. Juarez (DOB
When speaking with Juarez I could smell the strong odor of an alcoholic
beverage coming from his breath. Juarez's eyes also appeared to be bloodshot and glassy. I asked Juarez how
much he had to drink tonight Juarez stated "oh... 1 am kind of drunk." I again asked Juarez how much he had
to drink. Juarez stated "quite a few." I then asked Juarez what he had been drinking and he stated "Budweiser:
I asked Juarez where he had been drinking at. He stated in Shoshone.
I checked Juarez~s driver status through dispatch and found he was revoked out of Nevada and suspended or
revoked out of California. I returned to Juarez's vehicle and asked him to step out and come to the rear of his
vehicle for me. Juarez stepped out of his car and stumbled almost falling over backwards on two occasions. I
advised Juarez I was going to administer him the three standardized field sobriety test to determine if he was
ok to be operating a motor vehicle. Juarez then stated "I am drunk dude." I asked Juarez ifhe could take one
step forward toward me. Juarez stated "I can't." I asked Juarez if he was going to do the tests. Juarez stated
"no." I again asked Juarez ifhe was going to perform the tests for me. Juarez stated "no,," I instructed Juarez to
tum around and place his hands behind his back because he was being pia.ced under arrest for DUL Juarez was
placed in handcuffs. searched and placed in my patrol vehicle.
I transported Juarez to St Luke's Hospital where I read the ALS form to him. After reading the ALS form an
employee from StLuke's entered the room and drew two vials of blood from Juarez using the Idaho State
Blood Kit that I provided. A. fter completion of the blood draw Juarez was placed back in my patrol vehicle and
transported to the Blaine County JaiL
Once at the Jail I checked Juarez's criminal history and found a nUl conviction out oftbe state of Nevada on
7-11-2007. I also fOlmd a Dill conviction out of the state ofCalifomia on 9-17-2007.

D.U.INotes
Odor of alcoholic beverage
~Yes DNo
Admitted drinking alcohol beverage tgJ Yes 0 No
Slurred speech
DYes {8JNo
(glYes ONo
Impaired memory
[g) Yes 0 No
Glassylbloodshot eyes

sobriety Tests - Meets Decision Points?
Gaze Nystagmus
0 Yes 0 No
Wa1k& Tum
0 Yes ONo
One Leg Stand
0 Yes 0 No
Crash Involved
Jnjury

Dyes
DYes

(8jNo
{gINo

0

[gj No

Other
Drugs Suspected 0 Yes [Zl No
Reason Drugs are Suspected

Drug Recognition Evaluation Performed

Yes

Prior to being offered the test. the defendant was substantially informed of the consequences of refusal and
failure of the test as required by Section 18-8002 and 18-8002A, Idaho Code.

~~~
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rgj Defendant was tested for alcohol concentration. drugs or other intoxicating substances. The test(s)
waslwere performed in compliance with Section 18-8003 & 18-8004(4), Idaho Code and the standards and
methods adopted by the Department of Law Enforcement.

0

0

0

Breath Instrument Type:
Intoxilyzer 5000
Alco Sensor
BAC:
by:
[gJ Blood ANDIOR
Urine Test Results Pending? [gJ Yes
No (Attached)
Name of person administering breath test:
Date Certification Expires:

0

0

Serial #

o Defendant refused the test as follows:
By my signature and in the presence of a person authorized to administer Oaths in the State of Idaho, I hereby
solemnly swear that the information contained in this document and attached reports and documents that may
be included herein is true and correct to the best of my information and belief.
Signed:

/~/-dj?

//i?"

?

~

Subscribed and sworn to before me on

(affiant)

,1\AME?..-

~

11 f 10 II
(Date) 4.
II
'Y,/

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ {or)

PERSON AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER
OATHS.
Title: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

NOTA:R
Residing at:

-...:::~::::..::--«_fi----

My Commission expires:

-17

5th JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STAIE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BLA1NE
FELONY ARRAIGNMENT MINUTE ENTRY
STATE v.
D.L.#:
Address:
CD No.

Case No. : CR-2011-0002386
Date: 6/20/2011
Judge: R. Ted Israel

Juan L Juarez

HAC.

DOB:
Hailey, ID 83333
+. 3£ / I: JS': rr

Counter:

Interpreter: _ _....j.m....:..u:;;~..s:::...:·-=~~.=~=~~_____

Clerk:

Prosecutor: Matt Fredback ./

Heidi- - -

DEFENDANT having been charged with the following:
COUNT 1: Drivin Under the Influence- Two or More Offenses
.. J!
AMENDED:

~

Defendant:

)f

PINf

!f11

(.-1 Appeared

'I' -

:irs·

»,-~.

tf~;;'()1'j;L,~/1t4.p1>L~~~ ~ - (, ~1:3.i<l'ltrO" ~

( ) Failed to.Appear

~.:J tf.~

:.

) Bench Warrant Issued ~ Bond Forffiiture Ordered

( ) Advised of all rights and penalties per1( 5, including right to remain silent, that statements
may be used against hirnlher, right to bail, right to counsel, appointment of Public Defender
as provided by law, Preliminary Hearing. (0' viewed slideshow
( ) Represented by Counsel (present) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
(,;) Advised of Charges

() Waived Counsel

(v") Requested PD

( ) Waived Reading Complaint ( /) Complaint Read by Court

( ) Requested Continuance

~~I-IL-

'1 S"DO.

( .;) Bond $

( ) Private Attorney

tyf)

( ) Remanded to Custody of Sheriff

I

( ) Ordered Released

( ) Own Recognizance

( ) To Pre-Trial Senrices

( ) Other _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Public Defender appointed: _ _ _---cj.-:p-""a,-.LL--"JJ~~W.!::~L..:__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Preliminary Hearing set:
I:

.L{t {'ttWr. f p.fil11'4

A

/Ii.

J~

0 s,

~~U4 .

A

.;J () tIe

I (): ()t) tLItv

",,-r:;f: of 19p !~

tt;<.

'btl

9" AU.f.

~o

~~

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICLAL DISTFJCT
OF THE STATE OF IDlLBO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

)
)
)
)

VS.

rJ\..- f:..,..?

L. j \.,..~t.' -

, )

Defendant.

CASE NO. CR-

:z~

<1:0.:

0

W

MAGISTRATE DIVISION
STATE OF IDA..HO,
Plaintiff,

C)

LG \

.-J

~

=

C"J

Z

::::>
.....,

'"0
D-

~:;l
i:35
-(,)

~!1!1
!='J.~f

CS-'"
_1Il

1:'t::

35
-S;O

------~-----1~~---

CONDITIONS OF RELEASE

)
)

Defendant having appeared before the Court and the Court having:

u
IN set Bail in the amount of $~L~~=--~-~_'____
_
-,~

t:::I

[ ] released the Defendant on his/her own recognizance.

AND

LA determined that conditions of release are necessary.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
[x] The Defendant shall appear at all further proceedings in this matter.

[x] The Defendant shall at all times keep the Clerk of the Court advised of his/her current
mailing address. It is the Defendant's responsibility to obtain and correctly respond to any
notice or other document mailed to hislher last known address.
[x] If represented by counsel, the Defendant shall maintain contact with the attorney as the
attorney requires.
[x] The Defendant shall not be cited, arrested, charged or convicted of any offense that shall
constitute a misdemeanor or felony under the laws of the State of Idaho OJ any other municipal,
state or federal jurisdiction.

ix1 The Defendant shall not consume or possess any alcoh01 <H= controlled ~1I'bi'taMeeC withOllt
b. presctiption Issueo by a physician. The Defendant shall submit to evidentiary testing at his
own expense for alcohol OJ "ow;r:oHee sooatans8£ when requested by a police officer, probation
offIcer, cQunselor or the Court. Said testing shall be provided and/or monitored by the Blaine
County Misdemeanor Probation Office or any agency contacted by the Blaine County
Misdemeanor Probation office to supervise such testing. The Defendant shall campi)' Wltl, all
requirements of the Probation Office. Said testing shall occ,ur:
Lfj. Randomly.
! J Daily (The probation department may require more than one test peT day.)
[ ] Other: ________________________________________________________

--------------------~~---
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r'>4' The Defendam shal;

not enter am' estabIishmenl where alcohol is sold by the drink to be
.

;b~~sumed on the premises.

((J The Defendan~. shall not
l\.l.rQhQ!-at.{'ontn~n~HJ

be in actual physicaJ control of a motor vehiclt mQr "oosuruing
5ubatllftQfS 99' prAsrribwc '3: e pl"si"";,l1'

l J The Defendant shall

not leave:
[] the State of Idaho
J Blaine County [J Other:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ withou: the prior written
permission ofthe Court.
[ ] This restriction shall be monitored by electronic or global po:;itioning tracking. The
Defendant shall pay the cost of any monitoring. The Defendant is hereby notified that
violation of this condition of release constitutes the criminal offense of escape.
r ] Monitoring shall be provided by:

l ]

Tbe Defendant shall abide by all provisions of an)' existing no contact order.

fJ

Upon the posting of bail or release as outlined above, the Defendan: shall immediately
report to the Blaine County Misdemeanor Probation Department.

J Other provisions: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Judge

FAILURE TO ABIDE BY THE CONDITIONS OF THIS RELEASE MAY RESULT IN
FORFEITURE OF BOND, IF ANY) AND A WARRA.NT FOR THE DEFENDANT'S
ARREST.
1 acknowledge that 1 have read and received a copy of this Order.

0-2- 0 -1/

--

.

DATE~()(f"'Cjk@7;7,-~~,-Dei

lt: j Prosecutm
[-1 :);:fense .Attorney

dant

lx]

Defendant
l>:] Blaine Coun:;.' Sbe:-Iff

[.-{Blaine Count)' \1isdemeanor Probation Depa;tmel1~
1 .1 ()the:-:

- 2 0-

r4 T.he ~efen~ant shall not enter any establishment where alcohol is sold by the drink to be

~~~sumeG on the premIses.

[YJ The Defendant shall not be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle m8r cgpSllming
*OhgI-m;

cQntn~n8E1

6HBsta'8e:£;fi not

?r""sc~i-gid

1>:

e ph~ &i~.jatl

[ ] The Defendant shall not leave: [J the State ofIdaho
] Blaine County
[] Other:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ without the prior written
permission of the Court.
[ ] This restriction shall be monitored by electronic or global positioning tracking. The
Defendant shan pay the cost of any monitoring. The Defendant is hereby notified that
violation of this condition of release constitutes the criminal offense of escape.
[ ] Monitoring shall be provided by: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
[ ] The Defendant shall abide by all provisions of any existing no contact order.

p<J

Upon the posting of bail or release as outlined above, the Defendant shall immediately
report to the Blaine County Misdemeanor Probation Department.
[ ] Other provisions: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

DATED

LI:::J ') \..'ve:... L~ \ \
Judge

FAILURE TO ABIDE BY THE CONDITIONS OF TillS RELEASE MAY RESULT IN
FORFEITURE OF BOND, IF Al"Iry) AND A WARRANT FOR THE DEFENDANT'S
ARREST.

I acknowledge that 1 have read and received a copy of this Order.
DATED ______________________
Defendant

cr'·

[x J Prosecutor
[x] Defendant
[1Defense Attorney
[x] Blaine County Sheriff
[.{Blaine County Misdemeanor Probation Department
[ ] Other: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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p. 1

lLED_~~_
JUN 20 2011
Jolynn Drage, Clerk District
Court Blaine County, Idaho

El;) EL TRfBIJNAL DE DrSTRJTO DEI.. QUiNTO DlSTRlTO JUD1CIAL DEL EST.~DO DE
IDAHO. Eh' 'y' PAE.A EL CON DADO DE BLAINE.
SrJlkitucl ele Ahogadrl ncf!;!nsor Publico

lisc:;d dehe c2Impletar esta soliciwd [O[almeme t"\arql.,e wdas las c<lsilla:=: que correspopdan Si
:ill resnuesta a Ul1(\ pre!:!unta es "nil1g-unc e:;cribil "ninlrLlTIQ" en el espaciQ en blanco.
Si la
l<

pregullta 110 es z-plicahle a su sinmciol:, escriott "N:A" (no e::: ariicabJe", en el e;;pnciQ en blanco.

Nomb~e. y

L
~
=a
Ae+: a "Z. 2."

APellido:t
DlrecclOn Postal:.s

.

r.--

~ (§~..)
12

Fecha de nacimiento: 1- } I - ?C?
~
Numero e Seguro Soclal:hl{2,-IZ.. -6Z69

Telefon

Soltero~a) ~lsa~~i)~1 D~~~&n)

~ t)-

0-

'

0-

[ J
eltgo
hijos(a5) meno;'es de J g anu.s
Estoy obhgado a pagar fnan'.ltencion infu:Jtii (pensi6n de alimentos) en in suma de $~ por
meso ActLlnlmcl1te debo $~ pOl' pagos atrasados.
~
Trt..b<lJo I\.I JIL boras por sernana.
antidad q,~e !leva a la c~es $ 7CjC)
[ ] En Ia actualidad no estoy emp\eado.

f'ombre de empleador:
ingreso total mensu.a!: .$
Dur!ici6n de Empleo:

~

~v'"

(

to\

~ tJl \
"J
J'

Tengo LIlla cuen~a [ J corriente r J de ahorros u ( J otra cuenta en el banco: :=-_ __
EI valot· total de todns [as cantidades depositadas el1 ese banco es: $_/:.;:,,'-"'bJ."'...-"'---'-----'o

=

tJ:=
A-V

S~gundo

Tengo los SigUiel1tes}nf:esos adicionales mensuales:
trabajo:$
Desempleo: $
B!
?vlanutencion infantil:$
Otros ayudas gubernamentales: $ e>
Trabujo de media jomada:$~
lngreso de fonda fiduciario:·$
c?
Dividendos: $·-~O~-----lngreso de esposo(a): 3;
Otro $_..::=0:::..--_ _ _ _ _ __

V /...

a

Mi ingreso total el uno pasado fue:$:r:

tv /&=

taM..

tJo\- =:; Vye,....

Soy Dueno de los sigLlientes bien::s inmuebles:
LUQ:ar

Cantidad Debida

Valor

Los siguientes bicn~s personales me perteoecen r su valor es:
Cua!quier tlpo de vehiculo motorizado$
C?
Armas de Fuego: $ ~
Cualquier remolque 0 casa rnovil 0 rodante: $ .0
Muebles, enseres domesticos $
Cualquier tipo de herramientas 0 equipo: $
Cualquier otro bien personal Incluyendo, pero no siendo limitado a, equipos electr6nicos,
computadoras, equipo deportivo, instrumentos musicales, colecciones de sellas:,) estampillas,
monedas 0 tarjetas de colecci6n U otros objetos de valor', $

D

6

V

Tenga inten:s directo como socic. coma parte de una empresa c· como beneficlario de un
fideicomiso en los siguientes articuJos:
ArticulQ
)

t. -/?r

A-

Jun 20

2011

t ]

7: 50AM

Puedo

r ] N..,

NE COUNTY DETENTION

B

puedo

85533

2

pedir ptestac!o el di:1ero para pa;:1.r un abog<Lcio

':engo los sigllicnl\:!5 gasros mcnsuales
Gusto

Renta de .arrend[lfliiento / [)ng<J menStiat de IJ ll.poreca de la C<1!;,:
Corn ida

Scrvic(os (Agua, Elect:icidad. Gao, etc)
Dellda de Tarjetas de Credito
P'Ig.C de IprestalTIo de 1 a~{t'J
Gastos M6d icos
SegufOs (casa, auto, mrendnt.;\rio)
Orros: (sea espedfico.Por FaVOIf.' (')
$
,~
C'
$
-"g~-"----

sa
$0

--~---.r:-x'

--..-.\::::~

... ~.-.---

De:-;o a las sigL!i~nrcs personas 0 elltijades una cantidad en e.xceso de $150:
rc!i)tidud deb ida
Raz.6n de \a deudu.
Persona 0 etH10fd

__

t;L ·-+A. . ·. · - - - - - - - - -

POi' la presente autarizo a cuaJqtli~r persona::; emidil(! <1 revl!.lar infomw.ci6c fil1:ln::ieru a! Tribut.a;
de Distrito deJ Q"into Distrito ]udi~iat, Conctad0 de Blaine, bwdo de [darlO, siempre que ia
informacion esre re!acionada con mi siwac!-.'1!\ finuncien! como hI': :.ida descrita en est" soii::.imd,
codo 10 anterior con el prop6sito de evaluar mi eJegibilidad per:nanente parn el nombrmn!enta de
u;-; Abogado Defensor Publico.

Por 10. pre:sente. ademas. declar~ j certiftco bajojl:ra:neilto qCJe tod.1s las deci.araciones anteriores
son ciertas se~l: mi leal saber. Entiendo que $1 estas dtclaraciones no soc ciertas p~ledo se;procesado por PeijL.lrio. l.c.§ ] 8-540;, y ca:itigado con una c:Jndena de no mencs que [(no DJ mas
qtle catorce aries en 1::J penite:1ciada estataL

k

a

f\..::; .

FEerr.A: (; - :kO-1 (
ACVSADO:JV('{r\
0
~***** •• *.~.***~*.*.~~*** •• ***.~*~~ ••••• *.*.*.*.~.* •• _~.~W**~.*$~ •• ** •• *
ORDER
Based on the bove oppOication and good

C;luse

appearing tberefor:::;

iT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

l.

!

The application for Public Defender is:

~RA1'olED

[ ]

DE~lED

because-

The DefenCa:1t shaU ir:.irialiy reimburse Blaine County iT: the SU'Ti of:5
for t.''.1::
services of :he Public Defender. Paymem Clrrangernems sr.;o.tl be made WIth the Clerk of
the Court. Fallure ::0 ab:ce by those .!l!';a::gemenu rr.al' be grounds for Con.temp' of Court
and .an additional Jali ser.te<\..:e of" up tQ fi'v e da)'f1''1d<'~e of up r
.,. ,GOO

1

L

~ f""),-'vC
u\ ~l\ __ j.-;OGE
DATEO: ____________________

y "-

~''''''''''''''-

p.2

ORDER SETTlNC PRELIMINARY HEARING AND BOND

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the
i j;liie;, Idaho. a" (nli(1\\ S

111:11\(;1

i., SET FOR

PREUM!~AWY

IIEARI:'-lC

ill

till'

1~I:tiIlC

(

()tllll~

()tlrlh()l!~c,

DATE OF PRELIMINAR"

ASSI(;i"rW.JI'l)(;r

I I

HEARI~G: _ _ ,.___
Israel

[1

"-q !::::t._ ~:r-2bJL _. ~ ___ .
I

Ingram

0 Other

IT IS F! 'RTIHJ{ ORDERED that BONO IS SET ill lill' amount of:

IT IS Fl'RTHEH OJ{DEIU:D that
2. I l)\.ip ('nlliact (lrlier issued.

1\1 CLivi',!) !\1"

AT

.-J.l!.:"'qp-~_.

___ ...wAJ..KE;~.~

I I

t><r $

()I{

____.__._._

-

().::)

.7~_\:)~~

] Ii

I The Defendant MLJST APPEAR at the lime sct.
Conditions of' Release required.

.J1~
~~~ _/___._.__ .
Vf)lll§ft~----:

I v(1"O\LClltll1~ 1\11<11111.')
1'1-. 0 lYIaS

1--1 Defense

Allomcy

r I

nl~lill\:

County Sh<.:rill

D# IfM'\;

\FILEiTI~~
\

JUN 20

2~Y-\,
J

,--------- - 2 2

Fifth Judicial District Court, State
In and For the County of Blaine
201 2nd Avenue South, Suite 106
Hailey, idaho 83333
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,
VS.

II
,

)
)
)
)

Juan L Juarez
Hailey, 10 83333

\ FILED ~.~.

Case No:

(J

=1 ~

JUN 2 2 2011.I

I.

Jo/ynn Drage, Clerk District
Court Blaine County, Idaho

\1

.

CR-2011-0002386

)
)

Defendant.

ORDER APPOINTING PUBLIC DEFENDER

)
008:
DL or SSN:

)
)
)

CA

The Court being fully advised as to the application of Juan L Juarez, and it appearing to be a proper case,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that an attorney be appointed through the:
Public Defender's Office
Daniel M. Dolan
P.O. Box 757
Ketchum ID 83340

Public Defender for the County of Blaine, State of Idaho, a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, is
hereby appointed to represent said Defendant, Juan L Juarez, in all proceedings in the above-entitled case.

The Defendant is further advised that he/she may be required to reimburse the Court for all or part of the cost
of court appOinted counsel.

1
. .1
. ---

Date: _ _--:.-(,_-_.)_t)_-"",,;1..:;;.,0

Ju ge
Copies to:

~Public Defender

~Prosecutor

~Defendant - received

Order Appointing Public Defender

info at PSF

"DeputyCierk

DOC30 10/88
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OS/28/2011

15:20
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DANIEL DOLAN
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FILED
DANIEL M. DOLAN
Attorney At Law
671 First Avenue North
Post Office Box 757
Ketchum, ID 83340
Telephone: 208-726-3005
Facsimile: 208-726-1187
Idaho State Bar Number 4147
Attorney for Defendant

~~. --f-.1

01/04

n

V

JUN 2 8 2011
JoLynn Drage, Clerk District
Cour1 Blaine County,. Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCf OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.
Juan L. Juarez,

Defendant.

-

Case No. CR 2011 2386

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE

-)

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Daniel M. Dolan, Attorney at Law, DOES NOW,
appear as counsel of record for the above named defendant.
DATED: June 28, 2011

Daniel M. Dolan
Attorney for Defendant

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE

Page 1
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05/30/2011

PAGE

DANIEL DOLAN

187
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DA..1\UEL M. DOLAN
Attorney At Law
671 First Avenue North
Post Office Box 757
Ketchum, ID 83340
Telephone: 208-726·3005
Facsimile: 208-726-1187
Idaho State Bar Number 4147

F\LED~:-.-..-'
JUL 0 1 2011

1

Clerk District
JoLynn Drage,
Idaho
Court Blaine Coun ,

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTli JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO.
Plaintiff.
VS.

Juan. L. Juam;z
Defendant

Case No. CR 2011 002386
STIPULAnON
FOR CONTINUANCE OF

PRELIMINARY HEARING

CO:MES NOW the State ofIdaho by and through the Blaine County Prosecutor's
Office and Daniel M. Dolan, Attorney at Law and counsel of record for the abovc"named
defendant, and hereby stipulate that the preliminary hearing set in the above-entitled aw"1ion for _
may be continued to August 10, 2011, because the blood test

JulyS. 2011

~~lI.j)~

Matthew Fredback

the report.

I

~

DATED

Attorney For Defendant

DATED

I

Daniel M Dolan

STIPULA TION

Page 1
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Jun 30 2011

eQ/36/2Bll

3:52PM

~INE

COUNTY DETENTION

1268726~7

15:46

p. 1

DANIEL DOLAN

r:>AGE

82/134

DANIEL M. DOLAN
Attorney At Law
671 First Avenue North

Post Office Box 757

JUL C1 2011

Ketchum, ID 83340
Telephone: 208·726·3005

JoLynn Drage, Clerk District
Court Blaine Coun ,Idaho

Facsimile: 208-726·11 &7

Attorney for Defendant
Idaho State Bar # 4147
IN THE DISTR..ICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCf OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO t IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
MAGISTRATE DMSION
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff.
VS.

Juan Juarez,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR 2011 2386

Waiver of Time
for Preliminary Hearing

)

The defendant by his signature below acknowledges 1hat he/she has a right to bave a

preliminary h=aring within 14 days if in custody and 21 days if out of cUS'tOdy of the defendant's

initial appearance as is provided by Idaho Criminal Rule 5.1

Further, the defendant acknowledges by hislhcr signature below that he/she waives 1he
rigilt to have the preliminary hearing on the date cwn::ntly set and said hearing should be

continued to a date certain.
Dated this ~ day of .. )() f\;€""-2011

J

~~,
Juarez

Defendant

Waiver of Time

Pagel
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15:36
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FILED

~.~:
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f.p;..

JUL D5 2011
JoLynn Drage, Clerk District
Court Blaine County, Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

MAGISTRATE DIVISION
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff~

vs.

Juan Juarez~
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR20112386

Order Continuing
Preliminary Hearing

This matter having come before the above entitled Court upon the Defendant's motion for
a continuance of the preliminary hearing, the State not objecting and good cause appearing the
preliminary hc::u-ing shall be reset to a date certain.
NOW THEREFORE the preliminary h~g currently schedule herein shall be

continued to

AUgust 10.2Ql1
Dated this

• at 2;OOa.m.

o'clock.

-...L day of }\.. \ i
R. Ted Israel
Magistrate Judge

Order Continuing Preliminary Hearing

Page 1
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05/30/2011

16:30

1

DANIEL DOLAN

187

PAGE

06/06

CERTIFICATE QF SERVICE
I hereby certifY that on this
(P Day of ~ 2011. I served a
true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the~indicated below, and
addressed to each of the fonowing:
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
201 2nd Ave South Ste. 100
Hailey, Idaho 83333
208 788~5554

U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

Daniel M. Dolan
P.O. Box 757

U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overni&b.t Mail
Telecopy

Ketchum, Idaho 83340
208 12&-1187

Deputy Clerk

Order Continuing Preliminary Hearing

Page 2
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FILED
jim J. Thomas, ISBN 4415
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
201 2nd Avenue S., Suite 100
Hailey, Idaho 83333
Telephone: (208) 788-5545
Fax: (208) 788-5554

A.M~_

P.M.

SEP 12 2D11 }c..
JOLynn Dran C
Court 81. . "e, ~erk District
aln€} Coun . loaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CR-11-2386
MOTION TO REVOKE BOND

vs.
JUAN L. JUAREZ,
Defendant.

Plaintiff State of Idaho moves the Court pursuant to its previous ORDER ON
CONDITIONS OF RELEASE for the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, in the abovecaptioned case to revoke bond.
The Defendant was arraigned on June 20 th , 2011, on the felony charge of
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE (THIRD OFFENSE WITHIN TEN (10) YEARS),
I.C. §§ 18-8004, 18-8005(5), with an Order from the Court on Conditions of Release,
see State's Exhibit 1.
Plaintiff State of Idaho hereby alleges through the Affidavit Regarding Violation of
Conditions of Release of Blaine County Probation Officer Jodi Brown dated September
1ih, 2011, see State's Exhibit 2, that the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, has violated the
terms and conditions of his release as follows:

MOTION TO REVOKE BOND- Page 1

-29

1.

The Defendant was arraigned on June 20th, 2011, with an Order from the Court

on Conditions of Release, see State's Exhibit 1.
2.

On June 20th , 2011, the Defendant was ordered not to consume or possess any

alcohol and to submit to random testing as requested by the Blaine County Probation
Office, see State's Exhibit 1.
3.

On July 1S \ 2011, the Defendant posted a bond of two thousand five hundred

dollars ($2,500.00).
4.

On September 6th , 2011, the Defendant submitted to a random 80 hour alcohol

test (ETG/ETS). which was sent to Redwood Toxicology Lab and returned positive for
alcohol consumption, see State's Exhibit 2.
Wherefore, Plaintiff State of Idaho prays that a warrant be issued for the arrest of
the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, and that the Defendant be brought before the Court
and dealt with according to law.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO this \ 'L

day of September, 2011.

Matthew Fredback, ISBN 7262
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

MOTION TO REVOKE BOND- Page 2

- 3

o·

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- )V'-I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of September, 2011, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:

bL

Dan Dolan, Esq.
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 757
Ketchum, Idaho 83340

Lu.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_
_

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

J~tary

MOTION TO REVOKE BOND- Page 3
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rN The DISTPJCT COURT OF 'Y'HE FIFTH JU'DICIAL DISTF'JCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COuNTY OF

BLA.D~E ~~
O

LU

MAGISTRATEDIVrSION
STATE OF ID/LBO,
Plaintiff,
VS.

r

.h/- 6r? L.

~ 'v-. if'S.\{(t;:"-

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
, )
)
)

o
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CASE NO. CR- '26 \

~----~--~~--~--

CONDITIONS OF RELEASE

Defendant having appeared before the Court and the Court having:

IN set Bail in the amount of $ 1~~ \:)\.::::, . ~u

.
[ ] released the Defendant on his/her own recognizance.

AND

LA determined that conditions of release are necessary.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

[xJ The Defendant shall appear at all further proceedings in this matter.
[x] The Defendant shall at all times keep the Clerk of the Court advised of his/ber current
mailing address. It is the Defendant's responsibility to obtain and correctly respond to any
notice or other document mailed to hislher last known address.
[x] If represented by counsel, the Defendant shall maintain contact with the attorney as the
attorney requires.

[x] The Defendant shall not be cited, arrested, charged or convicted of any offense that shall
constitute a misdemeanor or felony under the laws of the State ofIdaho or any other municipal,
state or federal jurisdiction.

"k1 The Defendant shall not consume or possess any alcohol w= controlled SuPita·IH!.e6 witlJout
~ prescription lssued by a phYSlci'an. Tne Defendant shall submit to evidentiary testing at his
own expense for alcohol or cOlUfellee s~atEffie.e£ when requested by a police officer, probation

offlcer, cqunselor or the Court. Said testing shall be provided and/or monitored by the Blaine
County Misdemeanor Probation Office or any agency contacted by the Blaine County
h1isdemeanor Probation offlce to supervise such testing. The Defendant shall comply witll all
requirements of the Probation Office. Said testing shall occur:
Lf!r RandomlY
[ 1 Daily. (The probation departrnen1 may require more than one teSt per day.)
[ J Other: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

StkrE:-s-- .
~lf,IT

I
- 3 2·

M The Defendant shall not enter any establishment where alcohol is soid by the drink to be
;b~sumed on the premises.
l)(l The Defendant shall not be in actual ph~'sical cont:ol o~ 2
~

contrgUsEl sHbstal'll:;fl:5

PQt ?~"'s~:r;:,)"ioi

13;'

motor vehicle

mSf

consnming

fI pt"~1ila'"

[ ] The Defendant shall not leave: [J the State ofldaho
[J Other:
] Blaine County
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ without the prior written
permission of the Court.
[ ] This restriction shall be monitored by electronic or global positioning tracking. The
Defendant shall pay the cost of any monitoring. The Defendant is hereby notified that
violation of this condition of release constitutes the criminal offense of escape.
[ ] Monitoring shall be provided by: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
[ ] The Defendant shall abide by all provisions of any existing no contact order.

r<J.

Upon the posting of bail or release as outlined above, the Defendant shall immediately
report to the Blaine County Misdemeanor Probation Department.
[ ] Other provisions: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Judge

FAILURE TO ABIDE BY THE CONDITIONS OF THIS RELEASE MAY RESULT IN
FORFEITURE OF BOND, IF ANY, AND A WARRAI\TJ' FOR THE DEFENDANT'S
ARREST.
I acknowledge that I have read and received a copy of this Order.
DATED ________________________
Defendant

cc:

[x] Prosecuto:
[x] Defendant
[0Defense Attorney
[x] Blaine Count)' Sheriff
[ ~Blaine County Misdemeanor Probation Department
[ ] Other: ___________________

-33

Teresa Espedal
Blaine County Probation Department
219 151 Avenue South, Ste 108
Hailey, Idaho 83333
Telephone: (208) 788-5528
Fax: (208) 788-5541

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN A-1W FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE COUNTY

STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff

CASE #CR-2011-2386
AFFIDAVIT REGARDING VIOLATION
OF CONDITIONS OF RELEASE

vs.

Juan 1. Juarez
Defendant

STATE OF IDiillO )
) ss.
County of Blaine
)
I, Jodi Brown, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows:
I serve as the Blaine County Probation Officer
1.

Juan L. Juarez was ordered to comply with Conditions of Release in Case #CR2011-2386 on June 20 th , 2011.

2

A term of the defendant's release was that he/she not consume or possess any
alcohol. The Defendant shall submit to an evidentiary test at his own expense for
alcohol or controlled substances when requested by a police officer, probation
officer, counselor or the Court. Said testing shall occur: Randomly,

-34

3
The defendant has violated the Conditions of Release by: Juan Juarez reported to
the Blaine County Probation Office on September 6 th , 2011 and submitted to an 80 hour
alcohol test (ETGIETS) .The test was sent to Redwood Toxicology Lab and came back
positive for alcohol consumption.

fJ,f--rown
e County Probation Officer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

DIVINA B. SLOAN
NOlary Public
State of Idaho

li!(

daYOf54£~ ,20.i1.

Not~ P~blic fO~. /
... /
/I
ResIdmg m:
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N EXPIJUl',6
MY CommlSSlOn
Xpll c;S;- ". . 26, aI"
.0NIJI&I)'DDlU NOrBY PllJUC ~
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REDWOOD TOXICOLOGY LABORATORY

3650 Westwind Blvd., Santa Rosa, CA 95403 Phone: 707-577-7959

TOXICOLOGY SUMMARY REPORT

f

fi5

800-255-2159 Fax: 707-577-0365

Client: 5906 Blaine County Juvenile
Probation
Attn: Bea Sloan

~
~
.....
....

Print Date: 09/09/2011
Date Received: 09/08/2011

lA)

N
....

.........

Accession I
IReq f

ldenti fication

110908-08187 JUAN JUAREZ

Collected EtG

ETS

otherfCooments

09/06/2011 5350
JOO I BRO'rIN LCM

798

[EtG] Screen Cutoff - 100 ng/mL
[EtG] Confirm Cutoff - 100 ng/mL
[EtG] Confirmed by LC/I1S/HS
(ETS] Cutoff - 25 ng/mL
[ETS) Confirmed by LC/HS/MS

Lot
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Note: POS indicates positive result; (-) indicates negative/none detected result: QNS indicates specimen quantity not sufficient for testing.
EtG:Ethylglucuronide (EtG) ETS:Ethyl Sulfate (EtS)

Fax No

: (208)788-554l
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SEP 1 2 2011

Cierk District
Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

Case No. CR-11-2386

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

ORDER TO REVOKE BOND

vs.
JUAN L. JUAREZ,
Defendant.

FINDINGS AND ORDER
Based upon the foregoing Motion to Revoke Bail having been laid before me by
Matthew Fredback, Blaine County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, the Court hereby finds
probable cause to believe the Defendant has violated his conditions of release and
hereby enters the following order.
It is hereby ordered that the Defendant's bond of $2,500.00 be hereby revoked
and the Defendant held without bond until he is brought before this Court for further
proceedings, :

D

a summons be issued compelling the appearance of the defendant so that
the defendant may be dealt with according to law.
a warrant be issued for the arrest of the defendant so that the defendant
may be immediately brought before the Court and dealt with according to
law.

SO ORDERED this

ILday of September, 2011.

\\-~~
R. Ted Israel
Magistrate Judge

-----·8RDER'1B--REV0K-E-B6NB=-Page-1-------------------
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Y-

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of September, 2011, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
Blaine County Prosecuting
Attorney's Office
201 2nd Avenue S., Suite 100
Hailey, Idaho 83333

_

Dan Dolan, Esq.
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 757
Ketchum, Idaho 83340

VU.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_
Overnight Mail
Tele opy
_

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

_Aand Delivered
_
_

Ovemight Mail
Telecopy

-----ORDER-'fO'RE\1oKE~BONe-.:._pageL
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COURT MINUTES
CR-2011-o002386
State of Idaho vs. Juan L Juarez
Hearing type: Preliminary
Hearing date: 9/14/2011
Time: 9:15 am
Judge: R. Ted Israel
Courtroom: Magistrate Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: KATE
Tape Number: MC
Defense Attorney: Daniel Dolan
Prosecutor: Matthew Fredback
Counter #

918

Case called. Defendant is present with Counsel. The State is represented by Counsel. Maria
Djasran, Court's Interpreter, is present aSSisting the Court. Charge: DUI, repeat offense, felony.

919

State calls OFFICER JOSHUA COREY PRITCHARD of the Blaine County Sheriff's Office. He has been
with BCSO for three years. Pritchard is P.O.S.T. certified. Mr. Dolan: Objection, hearsay.
OVERRULED. Pritchard was dispatched on a report of suspected DUI. On June 18,2011, Officer
Pritchard was on patrol when he was contacted by Dispatch. He observed a white Chevrolet
Blazer cross the fog line 3 times, activated his lights, pulled over Juan Juarez. Defendant Is
identified as the driver of the vehicle. Pritchard advised Juarez of the reason for the stop, Inquired
if he was "all right", was provided an international driver's license and a manuel. Prtichard could
smell an odor of alcohol coming from the defendant's breath and noted Juarez had blood shot
eyes. Juarez was asked if he had consumed any alcohol and he replied that he had. The driver said
"Oh, I am drunk." and reported having consumed Budweiser and that he was coming from
Shoshone. The conversation was in English and the defendant appeared to understand the
English language. When asked to perform field sobriety tests the driver said "/ am drunk Dude."
When the driver exited the car he appeared to be very unstable. He declined to perform field
sobriety tests saying he was drunk. The defendant was transported to St. Luke's in Ketchum
where an ALS advisory was read to him prior to a St. Luke's employee drew blood using a blood
kit provided by Officer Pritchard. The blood klt was sealed when Pritchard provided It for the
draw. Officer Pritchard observed the draw, watched the tech agitate the vials to mix the
contents, took possession of the vials, sealed them in the package and taken back to Blaine
County Sheriff and placed in the evidence refrigerator. The blood was sent to the State Lab.
Results of the blood draw were received back from the lab. STATE'S EXHIBITS 1 AND 2. are
introduced and identified as the toxicology report from the State Lab. Exhibit 1 is offered.

935

COURT MINUTES 1

Mr. Dolan: Examination in aid of objection to admission of State's 1. Defense objects to admission
of this exhibit as the expiration date of the test kit is unknown.

Mr. Fredback: Response. Mr. Fredback continues direct of Officer Pritchard. Officer Pritchard
testifies the blood kit was not expired.

937

Mr. Dolan: Further exam in aid of objection. Officer Pritchard testifies his practice Is to check the
expiration date prior to using a kit.

93 8

Mr. Fredback: Exam is beyond scope and not relevant. Court inquires of Mr. Dolan re: relevance.
Court allows the question.

939

Mr. Dolan continues exam in aid of objection. Officer Pritchard estimates he has been Involved in
about 12 blood draws. Officer Pritchard denies having any issues with remembering how a blood
draw is to be conducted. Objection is renewed. COURT: STATE HAS PROVIDED ADEQUATE
FOUNDATION AND EXHIBIT 1 IS ADMITTED.

940

Mr. Fredback concludes direct exam: Officer Pritchard states everything he has testified to
occurred in Blaine County, State of Idaho.

941

Mr. Dolan: CROSS EXAMINATION OF OFFICER PRITCHARD. OffIcer Pritchard reviewed his report
and the video of the stop prior to testifying today. He did not review the audio of the hospital
interview. Mr. Juarez provided a passport in addition to an international driver's license at the
time of the stop. Officer Pritchard testifies that Mr. Juarez speaks with a heavy accent that he
assumed was Spanish. When Mr. Juarez was asked to perform the field sobriety tests, he baSically
said take me In, I'm drunk. Officer Pritchard testifies the unsteadiness observed In the Defendant
after he exited the vehicle was not due to his being cuffed. Officer Pritchard testifies that the
Defendant was not offered a breath test as Dispatch had advised Pritchard of prior DUI offenses.
It is the practice of SCSO to use blood draws for suspected felony DUl's rather than a breath test.
This is not SCSO required procedure. Mr. Fredback: Objection, relevance. Mr. Dolan responds.
COURT: THE OFFICER'S OPINION AS TO WHICH TEST IS MORE ACCURATE IS IRRELEVANT;
SUSTAINED.
Mr. Dolan inquires further re: Pritchard reporting that the Defendant refused to take a breath
test. Officer Pritchard does not recall making such a statement. Pritchard did not take the
Defendant's failing to submit to field sobriety tests as a refusal.

949

Witness is excused.

956

Mr. Fredback: Exhibits 2 and 3 are Introduced and Identified: STATE'S EXHIBIT 2 Is a packet from
the State of Nevada for a 2007 DUI conviction. STATE'S EXHIBIT 3 is a packet from Placer County
California for an excessive DUI in 2007
Mr. Dolan: No objection to the admission of State's:.: and 3. EXHIBITS 2 AND 3 ARE ADMITTED.
Mr. Fredback: Submits the matter to the Court.

959

Mr. Dolan moves to dismiss the case as the State has not provided any evidence that the Nevada
and Califomia DUl,s conform to Idaho DUI law. The waiver of rights form in Nevada does not
include a waiver of Jury Trial. Nevada does not allow jury trial for DUI as is allowed in Idaho.

COURT MINUTES 2

_~........ '.:..J<""~H_<.....

! ...............
It. . ._ _ _

-
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1003

Mr. Fredback: Response: State vs Moore, 2010 Court of Appeals case cited. Responsive Argument.
Supreme Court case State vs. Howard cited; addresses conformance with california DUllaw.

2011,

1008

COURT HAS LISTENED TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESS. STATE'S BURDEN ADDRESSED. THE
DRIVING PATTER OF THE DEFENDANT, THE OBSERVATIONS OF THE POLICE OFFICER, THE
ADMISSIONS OF THE DEFENDANT AND STATE'S EXHIBIT

1

PRESENT PROBABLE CAUSE TO

BELIEVE ON THE DATE CHARGED THE DEFENDANT WAS DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF
ALCOHOL REGARDING A FELONY CHARGE: STANDARD AT THIS LEVEL IS THAT THEY ARE
SUBSTANTIALLY

CONFORMING

JUDGMENTS.

STATE'S

3

INCLUDED

A

MISDEMEANOR

COMPLAINT FOR DUI: .08 or higher. DEFENDANT ENTERED A NOLO CONTENDRE PLEA TO THE
OFFENSE,

ESSENTIALLY

IN

COMPLIANCE

WITH

IDAHO

STATUTE.

STATE'S

2,

DUI

ADMONISHMENT OF RIGHTS DESCRIBES DUI IN NEVADA: 3 WAYS TO BE IN VIOLATIONPHYSICAL CONTROL WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE, BLOOD ALCOHOL EXCEEDING .08 OR
BLOOD ALCOHOL EXCEEDING .08 WITHIN 2 HOURS, SUBSTANTIALLY CONFORMING JUDGMENT
TO IDAHO STATUTE FOR PROBABLE CAUSE PURPOSES. THE LACK OF WAIVER OF RIGHTTO JURY
TRIAL IS SOMETHING TO BE ADDRESSED BY DISTRICT COURT. PROBABLE CAUSE IF FOUND AND
THE DEFENDANT IS BOUND OVER TO DISTRICT COURT. The Court notes the State has filed a
Motion to Revoke Bond a couple of days ago and a Warrant of Arrest was Issued.
1014

Mr. Dolan addresses the Court regarding the warrant. Defendant denies consuming alcoholic
beverages during the time frame. He was ill and treating his symptoms with over-the-counter
medications, including Nyquil. Defendant has been out of custody for an extended period and has
fully complied with the testing portion of his conditions without Incident. Defendant has been
able to go a long period of time without drinking. When he drinks, he drinks to excess. Defendant
has been going to work every day working for a landscaping company. Defense requests the
defendant be allowed to remain on bond.

1020

Court inquires of Mr. Dolan if he has seen the reports from the lab. Mr. Dolan has not seen the
levels. Mr. Dolan reviews the document further.

1021

Mr. Fredback: 5000 is very high metabolite reading. District Court does not consider ETG's below
1000 as they are inconsistent. Below 1000 can be different substances that would give positive

alcohol readings.
1023

Mr. Dolan: With Nyquil, has a high alcohol content, approximately 20%.

1024

Mr. Fredback: Responds to the Court's question. In the alleged crime .31 BAC, very high. In the
Nevada case, there was a violation of conditions of release that resulted in a Warrant that is stili
outstanding. The california DUI is an excessive, over .15. State's concern is that the defendant has
been drinking and driving with exceptionally high BAC. It is unknown whether the defendant can
afford a SCRAM unit. If he is drinking and driving, safety Is an issue. State requests revoking the
bond and incarcerating the defendant or amending the Conditions of Release to inciude a SCRAM
unit.

1

1028

RECESS to allow counsel time to investigate whether a SCRAM unit is available.
RECONVENE, ALL PARTIES PRESENT. There is a SCRAM unit that can be installed at 1:30 p.m.
today for $6-$10. Assuming that a bond revocation has not been sent out, the Court reinstates the

COURT MINUTES 3

bond on the same terms and conditions with the additional requirement that the defendant will
have a SCRAM unit installed. Court addresses the defendant that any use of alcohol in any form
may lead to his arrest. WARRANT IS QUASHED. ORDER BINDING OVER IS SIGNED. DEFENDANT IS
REQUIRED TO APPEAR IN DISTRIG COURT AND ENTER PLEA OF GUILTY OR NOT GUILTY.
ADJOURN

COURT MINUTES 4
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No. CR-11-2386

Plaintiff,

ORDER BINDING OVER

vs.
JUAN L. JUAREZ,
Defendant.

THIS MATIER came before the Court for a preliminary hearing on the 14th day of
September, 2011, on a complaint charging the Defendant with the felony offense of
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE (THIRD OFFENSE WITHIN TEN (10) YEARS, in
violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-8004, 18-8005(6), 18-8005(10).
The Court, having considered the testimony, other evidence and argument of
counsel, finds based upon substantial evidence upon every material element of the
aforementioned charged offense, that such offense was committed and that there is
probable or sufficient cause to believe the Defendant committed such offense.
Accordingly, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 5.1 (b), the Court hereby orders that
the Defendant be held to answer in the District Court on said felony charge and is
hereby bound over on the same to the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the
(

State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine.
DATED this ~ day of September, 2011.

(~~~
R. Ted Israel
Magistrate Judge

ORDER BINDING OVER - Page 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of September, 2011, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
_

Blaine County Prosecuting
Attorney's Office
201 2nd Avenue S., Suite 100
Hailey, Idaho 83333

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
vHand Delivered
_
Overnight Mail
_
Telecopy

Dan Dolan, Esq.
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 757
Ketchum, Idaho 83340

_
~

_

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Ov rnight Mail
Te copy

ORDER BINDING OVER - Page 2
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Jim J. Thomas, ISBN 4415
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
201 2nd Avenue S., Suite 100
Hailey, Idaho 83333
Telephone: (208) 788-5545
Fax: (208)788-5554

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CR-11-2386
INFORMATION

vs.
JUAN L. JUAREZ,
Defendant.

Plaintiff State of Idaho, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 7, by this Information
charges the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, with the following crimes:
COUNT ONE
Part One
That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, on or about the 18th day of June, 2011, in
the County of Blaine, State of Idaho, did drive or was in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private property open
to the public, to-wit: a 2000 Chevrolet Blazer bearing Idaho license plate E1 03010, at or
near milepost 104 on State Highway 75 in Blaine County Idaho, while under the
influence of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances to a degree which impaired
his ability to operate a motor vehicle and/or was driving with an alcohol concentration of

INFORMATION - Page 1
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.08 or more as determined by analysis of blood, urine or breath, in violation of Idaho
Code §§ 18-8004(1 )(a), DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE.
COUNT ONE
Part Two
That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, did unlawfully commit those acts set forth
in Count One, Part One, of this Complaint at a time when the Defendant had pled guilty
to or was found guilty of, within the previous ten (10) years, at least two violations of a
substantially conforming foreign criminal violation, to-wit:
1.

That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, on or about the 11 th

of July, 2007, was found guilty of or pled guilty to DRIVING UNDER THE
INFLUENCE, in violation of Nevada Revised Statutes § 484C, a
MISDEMEANOR, in the State of Nevada;
2.

That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, on or about the 17th

of September, 2007, was found guilty of or pled guilty to DRIVING UNDER
THE INFLUENCE, a MISDEMEANOR, in violation of California Vehicle
Code § 23152, in the State of California;
in violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-8004,18-8005(6),18-8005(10), DRIVING UNDER THE
INFLUENCE (THIRD OFFENSE WITHIN TEN (10) YEARS), a FELONY.

COUNT TWO
That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, on or about the 18th day of June, 2011, in
the County of Blaine, State of Idaho, did drive and/or was in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle; to-wit: a 2000 Chevrolet Blazer bearing Idaho license plate E1 0301 0, at
or near milepost 104 on State Highway 75 in Blaine County Idaho, knowing his driver's
license was suspended in Idaho, in violation of Idaho Code § 18-8001, DRIVING
WITHOUT PRIVILEGES, a MISDEMEANOR.

All of which is contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and
provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Idaho.

INFORMATION - Page 2
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DATED this ;)0

day of September. 2011.

Matthew Fredback, ISBN 7262
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

INFORMATION - Page 3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~cr=:y

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
of September, 2011, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
Dan Dolan, Esq.
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 757
Ketchum, Idaho 83340

_

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
21.vernight Mail
. Telecopy

J
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COURT MINUTES
CR-2011-0002386
State of Idaho vs. Juan L Juarez
Hearing type: Arraignment
Hearing date: 9/26/2011
Time: 10:05 am
Judge: Robert J. Elgee
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Defense Attorney: Daniel Dolan
Prosecutor: Matthew Fredback
Interpreter: Maria Djasran
Counter #
10.03

Counsel present, Def. present with Interpreter.
Court introduces the case, reviews the Info. Cnt 1- DUI (felony), Cnt 2:
DWP(misd).

10.04

Mr. Dolan waives formal reading of the Info.
Court reviews the maximum and min. penalties. Cnt. 1: 10 yrs. prison or 30 days
jail, fine of $5,000, driving privileges suspended for 1-5 years, and must use and
interlock device while operating a motor vehicle after the suspension period.
Cnt. 2: 2 days jail or up to 6 months jail, fine of$1000, driver's license would be
suspended up to 180 days which would add to any current suspension period.
Gives notification of subsequent penalties.

10.09

Def. pleads not guilty.

COURT MINUTES 1
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Court sets 3 day J.T. for 1/10/12 and a PTC for 12/19/11 at 9a.m.
10.11

Recess

COURT MINUTES 2
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Jim J. Thomas, ISBN 4415
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
201 2nd Avenue S., Suite 100
Hailey, Idaho 83333
Telephone: (208) 788-5545
Fax: (208) 788-5554
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JoLynn Drage, Clerk District
Court Blaine Coun!li. Idane:

__

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CR-11-2386
AMENDED INFORMATION

vs.
JUAN L. JUAREZ,
Defendant.

Plaintiff State of Idaho, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 7, by this Amended
Information charges the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, with the following crimes:
COUNT ONE
Part One
That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, on or about the 18th day of June, 2011, in
the County of Blaine, State of Idaho, did drive or was in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private property open
to the public, to-wit: a 2000 Chevrolet Blazer bearing Idaho license plate E103010, at or
near milepost 104 on State Highway 75 in Blaine County Idaho, while under the
influence of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances to a degree which impaired
his ability to operate a motor vehicle and/or was driving with an alcohol concentration of

AMENDED INFORMATION - Page 1
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.08 or more as determined by analysis of blood, urine or breath, in violation of Idaho
Code §§ 18-8004(1 )(a), DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE.
COUNT ONE
Part Two
That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, did unlawfully commit those acts set forth
in Count One, Part One, of this Complaint at a time when the Defendant had pled guilty
to or was found guilty of, within the previous ten (10) years, at least two violations of a
substantially conforming foreign criminal violation, to-wit:
1.

That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, on or about the 11 th

of July, 2007, was found guilty of or pled guilty to DRIVING UNDER THE
INFLUENCE, in violation of Nevada Revised Statutes § 484C, a
MISDEMEANOR, in the State of Nevada;
2.

That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, on or about the 17th

of September, 2007, was found guilty of or pled guilty to DRIVING UNDER
THE INFLUENCE, a MISDEMEANOR, in violation of California Vehicle
Code § 23152, in the State of California;
in violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-8004, 18-8005(6), 18-8005(10), DRIVING UNDER THE
INFLUENCE (THIRD OFFENSE WITHIN TEN (10) YEARS), a FELONY.

COUNT TWO
That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, on or about the 18th day of June, 2011, in
the County of Blaine, State of Idaho, did drive and/or was in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle; to-wit: a 2000 Chevrolet Blazer bearing Idaho license plate E103010, at
or near milepost 104 on State Highway 75 in Blaine County Idaho, knowing his driver's
license was suspended in Idaho, in violation of Idaho Code § 18-8001, DRIVING
WITHOUT PRIVILEGES, a MISDEMEANOR.

COUNT THREE
That the Defendant, JUAN L. JUAREZ, on or about the 18th day of June, 2011, in
the County of Blaine, State of Idaho, did willfully and unlawfully possess an open

AMENDED INFORMATION - Page 2
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container of alcohol in a motor vehicle located on or at or near milepost 104 on State
Highway 75 in Blaine County, Idaho, in violation of Idaho Code § 23-505(2),
POSSESSION OF AN OPEN CONTAINER OF ALCOHOL IN A MOTOR VEHICLE, a
MISDEMEANOR.

All of which is contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and
provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Idaho .

DATED this

• '

C>

l-(/

day of September, 2011.

Matthew Fredback, ISBN 7262
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

AMENDED INFORMATION - Page 3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this)S-f:: day of September, 2011, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
Dan Dolan, Esq.
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 757
Ketchum, Idaho 83340

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_
Overnight Mail
v-Telecopy

_
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Fifth Judicial District Court, State of Idaho
In and For the County of Blaine
201 2nd Avenue South, Suite 106
Hailey, Idaho 83333

STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,
VS.

Juan L Juarez
Shenandoah 39 Apt A 202
Hailey, ID 83333
Defendant.

)

)

Case No: CR-20 11-0002386

)
)
)
)
)

NOTICE OF TRlAL SETTING,
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE, AND
ORDER GOVERNING FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS

)
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for:

Pretrial Conference
Judge:

Monday, December 19,2011
Robert J. Elgee

09:00 AM

Jury Trial
Judge:

Tuesday, January 10,2012
Robert J. Elgee

09:00 AM

NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING, PRETRIAL CONFERENCE & ORDER
GOVERNING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS J

- 5 5·

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and
on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Wednesday,
September 28, 2011.
Defendant:

Private Counsel:

Juan L Juarez
Mailed /

Hand Delivered_ _

Mailed

Hand Delivered

/

Daniel M. Dolan
P.O. Box 757
Ketchum ID 83340
Prosecutor:

Jim Thomas Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
Mailed

Hand Delivered

Dated: Wednesday, September 28, 2011

By:

/~

------~--~r-~~~~L-~~~

Deputy C e

NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING. PRETRlAL CONFERENCE & ORDER
GOVERNING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 2
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COURT MINUTES
CR-2011-0002386
State ofldaho vs. Juan L Juarez
Hearing type: Pretrial Conference
Hearing date: 12/19/2011
Time: 8:59 am
Judge: Robert J. Eigee
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Defense Attorney: Daniel Dolan
Prosecutor: Matthew Fredback
Interpreter: Maria Djasran
Counter #
9.03

I

Counsel and Def. present with interpreter
Court introduces the case and reviews the Amended Info.
Mr. Dolan waives formal reading.

II
I
I

I
I
I

i

Court reviews the maximum penalties 10 years prison or a minimum of130 days
county jail, fine $5,000, driving privileges are suspended for 1-5 years. .
II

Mr. Dolan comments that this is a pretrial.
i

State clarifies that a misd. Count 3 was left off the original info. Def. has been
arraigned on all charges.
9.07

Mr. Dolan comments that the Def. is prepared to waive jury trial and hare a
court trial. The dispute is about the Defs previous record, which could be done
as a motion to dismiss or limine or court trial. The Def. is contesting that this is

COURT MINUTES 1

~--~~-~--'-~-~--
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a felony charge.
,

Court clarifies.

i
I

I
Mr. Dolan comments that whether the State has to prove the allegation~ is up in
the air.
9.09

State has no problem waiving the jury, will be motioning up a Motion ill Limine
i
before the trial.
[

Court makes the trial a court trial.
Mr. DC?lan requests keeping the trial date for 1/10.
Court comments, sets Court Trial for 1/10/12 at 1:30p.rn.
9.16

Def. waives is right to a jury trial.

9.18

Recess

I!
I

I

•

I

I

i

!

COURT MINUTES 2

I
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Jim J. Thomas, ISBN 4415
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
201 2 nd Avenue South, Suite 100
Hailey, Idaho 83333
Telephone: (208) 788-5545
Fax: (208) 788-5554
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DEC 2 9 2011

I

II

JoLynn Drage Clerk District
L-..;;C:.:::.:ou:::..;rt~B.:::;/al~>ne:..,~C~'o:::;.;un.:.:.:tV'...;.;ld~ah.;...o----,

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JUAN L. JUAREZ,
Defendant.

Case No. CR-11-2386
STATE'S MOTION IN LIMINE

---------------------------)
COMES NOW Plaintiff State of Idaho, by and through the Blaine County
Prosecuting Attorney's Office, and HEREBY moves the Court for an Order in limine.
The State seeks the Court's in limine ruling that the Defendant's two prior Driving
Under the Influence convictions within ten years are substantially confirming foreign
criminal violations as included in I.C. §§ 18-8005(6), 18-8005(10).
Oral argument is requested.

DATED this

'29

day of December, 2011.

Matthew Fredback, ISBN 7262
Blaine County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

STATE'S MOTION IN LIMINE - Page 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

9~ay

of December 2011, I caused to be
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thisA
served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
Dan Dolan, Esq.
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 757
Ketchum, ID 83340

_

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_
9vernight Mail
vTelecopy

Ja

son, Legal Secretary

STATE'S MOTION IN LIMINE Page 2
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COURT MINUTES
CR-2011-0002386
State of Idaho vs. Juan L Juarez
Hearing type: Court Trial! Motion in Limine
Hearing date: 1/10/2012
Time: 1:28 pm
Judge: Robert J. Elgee
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: Me
Defense Attorney: Daniel Dolan
Prosecutor: Matthew Fredback
Interpreter: Mary Jo Palma
Counter #
1.40

Counsel present, Def. present with Interpreter.
Court introduces the case.
Interpreter's oath is on file with the court.

1.41

Mr. Dolan comments that a jury trial has been waived. The Def. will be pleading
guilty to Part 1 of the Information. The State still has to prove Part 2.
Understands that the State will dismiss Count 2. Count 3 will be left for another
day.

1.45

State comments, intended to file a motion in limine which is the important issue.
Wants a ruling on the out of state DUI convictions, and after that decision has
been made then it can be decided if a court trial is needed.
Mr. Dolan responds about the continued court trial for identification of the Def.

COURT MINUTES 1
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State responds.

I Mr. Dolan thought the trial was going to be done today.
Court comments about the confusion, reads from the pretrial court minutes. Will
hear the Motion in Limine today and will give the State a continuance re: the
court trial.

1.49

Mr. Dolan requests that Discovery be closed at this time, doesn't want more
witnesses to be added or evidence.
State agrees.

1.53

Court has evidence disclosure and discovery closed.
State clarifies about disclosure.
Mr. Dolan states concerns about the identification issue.
Court comments.

1.55

Mr. Dolan only has the disclosure of the arresting officer.
State has every intention to disclose the records custodian.
Mr. Dolan doesn't have a disclosure or the documents from the jail.
Court will hear the Motion in Limine today, any other issues need to be address
at a later time. Disclosures need to be done immediately. At the end of today
there will be a briefing schedule and a court trial will be set. Court will take the
plea of guilty to Cnt.l Part 1
Def. wishes to plead gUilty to Cnt.l Part 1: DUl

1.59

Court inquires about a rights waiver form.
Mr. Dolan had the Def. just read the rights waiver form. Has a copy of the
Amended Information.
Court has the Interpreter read Count 1 Part 1 of the Amended Information to the
Def.
2.02

Court reviews the max. penalties for a misdemeanor charge

I Counsel agree the penalties are the ones that are in effect at the time of the

COURT MINUTES 2

offense
Court continues to review the penalties: 1 st offense: 6 mo. jail $1,000 fine and dl
suspension for 30 days, permit maybe granted 60-150 days, 2nd offense: 10 days
jail min. up to 1 year, fine of $2,000, dl suspension for 1 year, must use an
interlock device. Felony penalties: 10 yrs. prison, min 30 days jail, fine of $5,000,
dl suspension for 1-5 years, must use and interlock device while operating a
motor vehicle following suspension period.
2.05

Def. understands the penalties and what he is charged with.
Def. pleads guilty, understands the rights that he is waiving by pleading gUilty.

2.09

Mr. Dolan comments that if this is a felony the most the State will ask for is a
Rider.
State agrees.
Court continues to question the Def., wishes for the Court to accept his plea of
guilty. Was driving a motor vehicle on Hwy. 75 in Blaine Co. and was under the
influence at the time of driving and tested higher than a .08.
Court accepts the Defs plea of guilty to Cnt 1 part 1, finds that it was knowingly
and voluntarily made and it was made on a factual basis. Court will now hear the
Motion in Limine
State moves to dismiss Count 2: driving without privileges.
Court has the State prepare and order of dismissal of Count 2.

2.13

State addressed the motion in limine, presents State's Exh. 1 & 2- premarked- ID
-prior offenses within the last 10 years. Also presents the statute for the
individual states Nevada: 484.379 & 484.3792 & California: 23152 all for 2007.
Court inquires.
State also has Idaho case law that will be referred to in argument.
Court comments about rules re: judicial notice

2.19

Mr. Dolan has no objection.
Court will have them marked so that it is clear to the appellant court.
Mr. Dolan comments about in the State of Nevada the Def. doesn't have a right to

COURT MINUTES 3
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a jury trial
State stipulates that is the law of Nevada.
2.24

I

Mr. Dolan has no objection to Exh.l & 2
DOllrt.:ADMITS£XFLl '& 2

2.26

Court wants to preserve the law of Nevada and California for the record. State's
Exh.3 premarked- id- Nevada Law, Exh. 4 premarked-id- Nevada Law & Exh. 5
premarked- id- California Law.
Mr. Dolan has no objection to Exh. 3,4 & 5
Court ADM ITS £XH. :3,4, &:5

2.28

State addresses the Motion in Limine, reviews the issue re: Nevada not allowing
a Def. to a jury trial for a first offense DUl, cites case law. The Def. had a defense
attorney in both Nevada and California. Therefore re: a constitutional argument
it doesn't matter if another state doesn't permit a jury trial. Adds that the Def.
admitted to the charge. Addresses the substantially conforming argument, cites
Idaho Statute and case law, presents copies to the Court The only thing the
Court has to do is compare elements of the statues in the foreign judgment state.
Idaho has a lower standard for the definition ofDUl compared to Nevada &
California (it is easier to get a convicted in Idaho).

2.54

Mr. Dolan responds, clarifies that the Court is not ruling from the bench.
Court agrees if counsel would like to brief the issues.
Mr. Dolan continues, addresses the constitutional argument, believes that if the
Def. did not have the right to a jury trial it doesn't allow for that conviction to be
used as a prior conviction for enhancement. Addresses the substantially
conforming argument, it maters what is under the per-say statute and the
language between states. There are differences in the time of testing between
other states (Nevada & North Dakota).

3.12

I

State will file a brief on the constitutional argument, responds on the
substantially conforming argument re: only violating the per-say statute, in
Nevada the judgment doesn't differentiate the definition of per-say or DUL
Nevada and California criminalize driving under the influence not the BAC at the
time of the test. It is not required that the other state's law be identical it only
has to be substantially conforming.

COURT MINUTES 4
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3.17

,

Court inquires about the briefing schedule.
State suggests that Mr. Dolan reply and the State can reply to the Defenses reply.

I,

Mr. Dolan doesn't mind going first in the writing portion, but wants the ability to
respond if there is something in the State's reply.
Court takes the State's 3 cases as the opening brief, Defenses brief, State's reply,
and Defenses reply. Oral argument can be done at the time of triaL
Court has Defense brief due 1/30/12, State's reply brief due 2/13/12,
evidence/ testimony needs to be disclosed immediately court trial set for
3/9/2012 at9a.m.
3.24

Mr. Dolan comments that the Def. is on a SCRAM unit and it is getting expensive
because of his job. Probation might be able to help, otherwise a motion might be
filed.

3.25

Recess

COURT MINUTES 5
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Jim J. Thomas, ISBN 4415
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
201 2nd Avenue S., Suite 100
Hailey, Idaho 83333
Telephone: (208) 788-5545
Fax: (208) 788-5554

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

Case No. CR-11-2386

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS
COUNT TWO

vs.
JUAN L. JUAREZ
Defendant.

Plaintiff State of Idaho moves the Court pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-3504 and
Idaho Criminal Rule 48(c) for its order dismissing Count Two of the above-captioned
criminal action.
The reasons for the dismissal are: (a) pursuant to a plea agreement between the
parties; and (b) dismissal would serve the ends of justice and the effective
administration of the Court's business.
DATED this \ '1-

day of January, 2012.

STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT TWO - Page 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
~

2

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /
day of January, 2012, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
Dan Dolan, Esq.
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 757
Ketchum, Idaho 83340

_

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
C/Telecopy

STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT TVVO - Page 2
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JAN 1 9 2012

I

JoLynn Drage, Clerk Distr1ct
Court Blaine Ccun ,lctaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

Case No. CR-11-2386

STATE OF IDAHO,

ORDER GRANTING MOTION
TO DISMISS COUNT TWO

Plaintiff,
vs.
JUAN L. JUAREZ,
Defendant.

The Court, having considered the Motion to Dismiss Count Two, and good cause
appearing therefor, HEREBY ORDERS that Count Two in the above-captioned criminal
action be dismissed.
DATED this

Ir

day of January, 2012.

RObeteJYr

District Judge

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT TWO - Page 1

- 6 8-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

/1

day of January, 2012, I caused to be
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDlCIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Juan Juarez,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR 2011 2386
Defendant's Memorandum

The Plaintiff herein has raised the issue that the purported Judgment of Conviction from Nevada
should be admitted as a substantially conforming foreign criminal violation.

The state has introduced Exhibit 1, a Judgment of Conviction packet from Nevada consisting of
7 pages [bates stamp pages 39-45]. In the Judgment of Conviction packet from Nevada on page 3
[ bates stamp page 41] provides:
DUT ADMONISHMENT OF RIGHTS
... AND/OR while having a concentration of alcohol of 0.08 or more in my blood
or breath; AND/OR while having a concentration of alcohol of 0.08 or more in my
blood or breath within two hours after driving or being in actual physical control
of a motor vehicle, in violation ofNRS 484.379.
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The state has also submitted Exhibit 2, Nevada Statues § 484.379 in this matter.
The pertinent language of the submitted statue is:

§ 484.379. 1 part (c):.
(c)

Is found by measurement within 2 hours after driving or being in actual physical
control of a motor vehicle to have a concentration of alcohol of 0.08 or more in
his blood or breath, to drive or be in actual physical control of a vehicle on a
higbway or on premises to which the public has access.

The language which the Defendant maintains causes that the Nevada statue to not be a
substantially conforming foreign criminal violation is:
while having a concentration of alcohol of 0.08 or more in my blood or breath
within two hours after driving or being in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle, in violation ofNRS 484.379.

Compared to the Idaho code § 18-8004 (1) (a) which provides:
(1) (a) It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol,
drugs or any other intoxicating substances, or any combination of alcohol, drugs
and/or any other intoxicating substances, or who has an alcohol concentration of
0.08, as defined in subsection (4) ofthis section, or more, as shown by analysis of
his blood, urine, or breath, to drive or be in actual physical cOlltrol of a motor

vehicle within this state, whether upon a higbway, street or bridge, or upon public
or private property open to the public. (Emphasis added)

To put this simply the Idaho law requires the intoxication to be at the time of driving while the
Nevada statue is not concerned with the concentration at the time of driving only the
concentration at the time of the test.
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In Commonwealth of Virginia v. Dannv Rav Avers, 17 Va. App. 401: 437 S.E. 2d 580 1993 Va.
App: (Attachment A) the Virginia court looked the same issue as presented here and ruled that
the North Carolina statue as compared to the Virginia statue was not a substantially confirm
statue for the purpose of enhancing a DUI to a felony based upon the North Carolina conviction.
In reaching their decision the Virginia Court reasoned as follows.

To be a substantially conforming statue does not mean that [the other] state's law must
substantially confom1 in every respect to Virginia law. Only that the prohibition of the other
state's law under which the person was convicted must substantially conform to Virginia's law.
In making the determination the court looked at the elements of the two statues rather than to
look at the offender's conduct.

The Virgin court went on to state, if a conviction in another state is based on conduct which is
not a violation of Virgin law than to consider it to enhance a Virginia DUI would without
authority expand the scope of convictions which could be considered beyond that which the
Virginia General Assembly specifically authorized. Therefore, another states law permitting a
conviction for an act not constituting an offense under the Virgin DUI law is not a substantially
conforming statue.

The Virginia Court recognized that the North Carolina Statue, (like the Nevada statue) contains a
conclusive presumption that does not require that the accused have any particular blood alcohol
concentration or impairment at the time of driving, so long as he consumed no additional alcohol
between the time of driving and the time of the test.

The Virginia Court went on to state:
Thus under the North Carolina statue (or Nevada statue) a person whose bloodalcohol concentration, as a result of alcohol consumed before or during driving,
was at some time after driving 0.10 or greater must have had some amount of
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alcohol in his system at the time he drove and under the North Carolina statute
that was enough to be guilty.

Under the Virginia and Idaho statues the language is that it is unlawful to drive or operate a
motor vehicle while such person has a blood alcohol concentration of 0.1 0, for Virginia, 0.08 for
Idaho. The Virginia Court went on to state that the result of the subsequent alcohol test in
Virginia is merely an evidentiary fact which creates a rebuttal presumption that the measurement
accurately reflects the blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.

In Virginia, as in Idaho, a defendant may introduce evidence that despite the blood alcohol
reading at the time of the test his blood alcohol concentration was less than the legal limit at the
time of driving. However, in North Carolina, as in Nevada, such evidence would be irrelevant
because of the conclusive presumption. Thus as a result of the conclusive presumption the North
Carolina or Nevada statue was not a substantially conforming statue. This is based upon the fact
that the North Carolina and Nevada statues do not look at the concentration at the time of driving
but rather North Carolina and Nevada are only concemed of the concentration at the time of the
test.

In State v. Schmoll. 172 P.3d 555, 144 Idaho 800, (Idaho App. 2007) the Idaho Court of Appeals
for the first time addressed the issue of what a substantially confom1ing foreign criminal
violation is. The Court in it's analysis looked at United States v. Thomas, 367 F.3d 194 (4th
Cir.2004) a Virginia case which holding was similar to Avers, supra,

The court in Schmoll stated:
The Fourth Circuit compared Maryland and Virginia statutes for
enhancement purposes and determined that a prior Maryland conviction could not
be used for enhancement purposes in Virginia. United States v. Thomas. 367 F.3d
194 (4th Cir.2004). The Virginia statute provided for use of foreign convictions
to enhance a charge only if the statute on which the previous conviction is based
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was substantially similar to Virginia Code § 18.2-266. Thomas, 367 F.3d at 197.
In Virginia, a person could be guilty ofDUJ for driving or operating a motor
vehicle either with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.08 or more, or while
under the influence of alcohol. Va.Code ..tum. § 18.2-266 (2004). A test result of
0.08 or more created a rebuttable presumption that the person had such
concentration while driving and was under the influence while driving. Thomas,
367 F.3d at 198.

Maryland prohibited driving under the influence of alcohol and driving
under the influence of alcohol per se. Md.Code Ann., Transp. § 21-902(a) (2003).
Driving under the influence of alcohol per se occurred when a person showed a
BACofO.080rmoreatthetimeoftesting. M.C.A. § 11-127.1(a) (2002). This
alternative for conviction did not create a rebuttable presumption that the person
was in fact driving under the influence of alcohol, but rather gave rise to an
independent conviction merely for having a BAC of 0.08 or more. Thomas, 367
F.3d at 198. Although a conviction in Maryland for driving under the influence
would constitute a valid prior offense for enhancement purposes in Virginia, a
conviction for driving under the influence per se would not. rd. The standard the
court declared itself to be using to compare these two statutes was "substantially
similar," but the comi applied this standard very narrowly by turning the
comparison on the issue of the rebuttable presumption. It was unclear which
portion of the Maryland DUI statute served as the basis for the underlying
conviction. rd. Therefore since Maryland's per se violation did not provide for a
rebuttable presumption based on the blood alcohol concentration, the Maryland
statute was deemed not to be substantially similar to the Virginia statute. Id.

The court in Schmoll than went on to hold:
This Court exercises free review over questions of law and the application and
construction of statutes. State v. O'NeilL 118 Idaho 244 . 245,796 P.ld 121, 122
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(1990); State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, ]] 06 (Ct.App.2003).
In order

to

determine if the Montana statute under which Schmoll was previously

convicted is substantially conforming to I.C. § 18-8004, the court must first
determine which factors to compare and the standard with which to compare
them. The legislature expressly provided that the focus of the comparison should
be on the elements of the statutes, and not the specific conduct giving rise to the
prior violation. See

I.e.

§ 18-8005(8). The elements of the violation in each

state must substantially conform to each other. The legislature did not define
substantial confonnity; however, where the language of a statute is plain and
unambiguous, this Court must give effect [144 Idaho 804] to the statute as written,
without engaging in statutory construction. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462,
988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999); > State v. Bumight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.ld 214,
219 (1999); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389,3 P.3d 65,67 (Ct.App.2000).
The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning.
Bumight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219. Substantial conformity does not
require exact correspondence between the two statutes. Black's Law Dictionary
defines substantially to mean "[e]ssential; without material qualification ... in
substance." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1428 (6th ed.1990). Conformity
means 11 [c]orrespondence in ... use; agreement; ham10ny; congruity." Id. at 300.

The Court in Schmoll than went on to hold:
Although Idaho and Montana use the BAC test results differently, they
both prohibit the same essential conduct--driving while under the influence of
alcohol. Proving that a person is under the influence absent a BAC test requires a

greater degree of impairment in Montana than in ldaho, since in Idaho, the ability
to drive need only be impaired "to the slightest degree," while in Montana, the
ability to drive "safeJy" is the quality that must be diminished. lmpairment to the
slightest degree is an equal or lesser standard than the diminished ability to drive
safely test used by Montana: thus Montana's higher standard surpasses the

Defendant's Memorandum: Juarez

Page 6

-75·

elements required for a violation in Idaho. These two statutes frame their
prohibitions using the same language. requiring substantially conforming elements
to be met to sustain a violation .(Emphasis added)

The Court of appeals next looked at this issue in State v. Moore 231 P.3d 532, 148 Idaho 887"
(Idaho App. 2010), and adopted the language of Schmoll when it stated:
Although Idaho and Montana use the BAC test results differently, they
both prohibit the same essential conduct--driving while under the influence of
alcohol.

As pointed out in Avers, supra and Thomas, supra, by the Viriginia courts the difference between
the Viriginia law and the North Carolina and Maryland laws is the same as the difference
between the Idaho and Nevada law and that is the Nevada statue and the Idaho statue prohibit
different conduct. The Idaho law requires the intoxication to be at the time of driving while the
Nevada statue is not concerned with the concentration at the time of driving only the
concentration at the time of the test. Thus we ask you to adopt the same finding as the Viriginia
courts that from the plain face of the statue Idaho and Nevada are not SS# for the purpose of
enhancement of this matter.

The other issue concerning the Nevada conviction is that Nevada does not allow a jury trial for a
first offense DUI..

The United States COUli of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United Slates v. Tighe 266 F.3d
1187; 2001, (9th Cir) Attachment B ruled that to be able to use a prior conviction to increase the
maximum sentence in a criminal matter requires that in order to use the prior conviction the prior
conviction needed to include the protection of the right to a jury trial.
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F or the same reasoning as set forth in Tighe this court should not allow the use of a Judgment of
conviction to enhance a misdemeanor to a felony when the defendant in the prior proceeding did
not have a right to a jury trial.
Dated this

;'/ \
..!V

day of

~;r;~2012
/ \
..

'

, ./-1.,

~

~

(.../J)aniel M. Dolan,
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
} ?-"
I hereby certify that on 1- ~)c , 2012, I served a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing document and upon the attorney named below in the manner noted:

Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
201 2nd Ave South Ste. 100
Hailey, Idaho 83333

By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, at the post
office at,...-Ketchum., Idaho.
~r'

. ./

G/13y hand delivering copies of the same to the office of the attorney at his offices in Hailey.
_ _ By sending facsimile copies of the same to said attorney at his facsimile number 208-7885554.
I

(

/--r-~
j

!

'-.

\

\

----------------

Daniel M. Dolan.
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COlvllvl0}f'1lTEJ..LTH OF VIRGD'fLA v. DAN!\ry RA_Y AYERS
Record No. 0636-92-3
COUP..T OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
17 Va. App. 401; 437 S.E.2d 580; 1993 Va. App. LEXIS 592; 10VLR 631

November 30, 1993, Decided

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: [*"*1] As Corrected
December 6,1993.
PRlOR HISTORY: FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
MONTGOMERY COUNTY. Kenneth 1. Devore, Judge.
DISPOSITION: AffIrmed.
CASE SUMMARY:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The state appealed an order
of the Circuit Court of Montgomery COLmty (Virginia),
which vacated defendant's habitual offender adjudication
by holding that another state's driving while intoxicated
staMe, NC. Gen. Stat. 20-138.](a)(2), did not
substantially conform to Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-266 and
could not be used as predicate offenses for an habitual
offender adjudication in the state.
OVERVIEW: Defendant was convicted in the state of
driving while intoxicated in violation of Va. Code Ann. §
18.2-266(i), and he was adjudged a habitual offender on
the basis that he had prior driving while intoxicated
convictions in another state. Defendant then flied a
motion to vacate the habitual offender order on the
ground that his DUI convictions could not have been
used as predicate offenses \.Ulder the habitual offender act
because the DUl statute tUlder which he was convicted in
the other state, NC, Gen. Slat. § 20-]38.](a)(2), did not
conform to Va. Code Ann § J8.2-266(i). The 11101ion was
granted, and the state appealed. The court affmned,
holding that N.C Gen. Stat § 20-J38.1(a){2) did not
conforn1 to Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-2 6 6(i). N. C Gen. Stat.
§ 20- j 38. J (a)(2) contained a conclusive presumption that
allowed a conviction of anyone with a blood alcohol
concentration of 0.10 percent or higher at the time of the
test. The driver's blood alcohol concemration at the time
of driving was iIrcievan1, On tht other hand, Va. Code
Ann. § J8.2-266(i) allowed a defendant to imroduce
evidence to show that his blood alcohol concentratioI! a~
the time of driving was less that' 0.10 percenl.

OUTCOME The COllrt affirmed the order of the trial
COLlrt vacatlllg defendant's dTiving while intoxicated
habitual offender adjudication.
CORE TERlvIS
dnving,
habitual offender,
concentration, blood alcohol, twice convicted, time of
driving, consumed, conform, alcohol, conclusive
presumption, predicate,
Habitual Offender Act
substantially similar, case law, administered, conforming:
va.cation, drive, conformity
LexisNexis (TM) HEADNOTES - Core Concepts:
COlJNSEL: Jeffrey A. Spencer, Assistant Attorney
General (Stephen D. Rosenthal, Attomey General, on
briefs), for appellant.
MarcLls H. Long, Jr. (Frederick M. Kellerman, Jr., on
brief), for appellee.
JUDGES: Present: Judges Koontz, Elder and Fitzpatrick.
OPD'-llONBY: L.A.RRY G. ELDER
OPINION: [**580] [*402J
OPINION BY JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER
The COlwnonwealth appeals from the trial court's
vacation of DanDY Ray Ayers' habitual offender
adjudication. It argues on appeal that the trial court ened
in holding thai North Carolina's DUI statute, Lmder which
appellee was twice convicted, does not substantially
conform to Code';; 1
and [**581] could not be
used as predicat~ offenses for an habitual offender
adiudicati~n in Virgu1ia. For the reasons set forth beloyv,
w~ afflfm the trial COW-t'3 vacation of the adjudication.
Appellee was declared an habilual offender under
VirairJic(
law 011 F ebruarv-' 7. 1992, based on three
cconvlctlOl1S rendered agz.ins! him in the s1.iite of North
<

Carolina. The certiflcc copy of his driving recorc showed
fOLII No:tb Carolinz, convictions, two for[**"'2 J
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l7 Va, App, 401, *, 437 S,E.2d 580, *~';
1993 Va, App, LEXIS 592, *"'~: 10 VLR 631

LUider the miluence (DUl) and TWO for dJ:iving on a
suspended license, The DUI convictions were based on
offenses corrnnitted after July 1, 1986, the effective date
of the 0,10 percent "per se" provisions of Code § j 8,2266(i) , Appellee filed a motion to set aside the habitual
offender order on the ground that his DUI convictions
could not be used as predicate offenses under the
Habitual Offender Act because the North Carolina statute
under which he was twice convicted was not substantially
similar to the Virginia statute, At the hearing on February
25, 1992, the rrial court agreed and entered an order on
March 3, 1992, setting aside appellee's habitual offender
adj udication,

n 1 --wItb
mmimal .'"ehaLce or:: relevant case law-makes clear that ,hey are nOl substamially slIYlilar,
regardless of whether we mlerpreT the Act broadly or
narrowly,

nl NeIther the Virginia nor North Carolina DUI
statutes were amended between the time of appellee's
convictions in North Carolina and his adjudication in
Virginia as an habitual offender.

The sole issLLe in this case is whether the North
Carolina DUI law lmder which appellant was twice
convicted,
N,C,
Cen.
Sial,
§ 20-138. 1 (a)(2) ,
"substantially conforms" to Virginia's DUJ law, § 18,2266, See Code § 46.2-351(3), As we held in Cox v.
Commonwealth, 13 Va, App, 328, 411 SE.2d 444
(1991), "this does not mean that [the other] state's law."
must substantially conform in every respect to Code :§
18,2-266, Only that prohibition of the other state's[***3]
law under which the person was convicted must
substantially confonll," Ie! at 331, 411 SE.2d at 446, 111
making this determination, we look to the elements of the
two statutes rather than to the offender's conduct:

Appellee wa~ twiGe convicted ofDUl uncleI' NC Gen.
SIal. § 20-J38,J(a)(2), which states as follows: "A person
commIts the offense of impaired driving if he drives any
vehicle upon any highway
afIer having consumed
sufficient alcohol ["''"';'5J that he has, at any relevant time
after the driving, an alcohol concentratioD of 0.1 0 or
more." NC Cere Slat, § 20-4,01(330) defines "releyant
time afier the driving" as "any time after the driving in
which the driver still has in his body alcohol consumed
before or during the driving." A careful reading of this
statute reveals that it contains a conclusive presumption
that does not require that the accused have any pat1iclllar
blood alcohol concentration (BAC) at the time of driving,
so long as he consLUlled no additional alcohol between
the time of the stop and the time ofthe test.

If a conviction in another state is based on conduct which
is not a violation of Code § 18,2-266, then to consider it
tmder Code § 46,2-351 would, without authorit)!, expand
the scope of the convictions which could be considered
beyond that which the General Assembly specifically
authorized, Therefore, another [*403 ] state's law
permitting a conviction for an act not constituting an
offense under Code § 18,2-266 is not substantially
conforming under Code § 46,2-351,

A person whose blood-alcohol concentration, as a result
of alcohol consumed before or dmiJ:lg driving, was at
some time after driving 0,10 or greater must have had
[**582] some amount ofaleohol in his system at the time
he drove, The legislature has decreed that this amount,
whatever it might have been, is enough to constitute an
offense, This it may constitutionally do,

ld. The mere fact that both provisions are loosely
referred to as per Se statutes is insufficient to show
substantial conformity,
In their briefs in this case, the parties argue the
different interpretations given the ctUTent statutes and
their predecessors, See Shinault v. Commol1vveaLth, 228
Va.
269, 321 5.E,2d 652 (1984): Davis v,
Commonwealth, 8 Va, App 29 J, 38J S.E,2d lJ
(J 989),[**'4] The Commonwealtb urges us La interprd
the Habitual Offender Act and its substantial conformny
clause liberally to accomplisb the Act's stated plL.rpose of
, pub. l'IC saf·ety, r~ppe
/'
11 ee aso""'ts
'hr,'
preservllW
uV'
Ca",l 'hp
L ~ -}, "1
~hould b~ narrowly construed because it results in a
forfeiture, We fmd it unnecessa:'Y to m~alyze either the
case law or the Vrrginia Habitual Offende, Act i11 deDth,
.'
r',...,...
therns P'J~! ~,TPC.
hO'0/evcT, f02" a!l examln~Ulor:. 0] tne ~taLuteS
LV

,

[*404J North Carulina Ii. Rose, 312 N,C 441. 323 SE.2d
339, 343 (N C j 9(4) (emphasis added),
Under the corresponding VirgiYlia statute, by contras~,
it is "unlawful for any person to drive or operate any
motor vei1icie["'*';'6]
while sucll person has H blood
alcohol concentration of 0,10 percent or more ",," Va.
Code S j 8,2-266(i) (emphasis added). As we held in
Davis :', Commonwealth,- 8 Va,
al 298, 381 S,E2d
a1 15, a convicLion uIlder Code § 18,1-266(i) require:,
moof ihat the BAC of the accllsed We.S at least CUD
,
"fl}p.
w'as- drlving,"
The result of the
percent
.a1 '-__ t1·'11
- P~ 'ne
_
adn1inistered ::::henucaJ test iE, 111erely an
ev identl2.r)' fact \VhlCb creates 2, rebuttable presummion
Ulat the meaSUTe:me:nt accurately reflects the: blood
Ii

the :ime of driving,"
onutled)

A

le.

dcfenciam

rna;, introduce

V'-'

- 79·

17 Va. App. 401, *; 437 S.E.2d 580, *";
1993 \78.. App. LE)CIS 592; *:;;:;;; 10 \!LR 631

evidence to show that, despJte his blood alcohol
concentration of at least 0.10 percent on a subsequently
administered Test, his blood alcohol concentration a! the

free W c.ttilck the accuracy of the tesl, his
the lnne of cirivmg is melevalll.

time of driving was less than 0.] 0 percen7. See, e.g., Keh!

The applicable f'-iorth Carolina law contains a
conclusive presmnptlOn: therefore the statute is 110t
substantially confoJIIling
under Code § 46.2-351.
Accordingly, because appellee's North Carolina DUJ
convictions could not properly be used as predicate
offenses, the trial court did not err in vacating appellee's
habitual offender
mlication.

y Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 602, 605-06, t(26 S.E.2c!
127, 129-30 (1993). In Norti1 Carolina, such evidence
would be irrelevam, fm the statute comains E conclusive
presl.Uuption which aEoVis conviction[''';''"7] of anyone
with a BAC of 0.10 percent at the time of the test.
Although a defendant in Nortb Carolina would still be

0,

her BAC at

Affirmed.
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UNITED STATES OF }\MER1CA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHANNONWA YNE TIGHE, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 00-30263
Ul'\lTED STATES COURT OF A.PPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
266 F.3d 1187; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 20861; 2001 Cal DailyOp. Service 8333; 2001 Daily Journal DAR 10289

hme 13,2001, Argued and Submitted, Seattle, Washington
September 24, 2001, Filed

PRlOR HISTORY: [** 1] Appeal from the United
States District Court for the District of Montana. D.C.
No. CR-OO-00005-JSR John S. Rhoades, District Judge,
Presiding.
DISPOSITION: VACATED ,4.NI) REMANDED.
CASE SUMMARY:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The United States District
Court for the District of Montana sentenced defendant
under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18
U.s.c.s. § 924(e), which mandates a minimum sentence
of 15 years for any person who violates the felon-inpossession statute, 18 U.S c.s. § 922(g), and who has
three previous convictions for violent felonies or serious
drug offenses. Defendant appealed his sentence.
OVERVIEW: Defendant claimed that his sentence could
not stand because ACCA was unconstitutional in light of
the Apprendi decision, and because two of the prior
offenses upon which the district court relied as predicate
offenses were improperly counted as such. On appeal, the
court held that ACCA's use of prior convictions as
sentencing factors was proper. It also held that
defendant's prior South Dakota third degree burglary
conviction was a generic burglary conviction that
properly served as a predlcate offense under ACCA.
However, the court also held that Apprendi's narrow
"prior conviction" exception was limited to prior
convictions resulting from proceedings that afforded the
procedural necessities of a jury trial and proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. Thus, the "prior conviction" exception
did not include nonjury juvenile adjudications.
Therefore, the use of defendant's nonj ury juvenile
delinquen~y adjudicailon to increase his maximum
statutory penalty violated Apprendi. As the sentence
imposed was in excess of the applicable statutory
n~ximum, the district court's eITo: was not harmless.

OUTCOME: Defendant's sentence was vacated and the
matter was remanded for resentencing.
CORE TERMS: juvenile, prior conviction, sentence,
sentencing, jury trial, burglary, juvenile adj udication,
reasonable doubt, indictment, felony, statutory maximurn,
predicate offense, predicate, resentencing, convicted,
generic, violent felony, enhancement, sentencing
enhancement, proved beyond, juvenile delinquency,
maximum penalty, general rule, nonjury, qualifY,
sentenced, beyond a reasonable doubt, statutorily
mandated, burglary conviction, violent felonies
LexisNexis (TM) HEADNOTES - Core Concepts:
COUNSEL: Michael Donahoe, Assistant Federal
Defender, Helena, Montana, for the defendant-appellant.
Bernard F. Hubley, Assistant United States Attomey,
Helena, Montana, for the plaintiff-appellee.
JUDGES: Before: Betty B. Fletcher, Melvin Brunetti and
Raymond C. Fisher, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge
Fisher; Di.ssent by .Iudge Bnll1etti.
OPINIONBY Raymond C FisheT
OPINION: [*1189]
FISHER, Circuii Judge:
OVERVIEW This case is before us to review the
legality of Tighe'S sentence, imposed pursuant to the
Armed Career Cnmillal Act ("ACCA"), 18 U.S.C §
924(e), which manciates a minimum sentence of 15 years
for any person who violates the felon-in-possesslOn
statute, 18 U.S C § 922(g), a..T1d who has three previous
convictions fOT violent felonies or serious drug offenses.
T 19he claims that hls sentence C2u'1l1ot stand because
ACCA is unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court's
recent deClsion in Apprendi v. Nerv Jersey. 530 U.S 466,
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266 F.3d 1187, *; 200] U.S. App. LEXIS 2086], **;
2001 CaL Daily Op. Service 8333; 2001 Daily Journal DAR ]0289
147 LEd. 2d 435, 120 S Cr. 2348, and because two of
the prior offenses upon which the district[**2] court
relied as predicate offenses were improperly counted as
such. Although we reject Tighe's claim that ACCA 1S
facially unconstitutional, as well as his claim that his
third degree burglary conviction was not a "violent
felony" under ACCA, we agree that the district court
violated Apprendi in countmg as a predicate offense
Tighe's
previous
juvenile
adjudication.
[*1190]Accordingly, we vacate Tighe's sentence and
remand for resentencing.

BACKGROUND
On April 20, 2000, Tighe pled guilty to three counts of

a three-count indictment charging him with bank robbery
in violation of 18 USe. § 2iJ3(a) and (d) (Count I),
being a felon in possession of a flreann in violation of 18
USe. § 922(g)(1) and § 924(a)(4) (Count II) and
interstate transportation of a stolen vehicle in violation of
18 Us.e. § 2312 (Count III). The indictment did not
state that if he was found to be an armed career criminal,
he would receive a minimum sentence of at least 15
years. n1 During the Rule 11 plea colloquy, the district
court informed Tighe that if he had three prior
convictions for a violent felony he would receive a
sentence[**3] of not less than 15 years. 1n the
Presentence Report ("PSR"), the Probation Office
concluded that the ACCA sentencing enhancement
should be applied to Tighe, and set forth five previous
incidents of violent conduct. Tighe submitted objections
to the PSR, including objections to whether or not his
convictions qualified him for the enh.ancement. In a
sentencing memo, Tighe also objected on the ground that
Apprendi required that the tlu'ee felony predicates be
proven before a jury by a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard of proof.
nl Although the government claims in its brief that
the indictment indiGated that Tighe was notified of
the applicability of ACCA, the indictment makes no
such reference to ACCA or its applicable minimum
sentences.

At sentencing on August 28, 2000, the district court
determined. over Tighe's obieGtion, that he should be
sentenced ~ursuant
U.S.S.C;. § 4B1.4(b)(3)(B), whiGb
implements ACCA. The district court rejected !ighe's
Apprendi objection. As for the thre(;: pnor telOmes
reqwred[**4] to trigger the armed career criminal
enhancement. the district Gourt Erst relied upon a 1993
Wyoming anned robbery convlctior.. which was agreed

t;

upon by both p'1l1ies. The cow-t then found that a J 988
Oregon Juvenile adjudication of a charge of reckless
endangerment and first-degree robbery and lmauthorized
use of c motor vehiCle counted as a prior conv1ction.
Finally, the district court found that a 1992 Soutb Dakota
bw-glary conviction feil squarely within the "Taylor
heartland of burglary offenses" and therefore counted as
the third conviction necessary to apply the enhancement.
Having found tlu'ee countable convictions, the district
court sustained Tighe's objection to a 1993 South Dakota
grand theft conviction "in the interest of judicial
economy." The court sentenced Tighe to 23 5 months
lmprisonment for Count I, 180 months for Co\'ill! II and
120 months for COLmt III, all sentences to nm
concmrently. He timeiy appeals his sentence.
ST ANDAED OF REVIEW
The legality of a sentence is reviewed de novo. United

Stales v. ivfUlphy, 65 F3d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 1995). The
constitutionality of a statutory provision is reviewed de
novo. Taylorll. UniledStates, 143 F.3d Il78, 1179 (9th
Cir. 1998). [**5] Whether a conviction is a predicate
felony Lmder section 924(e) is reviewed de novo. United

States v. Bonal, 106 F.3d 1472, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997).
DISCUSSION

1. Constitutional Challenges to Tighe's Sentence under
ACCA
Tigbe brings both facial and as-applied constitutional
challenges to his se:ltences [*1191] under ACCA. We
address each challenge in turn.
A. Facial Challenge

The lvmed Career Criminal Act, 18 u.s. C § 924(e),
mandates a minimum sentence of 15 years for anyone
conviGted of being a felon in possession of a fireann in
violation of 18 U.s. C § 922(g)(1) who is fotmd to have
three previous convictions for a violent felony or a
serious drug offense. J8 us.e. § 924(e)(1); United
Slates v. McElyea, 158 F. 3d 1016, J018 (91h Cir. 1998).
A defendant convic1.ed of being a felon in possession of a
firearm who has not been previously convicted of three
violent felonies or serious drug offenses can be sentenced
anI v to a maxim1.l1n of 10 years. 18 U.s.e. § 924(a)(2).
Tighe challenges ACCA on its face on (he ground that it
"allows for a substantial increase[**6] in [the] statutory
maximum rsentence1 based on prior convictions, the
e;mtence of wi1ich n~ed only be proved to the judge by a
preponderance o~' the evidence." He argues that under
Apprendi v. New Jersey. 530 U.S 466, 747 LEd 2d
435. 720 S Cr. :3348 (2000;. the fact of bls pnor
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convictions must be proved to a Jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Under the current state of the law, the Constitution
cioes not require prior convictions that increase a
statutory penalty to be charged in the indictment and
proved before a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. United
States v. Pacheco-Zepeda, 234 F3d 4Jl, 413-14 (9th
Cir. 2001) ("The district court was entitled to consider
any prior aggravated felony convictions in sentencing
Pacheco-Zepeda for illegal reentry even though sllch
conduct had not been charged in the indictment,
presented to a j Llry, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt."); see also Apprendi, 530 U.S at 490 ("Other than
the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt." (emphasis added)); [**7]
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S 224, 24344, 140 L. Ed. 2d 350, lI8 S Ct. 1219 (1998).
Accordingly, we affIrm the district court's holding that
ACCA is constitutional on its face.

B. As-Applied Challenge
Tighe argues that his sentence is lllconstitutional
because it was increased beyond the statutory maximum
10 years by the district court's finding that he was
adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for committing a
violent felony when he was 14 years old. He argues that
Apprendi requires that the fact of his juvenile
adjudication be charged in an indictment and found by a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
One of the three predicate felonies used by the district
court to enhance Tighe's sentence was a 1988 Oregon
juvenile adjudication for reckless endangerment, robbery
and lUlauthorized use of a motor vehicle. As a juvenile,
Tighe was not afforded the right to a jury trial during the
juvenile proceedings under either state or federal law.
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 29 LEd. 2d
647, 91 S Ct. 1976 (1971) (concluding that, in a juvenile
delinquency adjudication, trial by jury is not a
constitutional requirement); Stare v. Reynolds, 317 Ore.
560, 857 P,2d 842 (Or. 1993).[*"'8J Despite the lack of a
jury trial and certain other procedural protections in the
context of most juvenile proceedings, however, Congress
has declared that juvenile delinquency adjudications
involving violent felonies may nonetheless quaiify as
predicate "convictions" lmder ACCA.
18 U.s. C §
92 4( e)(2)( C).
This is not the Erst lime we have addressed the
constitutionality
of
nonJlL"y
juvenile
[*1192]
adjudications as sentencing enhancements. In Ul1iled

Stares v. Williams, 89 J F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1989), a preApprendi case, we held tbal a sentencing Judge's use of a
prior, 110njury juvenile adjudication to enhance a
defendant's sentence under the sentencing guidelines did

not violate due process. Contrary to the government's
assertion, however, Williams is not dispositive of the
issue presently before us, because the nature of the
sentencing decision reviewed U1 that case was
fundamentally different from the sentencing decision
Tighe now challenges. Although Wilhams addressed the
use of pnor juvenile adjudications to enhance a
defendant's sentence, the defendant'B ultimate sentence in
that case was within the statutorily mandated range for
["'*9)the offense of conviction. In other words, William's
prior juvenile adJ udications were not used to increase the
statutorily mandated maximum punislllTlent to which he
was exposed. n2

n2 In Williams, the statute under which the defendant
was convicted, J8 U.s. C § 2 J J3(a), set the statutory
maximum punishment at not more than 20 years
incarceration. The defendant in that case was
ultimately sentenced to 57 months, which was well
below the statutory maxim\.UTI.

In contrast, under ACCA the fact of Tighe's prior
juvenile adjudication was used to increase his statutorily
mandated maximlUll punishment from not more than 10
years, under 18 USC § 924(a)(2), to at least 15 years, A
fact that is used to increase the maximum statutory
penalty to which a defendant is exposed raises an entirely
different set of constitutional concerns than a fact that
merely affects where a sentence is fixed within an
I.mdisputed statutorily mandated range. See United States
v. Moss. 252 F,3d 993, (**IO) 200] WL 637312 (8th
Cir., 2001). Accordingly, because Tighe challenges the
use of his prior juvenile adjlLdications to raise his
statutory maximum p\.Ulishmont, Williams does not
answer tho question of whether the district court's use of
sLlch adj udicatiol1s was constitutional.
As discussed in the preceding section addressing
Tighe's facial challenge to ACCA, the Supreme Court has
held that "other than the fact of a prior conviction, any
fact that increases the penalty for a crim:; beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi,
530 US at 490, ]47 LEd. 2d 435, 120 S Cl. 2348
(emphasis added); see aiso Jones v. United States, 526
U.s 227 aI 243, n. 6, J43 LEd 2d 311.119 S Ct. 1215.
Thus, the Supreme Court nas held that prior convictions
are exempt from Apprendi's general mle 2.11::, as
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sentencing factors, need not be afforded the same
procedural protections that anach to facts that are
construed as elements of the charged crime. n3

that autholizes ar. increased prison sentence for aliens reo
entering the United States after deponalioD if the alien
was convicted of a pno: aggravated felony. Almendarez.
Torres, 523 U.S. a/ 229. The defendant ~rgued that the

n3 It should be noted that several states' recidivism
statutes treat prior convictions as eiements of a crime
or provide for a jury determination of the fact of a
prior conviction. See Almendarez-Torres. 523 U.S at
246 (noting that some states treat prior convictions as
elements of the related crime and submit the fact of a
prior conviction to a jury); see generally Spencer v.
Texas, 385 U.S 554, 566-67. 17 LEd. 2d 606, 87 S
Ct. 648 (J 967) (describing various states' procedures
for proving prior convictions); Oyler v. Boles, 368
U.S 448, 7 L. Ed. 2d 446, 82 S. Ct. 501 (1962)
(examining West Virginia's procedure for proving
prior convictions).

[**11)
At first blush, it may appear that Tighe's 1988 juvenile
adjudication, which Congress has characterized as a
"prior conviction" for the purposes of ACCA, falls
precisely within Apprendi's exception for "the fact of a
prior conviction," thus foreclosing Tighe's argument that
the use of that adjudication at sentencing to increase his
maximum penalty violated Apprendi. Such an analysis,
however,
ignores
the
signifIcant constitutional
differences between [* 1193 }adult convictions and
juvenile adjudications. Compare McKeiver, supra, with
Duncan v. Louisiana. 391 Us. 145, 149, 20 L. Ed. 2d
491,88 S. Ct 1444 (1968) (holding that ,he rigbt of trial
by ju..ry is a fundamental right applicable to the states).
Neither Apprendi, nor Almendarez-Torres -- the case
upon which Apprendi relied to create the "prior
conviction" exception to its general rule .- specifIcally
addressed the urlique issues that distinguish juvenile
adjudications from adult convictions, such as the lack of
a right to a jury trial in mosl juvenile adjudications. Thus.
neither case squarely tackles the question that Tighe's
appeal now raises: do prior juvenile adjudications, which
do[**12] not afford the righe to a jury trial, fall within the
"prior conviction" exception to Apprendi's general rule
that a fact used to increase a defendant's maximwl1
penalty must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a
~easonable doubt? In order to answer this question, we
must inquire into the scope of the term "conviction" as
used by the Supreme Court in Apprendi. and tbe cases
leading up to Apprendl.
In Aimendarez-Tones, the case that fIrst held prior
convictions could be treated as sentencing factors that
raise the maximum penalty of an offense, the Court
addressed the constitutionality of a statutory prov1sion

fact of his prior conViction, which was used to increase
hiS statutorily mandated maxilUum punishment, was an
element of his offense and should have been charged in
the indictment. The Court rejected this argument, bolding
that the fact of the prior conviction was a sentencing
factor, and not 8 separate element of the[**13J crime t~
be charged in the indictment. !d. at 243.
The next term, in Jones v. United Slates, 526 US 227,
143 L. Ed 2d 31J, Jl9 5 Ct 1215 (2999), the Court
considered Almendarez-Tones' holding regarding the use
of prior convictions in the context of emerging concerns
about the viability of using facts not charged in an
indictment nor proved to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt to increase the statutory maximum penalty to
which a defendant is exposed. The Court explained why
the fact of prior convictions was cOllStitutionally distinct
from other sentence-enhancing facts, such that it was
pern1issible, wlder Almendarez-Tones, to use prior
convictions to increase the possible penalty for an
offense without treating them as an element of the current
offense: "One basis for thal constitutional distinctiveness
[of prior convictions) is not hard to see: unlike virtually
any other consideration used to enlarge the possible
penalty for an offense ... a prior conviction must itself
have been established through procedures satisfying the
fair notice, reasonable doubt and jury trial guarantees."
Jones, 526 US at 249 (emphasis[**14] added). Thus,
Jones' recognition of pnor convictions as a
constitutionally permissible sentencing factor was rooted
in the concept that prior convictions have been, by their
very nature, subject to the funda...'Tlental triumvirate of
procedural protections intended to guarantee the
reliability of criminal convictions: fair notice, reasonable
doubt and the right to a jury trial.
One year later, in Apprendi, the Court further
elaborated on the importance of such procedural
protections being inherent in prior convictions used as
sentencing faciors to increase statutory penalties. The
COUli expiained that "the certainty that procedural
safeguards attached to the 'fact' of prior conviction" was
crucial to [* 1194 J Almendarez· Tones' constitutional
holding regarding prior convictions as sentencing factors.
Apprendi, 530 U.S at 488. The Court identiiiec the right
to a jury trial as one of the requisite procedural
safeguards \0 which it refe:-red: "There is a vast
difference between accePting the validity of a. prior
judgment of conviction e~tered in a proceeciing in which
the defendant had the right to a jury trial and the nght to
reqUlre the prosecutor to prove guil: beyond[**15] a
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reasonable doubt, and allowing the judge to find the
required fact under a lesser sta.lldard of proof" Apprendi,
530 u.s. ai 496. The Court's continued acceptance of

Torres, its holding regarding prior convictions should
remain a "narrow exception" to Apprendi that does not
extend to nonjw-y juveniie adjudications.

Almendarez-Torres' holding regarding prior convictions,

then, was premised on sentence-enhancing prior
convictions being the product of proceedings that afford
crucial procedural protections -- particularly the right to a
jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Thus, as we read Jones and Apprendi, the "prior
conviction" exception to Apprendi's general rule must be
limited to prior convictions that were themselves
obtained througb proceedings that included the right to a
jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Juvenile
adjudications that do not afford the right to a jury trial
and a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof,
therefore, do not fall within Apprendi's "prior
conviction" exception. n4
n4 It does not matter to this analysis whether any
state provides the right to a jury trial for juvenile
adjudications. It is undisputed that Tighe was not
provided a jury when he was adjudged a juvenile
delinquent in Oregon or when he was sentenced as an
armed career criminal in tilis case.

l**16]
To the extent the government's argument can be
construed as a request to extend Apprendi's "prior
conviction" exception to io.ciude prior nonjury juvenile
adjudications on the basis of Almendarez-Torres' logic,
we decline to do so. The Apprendi Court's serious
reservations about the reasoning of Almendarez-Torres
counsel against any extension of that opinion's holding:
Even though it is arguable the Almendarez-Torres was
incorrectly decided, a..'1d that a logical application of our
reasoning today should apply if the recidivist issue were
contested, Apprendi does not contest the decision's
validity and we need not revisit it for purposes of our
decision today to tTeat the case as a narrow exception to
the genera! rule we recalled at the outset. Given its
unique facts, it surely does not warrant rejection of the
otherwise ulufonn course of decision during the entire
history of our jurisprudence.

Apprendi, 530 U.S al 489-90 (emphasis added); see also
id. at 487 (" Almendarez-Torres represents a1 best an
exceptionai departure from the historic practice that we
have described. ") Although this Circuit recogaized
[** 17] the continuing precedential vaiue of AimenciarezTorres in Pachecu-Zepeda, 234 F.3d at 4J3-N. we
conclude that, given the ''lmique facts "of Almendarez-

In sum, we conclude Apprcndi's narrow "prior
conViction" exception is limited to prior convictions
resulting from proceedings that afforded the procedural
necessities of a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. n5 Thus, the "prior conviction" [* 1195J exception
does not include nonjury juvenile adjudications,
Therefore, the district coun violated Apprendi when, at
sentencing, it increased Tighe's penalty beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum based on an adjudication
which denied Tighe the right to a jury trial. See
Apprendi, 530 Us. at 489; Jones, 526 US at 243 IJ. 6,
249.
n5 We acknowledge the concern that defendants
might be prejudiced if their prior juvenile
adj udicatiol1s are presented to the jury, but we note
that courts may fashion procedures to avoid putting
such defendants to the "Hobson'S choice" described
by the dissent The Court in Spencer v. Te.J:as, 385
u.s 554, 566-69, 17 1. Ed. 2d 606, 87 S Ct. 648
(1967), recognized that states, in implementing their
recidivist statutes, could use various procedures to
mitigate any prejudice to the defendant. Although the
Court declined to require a two-stage jury trial
constitutionally, see id. at 568, such a separation of
the guilt and sentencing phases of the trial would
address such potential prejudice.

[*"'181
Because Tighe properly preserved his ]onesiApprendi
clain: for appeal, his sentence CaImot stand unless the
disnict court's constitutional error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. United States v, Velasco-Heredia, 249
F.3d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 2001), United States v. GarciaGUizar, 234 F.3d 483, 488 (9th Or. 2000). Because
Tighe's sentence of 180 months for his violation of 18
u.S.C § 922(g)(1) is in excess of the applicable statutory
maximum (10 years) based upon the jury's findings, we
hold this enor is not harmless. Id.
We note that Tigbe's sentence lL."1der COlli,t I, the armed
robbery offense_ was also improperly affected by the
inclusi~n of hi~ juvenile adjudication as a predicate
offense for ACCA. For sentencing purposes, the district
court grouped COWlls I and II. See U.S.S.G. §
3Dl.l(a)(3). The com1 then detenmlled that Tighe was
an armed career offender because be was convicted of
being a felon in possession with three prior vlOiem
felonies. It applied U.S.SG § 4B14 (b)(3)(a) and
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detennined that Tighe's offense level was 31 (34 minus
three points
for
an acceptance-of-responsibility
adjustment) [*" 19J and that given his criminal history
category, the sentencing range for Count 1 was 18&-235
months. It sentenced him to the high end of that range,
235 months.

burgla!)'. Jd at 600, United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d
1000, 1005 (9th Cir. ]992).[**21J To constitute generic
bmglary, a burglary stantte must contain the foliowing
three elements: "[lJ an unlawful or unprivileged entry
into, or remaining ill [2J a budding or other structure, [3]
with the intent to commit a crime." Taylor, 495 U.S at

598.
For § 4B 1.4 to apply, however, the defendant must be
subject "ra an enhanced sentence under the provisions of
[ACCA,] J8 USC § 924(e)." U.S.S. G. § 4Bl.4 (a). A.s
we conclude above, Tighe could not be subjected to an
enhanced sentence under ACCA; thus, he also was not
subject to a sentence enhancement W1der U.S.S.G. §
4B 1.4. Without that enhancement, Tighe's offense level
would have been 29 and, given his criminal history
category, the sentencing range for Count I would have
been 151 to 188 months. Accordingly, Tighe's 235month sentence under Count I was also improperly
affected by the Apprendi violation. Cf. United States v.
Saya, 247 F.3d 929, 942 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that
Apprendi error resulted in a misapplication of the
Sentencing Guidelines but that W1der the applicable plain
error standard, no relief would be granted). n6
n6 Given our conclusion that the district court erred
in counting Tighe's 1988 juvenile adjudicatioG as a
predicate offense under ACCA, we do not reach
Tighe's remaining claims of error regarding the use of
that adjudication.

[**20]
II. Tighe's Taylor Challenge to his South Dakota
Burglary Conviction
Tighe also claims that his 1992 conviction for burglary
fails to qualify as a predicate felony under ACCA
because South Dakota's defmition of burglary is too
broad to constitute a "violent felony." vVe address this
issue here because it may arise again on remand if the
goverrunent attempts [* 1196] to resentence Tighe w1der
ACCA. We hold that Tighe's South Dakota conviction
can be counted as a predicate felony for ACCA purposes.
Although ACCA includes "burglary" among the
U.S. C.
§
enumerated
violent
felonies,
18
924(e)(2)(B)(ii), Taylor v. Uniled Slates, 495 U.S 575,
109 LEd. 2d 607, j j 0 S Ct. 2143 (1 990J. nonetheless
established that not all state burglary convictiom should
be considered predicate felonies lUlder thal Act. In
deciding whether a prior burglary conviction constltutes
a "burglary" for the purposes of ACCi'., the sentencing
court must determine whether the burglary statute at issue
substantially corresponds to the "generic" definitior: of

Tighe argues that South Dakota's third degree bmglary
statute, SDCL § 22-32-8, does not contain the necessary
elements of generic bmglary, because the South Dakota
statute omits any reference to the required entry being
unlawful or unprivileged. Accordingly, Tighe maintains
that his 1992 bmglary conviction was non generic and
cannot constimte a predicate offense w1der ACCA. In
relevant part, SDCL §§ 22-32-8 provides:
Any person who enters an llTIoccupied structure, with
intent to commit any crime other than the act of
shoplifting or retail theft ... or remains in an unoccupied
structure after forming the i.ntent to commit any crime .,.
is guilty of third degree burglary.
Given the plain language of the statute, Tighe's assertion
is technically correct, as there is no mention of the
lawfulness of the entry. Taylor itself recognized that a
state might omit this necessary element of generic[**22J
burglary: "[aJ few States' burglary statutes, however, ...
define burglary more broadly, e.g. by eliminating the
requirement that the entry be unlawful." 495 U.S at 599
(emphasis added). Ii would appear, therefore, that South
Dakota's statutory definition of burglary falls outside the
generic defmition of burglary.
In Slate v. Derby, 462 N,W2d 512,513 (S D. 1990),
however, the Supreme Court of South Dakota held that,
although not explicitly stated in the statute, "unlawful or
unauthorized entry into a structure [isJ an element of
third-degree burglary." The Derby decision's explicit
inclusion of the element of "unlawful or unauthorized
entry" brings the burglary statute under which Tighe was
convicted squarely with the defll1itioll of generic
burglary, as each of the three essential elements of
generic burglary are actually required to obtain a
conviction under the South Dakota Supreme Court's
mterpretation of South Dakota law. A state court's
interpretation of a statute is binding in dctennining
whether the elements of generic burglary are present
Bonal, 106 F.3d at 1475. Therefore, given the Soutb
Dakota court's inlerpretation[ *~23J of the burglary
statute, the Taylor definition of generic burglary is
satisfled and Tighe's pnor South Dakota conviction for
burglary was properly cOlmted as 2 predicate violent
felony uncier ACCA.
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Ill. Remand for Resentencing Because we conclude
that the district court ened by counting Tighe's 1988
juvenile adjudication as a predicate offense [" 1197Jul1der
ACCA, we vacate Tighe's sentence and remand to the
district court for resentencing. Tighe argues that at
resentencing, the government should be precluded from
arguing that his fourth prior conviction, a 1993
conviction for grand theft, qualifies as a predicate offense
under ACCA. At his original sentencing, tbe govel11ment
urged the district court to COlmt this cOllviction as a
predicate offense under ACCA. The district court,
however, sustained Tighe's objection to the conviction
"in the interest of judicial economy, "because it had
already determined that Tighe had the requisite truee
countable offenses. Despite sustaining the objection,
however, the district court noted that it had not fully
analyzed the conviction, which "could well qualify as a
violent felony pursuant to 18 US.C § 924(e)(2)."
Nonetheless, [**24] Tighe now argues that because the
government failed to file a cross-appeal contesting the
district court's grant of Tighe's objection to the use of that
conviction as a predicate offense, it has waived any
argument that the 1993 conviction qualifies as a
predicate offense. We disagree. Failure to cross-appeal a
sentencing enor does not constitute a waiver of the right
to contest that enor at resentencing. See United States v.
Garcia-Guizar, 234 F.3d 483, 490 (9th Cir. 2000) ("We
reject [the defendant's] claim that the goverruncnt waived
its right to correct the error in the original sentence
because it did not cross-appeal from the original
sentence. "). At resentencing, a district court is" free to
review the entire sentencing calculus." United States v.
Caterino, 29 F.3d 1390,1394 (9th Cir. 1994), ovenuled
on other grounds, Witte v. United States, 515 Us. 389,
132 L. Ed. 2d 351, 1J5 S. Cl. 2199 (1995). Thus, at
Tighe's resentencing, the district court is free to consider
whether Tighe's 1993 conviction for grand theft qualifies
as a predicate offense under ACeA.
Finally, Tighe argues that if thc district court is
permitted[**25] to consider his 1993 grand theft
conviction at resentencing, the government should be
precluded from offering any additional evidencc
regarding that conviction. In support of this contention,
Tighe relies on United Slates v. Matthews, 226 F.3d
1075 (9th Cir. 2000). Matthews involved completely
different facts. n7 There, the government patently faiied
to comply wlth evidenllary requirements al sentencing
and wanted to Ie-open the record on remand to correct its
error. Here, the government complied with its evidentiary
burden during sentencing. AlIOWlllg the governmcnt to
submit eVldence at Tighe's resentencing heanng will
therefore nm constitute an impermissible "second bite at
the apple" fo; the govemment. Accorciingly, at Tighe's

resentencing, the government may offer Tighe's 1993
grand theft conviction for consideration as a predicate
offense under ACCA, and may, if necessary, submit
additional documentation regarding that conviction.

117 Matthews has been taken en bane and can no
longer be cited as precedent. See United Slates v
Mallhews, 254 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 2001). If this case
were nol distinguishable from Matthews, we would
delay our decision until that case was decided.

[**26J
CONCLUSION
We conclude that ACCA's usc of prior convictions as
sentencing factors is proper under Almendarez-Torres.
We also conclude that Tigbe's 1992 South Dakota third
degree burglary conviction was a generic burglary
conviction that properly served as a predicate offense
under ACCA. We hold, however, that the use of Tighe's
1988 nonjury juvenile delinquency adjudication to
increase his maximum statutory penalty violated
Apprendi. Accordingly, we vacate [*1198] his sentence
and remand for resentencing.
VACATED At'lD REMAND ED.
DlSSENTBY; Melvin Bl1l11erti
DISSENT:
BRUNETTI, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
The majority reachcs the lU1supportable conclusion that

a juvenile adjudication is not a "conviction" for
sentencing enhancement pmposes because, in essence,
juveniles have no constitutional right to a trial by jury. I
respectfully dissent from Part I.B of the opinion because
it fails to recognize the full force of Supreme Court
precedent, our case law, and congressional intent. I begin
with 18 USc. § 922(g)(1), the relevant statute Lmder
which Tighe was convicted. That provision makes it
unlawful for a prior felon to possess a firearm. V\Then an
individual[**27] vlOiatcs the substantive crime set forth
ill section 922(g), he is subject to an enhanced penalty
under the Armed Career Criminal Act CAeCA"), 18
US.C § 924(e), if he i1as suffered th:'ee previous
convictlOl1S for "a violent felony or a serious drug
offense." Congress speciflcally included in section
924(e)'s definition of 2 countable conviction any "find.ing
that a person has c:ommitted aa ;:,ct of juvenik
delinquency invoiving a violent feiony." Id. §
924(e)(2)(C).
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This court has clearly held that section 924(e) is a
penalty enhancement statute and does not create a new
substantive federai crime. United Siales v. Dunn, 946
F.2d 615, 619 (9th Cir. J991) (citing United States v.
West, 826 F2d 909, 91 J (9th Cir. 1987)): see also
Taylor v. United Stales, 495 U.S 575, 1091. Ed. 2d 607,
110 S Ct. 2J43 (1990) (referring repeatedly to § 924(e)
as a "sentence enhancement provision"). We have further
held that the fact of the predicate felony convictions
required for a sentencing enhancement under section
924(e) need not be included in the indictment nor proved
at triaL ld. The judge may find the facl of1**28] the
requisite predicate convictions at the sentencing hearing
under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. Uillted
States v. Phillips, 149 F3d J026, 1033 (91h Cir. 1998).
With this backdrop in mind, I tum to the facts of this
case rclevant to my concern. The district court
determined at sentencing that Shannon Wayne Tighe had
been convicted of at least three prior violent felonies,
requiring an ACCA enhancement. One of these prior
convictions is a 1988 Oregon juvenile adjudication for
reckless endangerment, first-degree robbery, and
unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. Over Tighe's
constitutional objections, the district court included the
Oregon juvenile adjudication as a countable felony under
section 924(e) by relying, in great part, on our decision in
United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212 (9th Cir.
1985).
In Williams, the defendant contended that his due
process rights were violated because his adult criminal
sentence was enhanced due to prior Juvenile
adjudications for which he did not have a right to jllry
trial. Jd. at 2 j 3. Relying on McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
403 U.s. 528, 29 LEd. 2d 647, 91 S. Ct. 1976
(1971), [**29] in which the Supreme Court held that jury
trials are not constitutionally required for juvenile
adjudications, we allowed the juvenile conviction to
support the sentence enhancement. We observed that
while "juvenile delinquency proceedings must conform
to the due process guarantees of the Constitution ". these
due process guarantees do not include the right to a jury
trial for delinquency adjudications." Vlilliams, 891 F2d
at 214 (citations omitted). Thus, where a juvenile
received all the process constitutionally due at the
delinquency proceeding stage, we fOLU1d the later use of
the juveniie adjudication for an adult enhancement to be
constitutionally sound because" the conviction was
constitutionally valid for purposes of imposing a ~* ]199]
sentence of imprisonment for the [juvenile] offense
itself." fd. at 215. To hold otherwise would have required
the court "to hold that the enhancement of an adult
criminal sentence requues a higher level of due process

protection than the imposition of a juvenile sentence"--a
notion the court squareJy rejected. Id.
Tighe's case should be suaightforward lU1uer Williams
because, as explained above, there is[**30J no
constitutional problem with using a Juvenile deiinquency
adjudication to support a sentencing enhancement. But
the majority suggests that the Supreme Cooo's decisions
in Almendarez-Torres, Jones, and Apprendi direct a
different result than the one Williams demands.
disagree.

u.s.

Jones v. Uniled Stares, 526
227, 1431. Ed. 2d
3Jl, 1J9 S. Ct. 12/5 (1999) was a precursor to the
Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 US
466, 147 LEd. 2d 435, 120 S Ct. 2348 (2000), which
held that "other than the fact of a prior conviction, any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi.
530 Us. at 490: see also Jones, 526 Us. at 243 n. 6.
The "other than a fact of a prior conviction" language in
Apprendi hearkens back to the Court's decision in
Almendarez-Torres v. United Slates, 523 U.S 224, 140
L. Ed. 2d 350, Jl8 S Ct. 1219 (1998).

Almendarez-Torres held that where a legislature crafts
a penalty provision which simply authorizes a court to
ll1crease a[**31) sentence for a recidivist, the
Constitution does not require the government to charge
the fact of the prior convictlOn in the indictment. ld at
226-227. There, the Court examined whether a provision
in an illegal re-entry statute, which raised the penalty for
illegal re-entry from two to twenty (20) years based on
recidivism, was a sentencing factor or an element of the
crime. In concluding that it was a sentencing factor, the
Court rejected the argument that, because the fact of
recidivism increased the maximW11 penalty to which a
defendant was exposed, Congress was constitutionally
required to b'cat recidivism as an element of tbe crime
that must be charged in an indictment and proved beyond
a reasonable doubt. Id. at 239: see also United States v.
Pacheco-Zepeda, 234 F3d 411, 413-J4 (9th Clr. 2001)
(explaining that Almendarez-Torres "stands for the
proposition that not every fact expanding a penalty range
must be staled it: a felony indictment, the precise holding
being that recidivism ll1crcasing the maximwn penalty
need not be so charged.") (citation and internal
quotations omitted). In United States v. PachecoZepeda,[**32] we had occasion to address whether
Almendarez.-Tones remained good law after the Court in
Apprendl eXDressed some concern ove: its continuing
Pacheco-Zepeda. 234 F3d at 414. We
validity.
obse;ved that ADprendl
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reasoned that any clue process Of Sixth Amendment
concerns--arising Oll! of the judicial detennination of a
"fact" that increased punishment beyond the statutory
maximum--were mitigated in Almendarez-T olTes by
"both the certainty that procedural safeguards attached to
any 'fact' of prior conviction, and the reality that [the
defendant) did not challenge the accuracy of that 'fact' in
his case.
rd.

Thus, we found that "the Comt in Apprendi chose not
to overrule Almendarez-Torres, and unmistakably carved
out an exception for "pnor convictions" that specifically
preserved the holding of Almendarez-Torres. Id.
(emphasis added). The majority acknowledges, as it
must, that Almendarez-Ton'es is still part of [* 1200J "the
current state of the law." However, it proceeds to rnake
the tortured argument that prior juvenile adjudications,
which do not afford the right to a jmy trial, do not fall
within the "prior conviction"[**33] exception to
Apprendi's general rule that a fact used to i.ncrease a
defendant's maximum penalty must be submitted to a jury
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The majority
does so by relying on language in Jones (and later
reiterated in Apprendi) that explains why it is
constitutionally permissible to use prior convictions to
increase the possible penalty for an offense without
treating the fact of the convictions themselves as
elements of the crime. I repeat the specific Jones
language here:
One basis for that constitutional distinctiveness [of prior
convictions] is not hard to see: LU1like virtually any other
consideration used to enlarge the possible penalty for an
offense ... a prior conviction must Itself have been
established through procedures satisfying the fair notice,
reasonable doubt and jury trial guarantees."
Majority Opinion at 13595 (quoting Jones, 526 U.S at
249.)
The majority takes tlus language and makes the
quantum leap to hold, in effect, that in order for a pnor
conviction to support <1 sentencing enhancement, it must
have been "subject to the fundamental tnumvirate of
procedmal protections intended to guaramee[**34] tbe
reliability of criminal convictions: fair notice, reasonable
doubt and the right to a Jury trial." Majority Opinion at
13595. Because part of this 50-called "fundamental
triumvirate of procedural protections" is absent for
juvenile adj udications, the majority takes Juvenile
adjudications out of the equation, even though Congress
sp~cifically made tbem pm1 of it.

I do not beheve the Janguage plucked from Jones
provides sufficient authOrity to overrule (albeit
implicitly) this court's decision m Will1ams, nor do 1

think the majority'S attempt to distinguish Williams is
valld. In my view, the language in Jones stands for the
basic proposition that Congress has the constitutional
power to treat prior convictions as sentencing factors
subj ect to a lesser standard of proof because the
defendant presunlably received all the process that was
due when he was convicted of the predicate crune. For
adults, this would indeed include the right to a jw:y trial.
For Juveniies, it docs not. Extending Jones' logic to
juvemle adjudications, when <1 juvenile receives all the
process constitutionally due at the juvenile stage, there is
no constitutional problem (on which[**35] Apprendi
focused) in using that adjudication to support a later
sentencing enhancement. Our decision in Williams
recognizes just that.
The majority does not make clear how its decision
today will work in practice, but it is obvious that it will
be troublesome. If a Juvenile adjudication (withollt the
right to a jury trial) does not fall within the AlmendarezTorres exception, then, to comply with Apprendi,
prosecutors will be required to prove the fact of the prior
convictions to the jury in order to support the sentencing
enhancement. While, as the majority notes, some states
treat prior convictions as elements of the related crime
and submit the fact of a prior conviction to a jill)', it
overlooks the fact that the Supreme Court has long
recognized "that the introduction of evidence of a
defendant's prior crimes risks significant prej udice."
Almendarez- Torres, 523 US. at 235 (citing Spencer v.
Texas, 385 U.s. 554, 560, 17 L Ed 2d 606, 87 S. Ct.
648 (1967)); see also United Slates v. Dunn, 946 F.2d
615, 619-620 (9th Cir. j 996) (commenting that including
information regarding three prior violent felonies in
the[**36J defendant's indictment "probably would have
introduced an unacceptable level of prejudice into his
trial"). Thus, a [*1201J defendant with a prior juvenile
adjudication will be put to the Hobson's choice of
stipulating to the priors or parading them before a jury.
But, as Almendarez-Tones recognized, "even if a
defendant's stipulation were to keep the name and details
of the previous 0 ffense trom the j my, ... jurors would still
leam, from the indictment, the judge, or the prosecutor,
that the defendant had committed [three violent
felonies]." 523 U.S. at 235 (Citation omitted) This
approach seems to wreak havoc on the very due process
rignts Apprendi sought to vindicate.
Fo' these reasons, I respectfully dissent from Pan I.B
and tl1t ultimate result. bul concur ir: all other respects.
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Jim J. Thomas, ISBN 4415
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
201 2nd Avenue S., Suite 100
Hailey, Idaho 83333
Telephone: (208) 788-5545
Fax: (208) 788-5554

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

Case No. CR-11-2386

STATE OF IDAHO,

STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION IN LIMINE

Plaintiff,
vs.
JUAN L. JUAREZ
Defendant.

Plaintiff, State of Idaho hereby submits this memorandum of authority in support of the
Motion in Limine.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
th

On September 14

,

2011, a preliminary hearing was held in this case in front of the

Honorable R. Ted Israel in Magistrate Court. During that hearing, the State presented evidence
showing that the Defendant was previously convicted of driving under the influence pursuant to
Nevada Revised Statute 484.379, attached hereto as Exhibit A. This evidence consisted of a
certified judgment of conviction dated July 11 th, 2011 out of Lyon County, Nevada, attached
hereto as Exhibit B.
Evidence was also provided that the Defendant had been previously convicted of Dr'lving
Under the Influence pursuant to California Vehicle Code § 23152, this evidence consisted of a
certified judgment of conviction dated September 1tn, 2007, out of Placer County, California,
attached hereto as Exhibit C.
At the preliminary hearing, Judge Israel found probable cause for Driving Under the
Influence, 3rd Offense in 10 years, a Felony, and ordered the Defendant bound over to the

STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE - 1

- 90-

District Court.

The State then filed a Motion in Limine to have this Court rule that the California

and Nevada Judgment of Convictions are substantially conforming to Idaho's DUI statute as
included in LC. § 18-8005(6), 18-8005(10).

The Court heard preliminary arguments on the

issues and allowed the parties the opportunity to submit briefs.

While the Motion in Limine

requested the Court rule that both the California and Nevada DUI statutes are substantially
conforming criminal violations, the Defendant's Memorandum is focused solely on Nevada's
DUI Statute.

Whether or not the Defendant is conceding that the California DUI statute is

substantially conforming, this brief shall address and respond to the Defendant's arguments.

ARGUMENT
1. The Nevada conviction for Driving Under the Influence is Substantially Conforming
criminal violation under I.C. § 18-8005(10).
Under Idaho Code, § 18-8005( 10), a substantially conforming foreign criminal violation
exists when a person had pled guilty to or found guilty of a violation of any federal law

or law of

another state, or any valid county, city, or town ordinance of another state substantially
conforming to the provisions of section I. C. § 18-8004. The determination of whether a foreign
criminal violation is substantially conforming is a question of law to be determined by the Court.
The Statute under which the Defendant was convicted in Nevada (N.R.S. 484.379) (see
exhibit A) substantially conforms to LC. § 18-8004.

Nevada's applicable statute states in

applicable part:
"1.

It is unlawful for any person who:
(a) Is under the influence of intoxicating liquor;
(b) Has a concentration of alcohol or .08 or more in his blood or breath;

or

(c) Is found by measurement within 2 hours after driving or being in actual physical
control of a vehicle to have a concentration of alcohol If .08 of more in his blood
or breath,
To drive or be in actual physical control of a vehicle on a highway or on premises to
which the public has access."

N.R.S. 484.379.

Idaho Code § 18-8004(1 )(a) reads:
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"It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any other
intoxicating substances, or any combination of alcohol, drugs and/or any other intoxicating
substances, or who has an alcohol concentration of 0.08, as defined in subsection (4) of this
section, or more, as shown by analysis of his blood, urine, or breath, to drive or be in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle within this state, whether upon a highway, street or bridge, or
upon public or private property open to the public."
Defendant first argues that the Nevada statute is not substantially conforming because
"Idaho law requires the intoxication to be at the time of driving while the Nevada statue is not
concerned with the concentration at the time of driving only the concentration at the time of the
test." Defendant's Memorandum p.2. The Defendant incorrectly reads the Nevada Statute.
N.R.S. 484.379 clearly prohibits driving while intoxicated by including the statutory language
prohibiting ..... any person who... is under the influence of intoxicating liquor or has a
concentration of alcohol of .08 or more in his blood or breath to drive or be in actual physical

control of a vehicle on a highway or on premises to which the public has access.

The

Defendant's argument relies solely on sUbsection 484.379(1)(c) and ignores 1(a) and 1(b). A
plain reading of the statute provides that N.R.S. 484.379(1) has an "or" after (b) that applies to
(a),(b), and (c).

Therefore, The Defendant is incorrect in stating the Nevada Statue is not

concerned with the alcohol concentration at the time of driving.
Defendant also claims that there is a significant different between Idaho and Nevada
because Idaho's statutory scheme allows for a defendant to introduce evidence that his blood
alcohol reading was less than when he was driving and this same evidence would be prohibited
in Nevada.

The Defendant ignores N.R.S. 484.379(4).

Importantly, N.R.S. 484.379(4)

provides that "if consumption is proven by a preponderance of the evidence, it is an affirmative
defense under paragraph (c) of subsection 1, that the defendant consumed sufficient quantity of
alcohol after driving or being in actual physical control of the vehicle, and before his blood or
breath was tested, to cause him to have a concentration of alcohol of .08 or more in his blood or
breath." The statute then provides the Defendant must provide notice to the State for this
defense. Basically, it is a defense in Idaho and Nevada where the Defendant claims he was not
intoxicated while driving. Nevada merely created an affirmative defense and required noflce.
This is not a substantial deviation from Idaho's statute.
Idaho case law supports the argument that the Nevada statute is a substantially conforming
foreign conviction despite the provision allowing for testing within 2 hours of driving. The Idaho
Court of Appeals first analyzed substantially conformity in State v. Schmoll, 144 Idaho 800, 172
P.3d 555 (Ct. App. 2007).

In that case, the Court was comparing Montana's DUI statute to
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Idaho's and set out some basic guidelines. First, exact correspondence is not required. Id. at
559.

Next, the Court compares the elements of the statutes.

Id.

at 558-59. Finally, it is

important for the Court to decide whether both statutes prohibit the same essential conduct driving while under the influence of alcohol. Id.
The Defendant in State v. Schmoll made a similar argument under the Montana DUI statute
as the Defendant in the present case.

In Schmoll, the Montana statute at issue provided "If

BAC tests are preformed within a reasonable time after the alleged violation, the results of the
tests give rise to several inferences... If the test reveals a concentration of .08 or more, there is
a rebuttable inference that the person was in fact under the influence of alcohol when driving."
Schmoll, 172 P.3d at 559., M.C.A §61-8-401(4)(c). The Court ruled that the difference between

Montana and Idaho in using BAC was inconsequential, reasoning "[p)roving that a person is
under the influence absent a BAC test requires a greater degree of impairment in Montana than
in Idaho ... " Id.

Finally, because the "two statutes frame their prohibitions using the same

language, requiring substantially conforming elements to be met to sustain a violation." Schmoll
at 559.
The Idaho Court of Appeals also considered the substantially conforming prior out of state
DUI statutes in State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887,231 P.3d 532 (Ct. App. 2010). In that case the
Court considered whether North Dakota statute is substantially conforming to Idaho. The North
Dakota statute had a provision similar to Nevada's and stated "that person has an alcohol
concentration of at least ten one-hundredths of one percent by weight at the time of the
performance of a chemical test within 2 hours after the driving or being in actual physical control
of a vehicle." State v. Moore 231 P.3d at 541. The Defendant did not challenge this issue and
the Court did not rule on it, but the Court reiterated the same issues in Schmoll and ruled that
North Dakota's DUI statute was substantially conforming to Idaho Code § 18-8004.
As in Schmoll, since Nevada uses the BAC evidence differently, this Court should compare
the statutes respective definitions of "under the influence." In Idaho, under the influence has
been defined to include "impairment of driving ability to the slightest degree; the impairment
must be noticeable or perceptible, but does not need to rise to a level where the defendant is
incapable of driving safely or prudently." Schmoll, 172 P.3d at 559. Nevada defines under the
Influence in 484.379(2)(c) as "to a degree which renders him incapable of safely driving or
exercising actual physical control of a vehicle." Therefore, Nevada has a higher standard that
surpasses the elements required for a violation in Idaho. See Schmoll at 559. The elements of
the Nevada and Idaho statutes are substantially conforming under Idaho Code § 18-8004.
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2. The Nevada conviction for Driving Under the Influence is constitutionally valid and can
be used by the State to enhance the Defendant's current Driving Under the Influence
charge.
The Defendant next claims that because Nevada does not allow for a jury trial for a first
offense DUI, a prior conviction cannot be used as a substantially conforming prior conviction.
The Defendant cites United States of America v. Shannonwayne Tighe 266 F.3d 1187, (9 th
Circuit 2001 ) as authority for his argument.
The Supreme Court of the United States has upheld Nevada's refusal to provide jury
trials for misdemeanor DUls as Constitutional. See Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, Nevada,
489 U.S. 538, 109 S.Ct. 1289, 103 L.Ed.2d 550 (1989).

In Blanton, the Court stated that a

person charged under Nevada law with a DUI does not have a right to a trial by jury because it
is a "petty crime" which is not subject to the Sixth Amendment jury trial provision. See Id. at
538, 1290. The Court concluded that the Nevada DU I statute is a petty crime because it carries
a maximum prison term of six months or less and the additional statutory penalties are not so
severe that they clearly reflect a legislative determination that the offense is a "serious" one. Id.
This reasoning conforms to previous Supreme Court decisions which hold that petty crimes are
not subject to the Sixth Amendment jury trial provision, while "serious" crimes are subject to that
provision. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444,20 L.3d.2d 490 (1968), Frank
v. United States, 395 U.S. 147,89 S.Ct. 1503,23 L.3d.2d 162 (1969), Baldwin v. New York, 399
U.S. 66, 90 S.Ct. 1886,26 L.3d.2d 437 (1970).

Therefore, the refusal of Nevada to provide a

jury trial for defendants charged with misdemeanor DUI does not violate that defendant's
constitutional rights.
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada has addressed the issue of
whether prior nonjury DUI convictions can be used to enhance a felony DUI sentence.

In

Westmoreland v. Demosthenes, the U.S. District Court held that a defendant's due process

rights are not violated when a prior non-jury DUI conviction is used to enhance a sentence for
felony DUI. See 737 F.Supp. 1127 (D.Nev. 1990).
The Defendant relies on United States of America v. Shannonwayne Tighe. That case
discusses the use of a prior juvenile conviction as a sentencing enhancement because he had
no right to a jury trial for juvenile offenses. While the Tighe Court ruled that a juvenile conviction
without the right to a jury trial may not be used as a sentencing enhancement, most federal
appellate courts disagree with the Ninth Circuit and have rejected the reasoning of the Tighe
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majority. United States v. Smalley (8th Cir.2002) 294 F.3d 1030, 1032; United States v. Jones
(3rd Cir.2003) 332 F.3d 688, 696; United States v. Burge (11th Cir.2005) 407 F.3d 1183, 1190.
While this issue is apparently an issue of first impression in Idaho, this Court should rule
that the Nevada conviction is constitutional pursuant to the holdings in Blanton and
Westmoreland because these cases address the precise issue before the court.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Defendant's prior conviction in Nevada was constitutional and valid
under Nevada law. Furthermore, Nevada's refusal to provide for a jury trial on misdemeanor
DUI's has been upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States. The Federal District Court
has also upheld the use of those non-jury convictions for enhancement purposes on a felony
DUI. Nothing in Idaho law provides that the use of such a conviction is not permissible for the
purpose of enhancing a DUI to a felony.

Furthermore, the Nevada statute under which the

Defendant was convicted is a substantially conforming foreign criminal statute. Therefore, the
defendant's prior conviction from Nevada is constitutionally and statutorily valid, and can be
used to enhance his current DUI to a felony. The State's Motion in Limine should be granted.

DATED this

,,>

day of February, 2012.
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Matthew Fredback, ISBN 7262
Blaine County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /Cl'day of February, 2012, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method indicated below, and
addressed to each of the following:
Dan Dolan, Esq.
Attorney at Law
PO Box 757
Ketchum, Idaho 83340

_
_

V

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

egal Secretary
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N.R.S.484.379

wes~sed

Statutes Annotated Currentness
Title 43. Public Safety; Vehicles; Watercraft
Chapter 484. Traffic Laws (Refs & Annos)
Rules of the Road
Driving Under the Influence ofIntoxicating Liquor or Controlled or Prohibited Substance
484.379. Unlawful acts; affirmative defense; additional penalty for violation committed in work zone
<Text of section expires by limitation on the date of the repeal of the federal law requiring each state to make it unlawful for a person to operate a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or greater as a condition
to receiving federal funding for the construction of highways in this State. See, also, section effective on the date of the
repeaJ of the federal law requiring each state to make it unlawful for a person to operate a motor vehicle with a blood
alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or greater as a condition to receiving federal funding for the construction of highways in this State.>
1. It is unlawful for any person who:
(a) Is under the influence of intoxicating liquor;
(b) Has a concentration of alcohol of 0.08 or more in his blood or breath; or
(c) Is found by measurement within 2 hours after driving or being in actual physical control of a vehicle to have a concentration of alcohol of 0.08 or more in his blood or breath,
to drive or be in actual physical control of a vehicle on a highway or on premises to which the public has access.
2. It is unlawful for any person who:
(a) Is under the influence of a controlled substance;
(b) Is under the combined influence of intoxicating liquor and a controlled substance; or
(c) Inhales, ingests, applies or otherwise uses any chemical, poison or organic solvent, or any compound or combination
of any of these, to a degree which renders him incapable of safely driving or exercising actual physical control of a vehicle,
to drive or be in actual physical control of a vehicle on a highway or on premises to which the public has access. The fact
that any person charged with a violation of this subsection is or has been entitled to use that drug under the laws of this
State is not a defense against any charge of violating this subsection.
3. It is unlawful for any person to drive or be in actual physical control of a vehicle on a highway or on premises to
which the public has access with an amount of a prohibited substance in his blood or urine that is equal to or greater than:
Prohibited substance

Urine Nanograms per
milliliter

Blood Nanograms per
milliliter

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Go\'. Works.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(2)

(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)

U)

Amphetamine
Cocaine
Cocaine metabolite
Heroin
Heroin metabolite:
(1)
6-monoacetyl
morphine
Lysergic acid diethylamide
Marijuana
Marijuana metabolite
Methamphetamine
Phencyclidine

500
150
150
2,000

100
50
50
50

Morphine
10

2,000
10

25

10

10
15
500
25

2
5
100
10

50

4. If consumption is proven by a preponderance of the evidence, it is an affirmative defense under paragraph (c) of subsection J that the defendant consumed a sufficient quantity of alcohol after driving or being in actual physical control of
the vehicle, and before his blood or breath was tested, to cause him to have a concentration of alcohol of 0.08 or more in
his blood or breath. A defendant who intends to offer this defense at a trial or preliminary hearing must, not less than 14
days before the trial or hearing or at such other time as the court may direct, file and serve on the prosecuting attorney a
written notice of that intent.
5. A person who violates any provision of this section may be subject to the additional penalty set forth in NRS 484.3667 .
CREDIT(S)
Added by Laws 1969, p. 1485. Amended by Laws 1971, p. 2030; Laws 1973, pp. 587, 1277, 1501; Laws 1975, p. 788;
Laws 1981, p. 1924; Laws 1983, p. 1068; Laws 1993, p. 539; Laws 1999, pp. 2451,3415; Laws 2001, c. 10, § 98, eff.
April 2, 2001; Laws 2003, c. 421, § 6, efr. Sep. 23, 2003.

NOTES OF DECISIONS
In general 2
Actual physical control of vehicle 8
Arguments and conduct of counsel 15
Arrest, stop or inquiry 9
Blood tests 11
Burden of proof 5
Contributory negligence 16
Double jeopardy 4
Due process 3
Enhancement of offense 17
Instructions 14
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CASE NO. 07 CR 00294 3G

2001 JUL ! I f,JI 10: '5

:2

\ ..

4

IN THE JUSTICE COURT OF DAYTON TOWNSHIP

5

t",

:';"),,
': '/ :',."\\
I

l6~~:~ '~'D,~~:k

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LYON, STATE OF NEVADA

6
7
8

9
10

THE STATE OF NEVADA,
COUNTY OF LYON,
Plalntiff,
vs.

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION
AND ORDER OF THE COURT

II

12

JUAN LEON JUAREZ,
Defendant. I

13
14

15
16

The Defendant above-named, having appeared before the Court this July
11, 2007, pursuant to plea negotiations, and having entered a plea of Guilty on
07/11/2007 to the charge(s) of DUI FIRST OFFENSE NRS 484.3792.1A, a
misdemeanor committed on OS/23/2007 the Defendant was canvassed on plea,

17

18

Represented by KENNETH WARD. The Deputy District Attorney ROBERT BRYANT
was present representing Lyon County.

19

20

Good cause appearing, IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant's plea be accepted into
the minutes of the court. The defendant is hereby adjudged guilty of:

21
22

COUNT I:
A violation of NRS 484.3792.1A DU! FIRST OFFENSE, a
misdemeanor.

23

24
25
26
27

SENTENCE - COUNT I

$ 500.00 FINE
$ 115.00 Administrative Assessment
$10.00 Court Facility Fee
$7.00 Specialty Court Fee
DEFENDANT GIVEN CREDIT FOR $300.00 FOR 4 DAYS TIME SERVED IN JAIL.

28

.-

___

....

_, ..,... r...

~~UJU'-99-

1\

l.

2

Defendant ordered to reimburse this court $ 250.00 for the services of the Public
Defender.

3
4

Defendant ordered to pay $60.00 Chemical Analysis Test.

5
6

Said Fine(s), administrative assessment(s), and additional fees imposed total the sum of

7

$ 642.00 AN ADDITIONAL $25.00 FEE is assessed for payment arrangements
making new balance $ 667.00. Payments set at $ 115.00 monthly beginning

8

08{11{07. If full payment in the amount of $ 642.00 is received by 07{21{07
the $25.00 fee will be waived.

9
10

Defendant is sentenced to ~ day(s) Lyon County Jail/suspended all but ~ days
for 2 YEARS.

11
12

Defendant given credit for time served and does not have to report to jail.

13
14

15

16
17

CONDITION OF SUSPENSION - COUNT I
If defendant fails to comply with any of the below orders the suspended sentenced will
be imposed.

18

Defendant ordered to attend and pay for a DUI Workshop and complete by 09/11/07

19

Defendant ordered to attend and pay for a Victim Impact Panel by 09/11{07.

20

No further related problems.

21

22
23

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant appear alcohol/drug free to all assigned
programs and county jail.

24

This order Signed on Wednesday, July 11, 2007

~

25
26

WILLIAM G. ROGERS
Justice of the Peace

27
28

///

J\'\

I hereby understand the above conditions of my sentence. I understand that if I am
unable to pay my fines or comply with any other COURT ORDER I must appear in court
2
on the last Thursday of the month prior to the due date at 3: 00 pm. to request an
3 extension. I understand that a $10.00 late charge will be added anytime my payment
becomes DELINQUENT. Failure to comply with any COURT ORDER will result in the
4 issuance of a BENCH WARRANT for my immediate arrest.
5

Defendant's signature

6

Street Address ~l,0C/)t

7
8

City

9

tAhoe.- C; -\-j

19hw MeJ bGf 23

State -,-C.: : .-f-i4--'>,__ ZiP ~G

l?}S

/

7,0 rx)"'J,- 'D 1b

10

Mailing Address

II

City _______ State _ _ _ _ _ Zip _ __

12

Phonel2?D)

52, S-

4039

13
14

15
16

Payments may be mailed to DAYTON JUSTICE COURT 235 Main Street, Dayton NV
89403, Please make checks payable to DAYTON JUSTICE COURT and indicate the case
number and/or defendants name to ensure proper credit. PAYMENTS MAY BE MADE
WITHIN MONDAY - FRIDAY BETVVEEN THE HOURS OF 8:00 - 4:30. A drop box is
available for after hour payments. DO NOT PLACE CASH WITHIN THE DROP BOX.

7

8
9
20

If for any reason you are unable to comply with any of the above orders by the
required date you must appear IN PERSON prior to the due date to request an
extension from the judge at 3:00 PM on one of the dates below.

21

22 1~____________~__~E=x~te~n~si~on~H~ea=r~inrlgcS~c~h~ed~u~le~2~O~O~7____. -__________~
JANUARY 25, 2007
FEBRUARY 22, 2007
MARCH 29, 2007
APRIL 26, 2007

23

Ir--------------T------------~r_------------_r------------_H

MAY 31, 2007
24

\ SEPTEMBER 27,2007

JUNE 28, 2007

JULY 26, 2007

AUGUST 30, 2007

OCTOBER 25, 2007

NOVEMBER 29,2007

DECEMBER 27,2007

25

CERTIFIED COpy

26

The document to which this

27
28

CE rtlflcate

Is

attached is a full, true and correct opy of the
original on file and of record in my office.

B·s· \\

DATE:

Justice of the Peace of

Dayto~

Township

n

JUsticne rt of the, State of Neval1kln and for
Lyon
up :~r, ,..rJ; .--,-"r.11/1(~

BY:

GJ

Vk:x,z,fliifl\,"

CourtCI~k

I. JtlA
li Uij) U j - 101

\(t

PLACER COUl'\"TY SUPERIOR COURT

\~

~.,GN~NT /PLEA/JUDGMENT & SENTENL..t..-

/!LJ71 ~.I...- ~

? ~ D:p'.:
J'''''~

Date:._-!-_.L-.2--=---I-_ Court met at: --{-I

~orter:

DAVIES

Cierk.
Defens~

Counsel:

PD

~/

p

I

-

Case No':._

14

~.L...I<d~..L..::fjb_Z---jV~_ _

Judge.: ____-=B1=AHRKE"""'~~_______________

AN

ITZPATB IrK

_

Probation::_ _ _ _ _ _---,';:?--==:::-_ _ _ _ __

~7'r''.-:. .1f--.~,/)

D.D.A::o-._---'-r.../;Z\"-''ITR:....u:i.i;:Au.:>l\TL----tL-L1U.:...L1I=---::,,-L_ _ _

.~-----h~~~
~
.J' J1
,,~
I LlllL/\ jj ;,. ) <<'I
certifIed 0
CuStOOI.' Sturus:-'f::....f-l--l-- lnrerpreter: _ _....L,b-!
IT n .'

~

guali5ed Language: -.S=";f.,t.:.==-..!c.....;:::.:..~_+-_

V"

NEXT COURT APPEARANCE:

Time Estimate

/D-14
OOrdered booked/released

EJDefendam present Onot present.
DAtm waived OArm completed OViol ofProb
._ -....ApJl.L.- DPllblic Defender
DConflicrFiIm

D

ONor guilty ODt:~ed
OG~
~ro Conrendm
[[Ji:dmittcd DAdvised
PIX time waived C10 060 DTime not waived
Trial time waived OlO next date Dgeneral

~eyaived for i2enc.;f
l!drJismissed
DAmended

a

.'

OAdvised pymt of booking/
incarceration fees
OAdvised financial resp.
ORPOwaived
ORe-test ordered
OArt-uckle waiver
OAppeal waiver
OStipu]ate to ProTem
ODrop
OCTETS filed and served
DArnended CLETS filed and served

#~. /Tahl rights waive.

.rai / written
:;::'waf Oshown Onot shown
(lflina1) JulY tnal / Con
..
.(lflitial) Confrontation & examination.
( ~(jnitial) Right to remain silent.
/T_ttend
selfhclp meetings per wetk ~lntil ;;.nl!tf nrdC'r of the court

DProbation summarily revoked
Probation reinstated
OB/W ordered. Bail $. _ _ _ _ _ ONCIC
DArrest warrant ordered .
DB/W stayed / held
DB /W recalled set aside
OBail Forfeited
Exonerated
OO/R revoked
OReinstated upon payment of reinstatement fet
DBail apply / balance exonerated
OForfeiture set aside

o

0

Defendant ordered to report to the:
OCriminal Division 0 Judicial Assist.
OPublic Defender
Rev
e Services
robarlon Department
Oforthwith Don_-t-_ _-+-LL-1--1--,,-

o

~------L-.t...#-f-..L....J.f<:.=---

OPreliminary examination waived, de[enclar:.c held to <inswtr. OC:Cll:1 deemed Complaint to be Information.

Evaluation: OEC7300EC1017 DFull OCuo>u!tICj'JC Q(;enmJ DpC1368 DpCl026 OPC288.1
Regues(ec by: OCoun DDA ODefense, ",rith Dr.

0

\'1/13051

DReguest for nc\ii jiiil'turnirl-date Dgranted Ddenierl. New jail tu,,~ in date _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Previous jail rum in ciate::--_ _ _ _ __
Transcript request date
rep,:>rter_._._.
reguested by DCourt DDefense Counsel DDistrict Attorne::
Ofier.: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

In&:ation'. _______

------_._- ..---,,_....-. - ... _.... -_..---------

---(;2=-.-=3::---/6-==--z..-(/tJ77 L

-Pie-a'

J

~'

) J / /,

-7 _

J/"'/)

f-'ople vs. _\.,"".!,--",-f/L£!J;=-.--Lr-,~=--,r.----=_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. d ament IS Impose d .
e ImpositIOn 0 f sentence be sus pen dd
e an dt he f01l owina.lu
IT IS HEREBV ORDERED t hat t h'
PROBATlON
CREDIT FOR TIME
CONDITIONAL
FORMAL
JAIL
CASE NO.
PROBATION
REINSTATED
SENTENCE
SENTENCE SERVED
(number ofvears)
( number of years)
Dyes o no

7d--Lj6zr; 3

f;J

,

CJ +0

CIS

CtC

).,:A.

Dyes

ono

(

+

)

Dyes

ono

(

+

)

Dyes

o no

(

+

)

Dyes

o no

(

+

)

Defendant must compiete
0 actual days and 0 conduct credits included in custody. DDefendant may apply for alternative sentencing
on remaining balance from in custody. D Defendant may be released to residential treatment from in custody to complete balance of sentence.
D Defendant may be released to residential program ifbed is available prio¥to §.entence being satisfied.
SAID SENTENCE IS TO COMMENCE 0 forthwith ~n
/ I ?(J~'-:U'/
at 10:00 a.m. when the defendant shall repon
to the Placer County Jail at 2775 Richardson Drive in Auburn, California. g.see reverse side of this form for additional terms and conditions.
Defeudant is not eligible for alternative sentencing 0 No electronic monitoring 0 Other
hours community service 0 in lieu offine Offll' ~ne conversion 0 vacated & convened back to fine amount listed below.
License is 0 suspended 0 revoked 0 restricted for peri9dOf.,,~:.,;;;':>
0 days 0 months 0 years,
Restriction includes 0 to/from work 0 during the scope cif:y,Jork 0 to/fr,om program 0 to/from school 0 Other restrictions
Interlock Device must be utilized for a period of
1·~~'Years 'on any .Vehicle owned/operated. 0 2 self-helps per week fo-r-6:-m-on-th'-s""'j:-n-H:-e-u-0-[r-IDIJ D~gnated as Habitual Traffic Offender.
. ~/., <: ;..:' "l
.
.
lJ..l-Within 21 days enroll into 0 12 hour Alcohol Educ. ff.l fio~n~tih....l'.,r-f,o
. :. ·nder pro g"
6 month 1st Offender Prog. 09 mo!)t 1st Offender Program
18 month Alcohol Prog.
··r- ':-':. ;.. . '/r/i/'1
"7 / () 0
~
Mandatory Jail Sanction for DTrack 3 OProposH.fori~~6,i 2}; ~.~,:' I UV . 0 -- ()
Attend DUr Panel within 60 days 0 Clerk's offj:~.1,s a,uthorizd:l;tofes1rict, C~lifomia Driver's License with proof of insurance nd employ ent/school.
Not own or have in possession or control, any deadly w!!apoiiQ; ~reai-ip. '0 ',Register pursuant to
0 Forfeit weapon(s). _ _ _ __
[J Submit person/vehicle/residence to search/seizure at any time without beriefjf.oTwarrant as directed by any Peace Offtc:r.
Testing ORe-Test
OPC295DNA Samples 0 Reg.ist~r pUrsuant to _ _ _ _ __
Cd N~tact 0 peaceable contact with
..
., <i; ;,~
.
If:l1\5stain from use or possession of intoxicants O.i1otfrequeJ1tplaces where alcohol is the chief item for sale. 0 Submit to alcohol testing as directed.
Participate in and complete: 0 Batterers 52 weeiC-ptog'[JJt'Y~ek"par~nting program 0 Anger Control 10 Anger Control II 0 Drug Awareness
Theft I O. Theft DO HIV Educ. Oq~ic;:es; Ch~lIenge~i.~:Yi??-i!ges.O _ _ SelfHelp(s)per week for __wks OUntil Further Order
~ange reSIdence or leave the State of CahfomJawlthp.!~! pnor approvaL 0 Repon to court as directed. 0 Repon to obahon as ordered.

o
o

o
o

o

3l'n '1

3.m

o

o
o
o

o

o

~~~r~~~g~Of ~d~ress to ~~.co~~~

__

_ "~-'

--:'_~~ ~

Ij. _.. .... -JlI~.-

; ." .___

L

__

_

... _

Probation is 0 modified 0 revoked 0 terminated.
Probation will terminate upon completion of jail sentence in case number(s)_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
MODIFICATION OF TURN IN DATE
Original turn in date
New tum in date
Original sentence

;&~1tl~£,~;~~~i:~~!~e~FERRAL FOR PAVMENTSSSN _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _f.._L'JJ
Pay base fine of
DV Fund (PCI203.097(5»
St. Indemnity(PC 1202.4(b)(I»
Women's Center

rFine

Total amount due:

$

~17 ()=.;,;..;;-

$ _______
$ _ _ _ _ __
$
$------

CDL

ttorn~s $

A

~yments

Restitution to victim $
--0--B-O-Ok-i-ng-fe-eS-S-I-5-0-.00
granted/modified $
0 per month commencing _ _ _ __

o Payment or 0

Fine staved until

o Committed in lieu offi~e pursuant to PC2900 . 5. 0

0 Pay today
Consecutive 0 Concurrent

$_-----

Calculation Attached

i:'OU ARE ORDERED to pay booking and incarceration fees subject to a financial evaluation of ability to pay and the right to a hearing on ability to pay. YOll ARE
FURTHER ORDERED to contact Revenue Services. 11582 B Avenue, DeWItl Center, Auburn, CA within 5 days or within 5 days after you are released from
custody for a fmancial evaluation and to establish a payment schedule for your fines, attomey fees (if applicable), booking and incarceration fees, presentence report,
a,..,d any other monetary assessment ordered. If you fail to appear for your fmancial evaluation. Revenue Services will recommend that the Court order you to pay such

3!r;m:.QiLkip 6! 11
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THE FOREGOING INSTRUMENT
IS A CORRECT COpy OF THE
ORIGINAL ON FILE IN THIS
OFFICE.
ATTEST:
Superior Court Clerk.

~~s::--'
~~PUty

By .
I

COURT MINUTES
CR-2011-0002386
State of Idaho vs. Juan L Juarez
Hearing type: Court Trial
Hearing date: 3/9/2012
Time: 8:58 am
Judge: Robert J. Elgee
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Defense Attorney: Daniel Dolan
Prosecutor: Matthew Fredback
Interpreter: Mary Jo Palma
Counter #
9.12

Counsel present, def. present with interpreter
Court introduces the case.
Interpreter's oath is on file with the Court.

9.13

State comments that a motion in front of the Court re: a prior conviction might
dispose of the case if the Court would like to rule on that issue.

9.14

Mr. Dolan requests to have some brief argument.

II

State is prepared to dismiss count 3.
Court has the State's brief, and the Defense.
9.17

Mr. Dolan comments about what the defense is relying on re: substantially
conforming law, and lack of right to a jury trial on a first offense DUI in Nevada.

COURT MINUTES 1

-105-

I Court has counsel argue the Motion in Limine

r
II

State addresses the Motion in Limine and reviews the brief that was filed. Cites
case law that compares Idaho's statutes to another state re: substantially
conforming. Cites case law that addresses the lack of right to a jury trial on a
first offense DUI.

I

I

9.26

Mr. Dolan responds and reviews the defense's brief that was filed. Discusses the
de waiting period in regards to a rising blood alcohol level, this is the difference
in statute. Reviews the difference in statute regarding a defendant's right to a
jury trial for a first offense DUl, cites case law.

I

Court inquires if it matters whether the conviction is because of a plea or
because the case was tried in front of the court.
Mr. Dolan responds, believe it doesn't matter, continues with argument.
9.40

State responds, reviews case law comparing Idaho to Montana.

9.49

Mr. Dolan responds.

9.54

Court needs a half hour to review cases before ruling.
State and Mr. Dolan suggest putting on the evidence now to allow the Court time
to issue a decision.
Court would rather take the half hour and rule and see where the case is.

9.55

Recess
Back on record.

10.47

Court thanks counsel for waiting for the Court to review case law. As to the
question of Nevada statute and s conviction on Nevada law substantially
conforms to Idaho law, has reviewed case law.

10.59

Mr. Dolan comments about case law, and the difference in law between states re:
Nevada not being a rebuttable presumption.

I

Court responds that the point in the observations is that the court of appeals
believes there may be some differences, but that doesn't keep it from being
substantially conforming. Court determines that the statutes are substantially
conforming for purposes of the convictions use for enhancement. Court
addresses the issue of constitutionality, reviews case law. If a conviction is

I

I

COURT MINUTES 2
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constitutionally sound, which a conviction without a jury trial is sound.
This Court finds that the conviction in Nevada meets the constitutional
standards. Therefore is valid for used in Idaho as an enhancement.
11.17

I

Mr. Dolan is ready for the trial
Court takes two minute break
Recess
Back on record.

11.24

Counsel agrees that this is the time to commence a court trial.
Court will take up the court trial on the DUl.
State comments that the question now is the identity of the person who has the
previous convictions and this charge.

11.25

Mr. Dolan comments that the Def. plead to the DUl, it is a question of identity.
Counsel agrees that in a previous hearing State has admitted Exh. 1 & 2 which
are certified copies of previous convictions.
Court finds Exh's that were admitted on 1/10/12 for a Motion in Limine hearing.

11.27

Mr. Dolan comments.
Court clarifies that Exh. 1 & 2 are admitted for purposes of this hearing.
Counsel agree.
State calls 1st Wit, Joshua Prichard, sworn under oath and questioned on direct.
Wit. works for Blaine County Sheriff for the last 3 years, post certified, on June
18th he was patrolling south of Bellevue on hwy. 75, looking for a specific
vehicle. There was a complaint of an intoxicated driver. Followed the white
Chevy Blazer, vehicle failed to maintain the lane. Identifies the driver of the
vehicle as the Def. seated at counsel table. Def. provided him an international
. Requested that the
driver's license and a passport with a DOB of
Def. provide a field sobriety test, after asking the Def. if he had consumed
alcohol. Def. declined to do the field sobriety test.

11.28

I Mr. Dolan objects- ask clarifying question re: miranda rights and questions
I asked of the Def. Suggests playing the video to save time.
!

COURT MINUTES 3
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State has no objection. Lays foundation: the stop of the Def. was on 6/18/2011
and was recorded.
Court has State mark video as Exh. 1- stipulated- ADMITTED only from the start
time of 22:06 to the end time of 22:13.
1.44

Counsel publishes Exh. 1 to the Court.

11.50

Mr. Dolan continues questioning in aid of an objection.

I Object to statement made while under arrest prior to miranda rights being
given. While in handcuffs Def. said first ttl have a warrant".
State responds, doesn't know if this is an interrogation
Court review's case law re: Miranda rights, it appears that the question was
prompted by the Defs statement about having a warrant. Overrules objection.
11.54

State continues questioning the Wit. Wit. transported the Def. to the hospital for
a blood draw and then to Blaine Co. Public Safety Facility and participated in the
pre-booking process, describes forms that are filled out by the arresting officer,
Def. gave his full name Juan Leon Juarez gave date of birth nonverbally.
Everything happened in Blaine County.

11.56

Mr. Dolan questions the Wit. on cross, Def. told him that he had been drinking
Budweiser when he was asked "where have you been drinking".
State objects- relevance.
Mr. Dolan responds about the communication problem re: the Defs
understanding of the officer's questions.
Wit. assumed the Def. spoke Spanish, did not play the rights in Spanish was not
able do so at the hospital. Def. did not have a California or Nevada driver's
license.

12.01

State continues question the Wit. out of all the questions he felt the Def.
understood.
Court excuses the Wit.
I State calls 2 nd Wit. Heather Saunders, sworn under oath and question on direct.

Works for Blame Count)1 Shenff and ha", been there for the last 12 l/.12 yrs. her
position is Assistant Jail Administrator. Describes the booking process, and the
C'

COURT MINUTES 4
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comparison of records. Has the jail file on Juan Juarez, which is kept under lock
and key in the booking room.
State offers Exh. 2 marked-id- booking sheet
Court comments about Exh. from previous case re-marks Exh. l-ICOP video to I
Exh. 6 and marks the booking sheet is Exh. 7.
Mr. Dolan objects to Exh. 7.
Mr. Dolan questions the Wit. to aid in an objection, would know if there were
mistakes, describes how she uses booking information to be given as statistics.
Describes what things can be changed and what things cannot be changed.
Agrees that certain ID numbers the Def. would not know and would not be able
to provide.

12.09

Mr. Dolan objects to this document being admitted because of the accuracy of
the information.
State responds reviews hearsay rule, the booking sheet is not created for
criminal hearing. State questions the Wit. the purpose of the booking sheet is to
know who is or has been in the facility and for reporting purposes for State and
Federal Government.
12.18

Court takes judicial notice to some degree, reviews the booking sheet. ADMITS
Exh.7.

12.22

Mr. Dolan questions the Wit. on cross. Wouldn't know if the booking officer had
the wrong DOB. There is information in the report that does not come from the
arrestee. Agrees the report does not have a middle name.
State has no further questions.
I

Court excuses the Wit.
State rests.

12.25

Mr. Dolan has no witnesses & rests.
State gives dosing argument, cites case law, reviews Exh. 1 & 2 convictions from
Nevada and California and the personal information contained within compared
to the Idaho booking information. Believes that the State has proven that the
I Def. is the same person.

COURT MINUTES 5
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Mr. Dolan presents to the Court case law. The case law says that what should be
used of mug shots, finger prints or identified by court staff that was present at
the previous convictions. The Defs name is not unique for the area.

12.33

Court will not find that Juan Juarez as a unique name.
12.38

Mr. Dolan continues, addresses the difference in lack of a middJe name in Blaine
County, and proceeds reviewing the difference in personal information.
Reviews case law.

12.45

State responds.
Mr. Dolan objects to argument.
Court allows State to continue.
State continues.

12.47

Court comments about Lawyer case law re: Def. did not object to being the same
person. The point in mention it this Court is not holding the Defs silence against
him. In looking at the judgments and the differences in personal information
between them. Finds that the Def. is one in the same and is gUilty to the prior
convictions.

12.57

Mr. Dolan argues about there being no evidence as to who filled out the
information in the judgments.
State has an issue with Mr. Dolan arguing after a decision has been given.
Court allows Mr. Dolan to comment.
Mr. Dolan continues.
Court responds, it appears that the Def. filled out the information himself.
Orders a PSI and a Substance Abuse Evaluation.
Mr. Dolan comments about services that a Def. can acquire through the state,
only if the evaluation is through 19-2524.

12.59

Court orders assessment under 19-2524.
Mr. Dolan gives the Defs contact information: 851 Shanendoa Dr. AptA202 in
Haileyand phone #: 208-570-3888.

I
I
i

I
COURT MINUTES 6
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Court gives questionnaire to the Def. for a PSI. Sets Sentencing for 5/21/2012 at
10:30a.m.
1.05

Recess

COURT MINUTES 7

-111

RESET

(Clerk, cneck Ii applicable)

Assigned to: ______________
Assigned:

Fifth Judicial District Court. State of Idaho
In and For the County of Blaine
ORDER FOR PRESENTENCE REPORT AND EVALUATIONS
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,

\ FILED

VS.

Case No: CR-2011-0002386

) CHARGE(s): (see court minutes)

~:~.,~~))

REQUIRED ROA CODES: (Enter the appropriate code)

)

MAR - 9 2012

) PSI01- Order for Presentence Investigation Report (only)
) PSMH1- Order for Presentence Investigation Report and
JoLynn Drage, CierI< District
~~ental Health Assessment
L....!::C:£o~uT1:;.,.B2:I~8/n!!!:e~COU~n':J:..:.,Ida:::::;.h,;.:;o_.... ~<>rder for Presentence Investigation Report and
)
Substance Abuse Assessment

Juan L Juarez
Shenandoah 39 Apt A 202
Hailey, ID 83333
Defendant.

)

----~~~~~~~~--~--~~~~~)
On thisFriday, March 09, 2012, a Pre-sentence Investigation Report was ordered by the Honorable

Robert J, Eigee to be completed for

Court appearance on Monday, May 21, 2012 at: 10:30 AM at the above stated courthouse.
PLEASE PROVIDE ASSESSMENTS BY THIS DATE: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
EVALUATIONS TO BE DONE: Copy of each evaluation to be sent to Presentence Investigation Office to be included with PSI
Under Ie 19-2524 assessment(s) is (are) ordered which shall include a criminogenic risk assessment of the defendant
pursuant to (IC 19-2524(4)):

o

Mental Health Examination as defined in IC 19-2524(3), including any plan for treatment (PSMH1 ROA code); and/or

~bstance Abuse Assessment as defined in IC 19-2524(2) including any plan for treatment. (PSSA1 ROA code)
Other non- §19-2524 evaluations/examinations ordered for use with the PSI:
o Sex Offender 0 Domestic Violence 0 Other_ _ _ _ _ __ Evaluator: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

o

No evaluations are ordered. (PSI01 ROA code)

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Daniel M, Dolan
PROSECUTOR: Jim Thomas
THE DEFENDANT IS IN CUSTODY:

0 YES

~O If yes where: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

PLEA AGREEMENT: State recommendation
WHJ/JOC 0 Probation 0
PD Reimb 0
Fine

~stitution ~ _~o~er: NoNe...
Signature: ------~III!II::oIH;..-1!!k:L~~,.......,,--.;::;....-------------ud
,

:1) 9 \2.0\2-

Date:

ACJ

0

DO YOU NEED AN INTERPRETER?

EFEN ,ANT'S INFORMA TlON:
Name:

0

~ AQ ~ L -=:s\A.D52 Q ?-

0 NO

rilMale 0 Ferr:ale 0 RACE: Caucasian

tiyES

~Hispanic 0

Other

Addre
TelePh+

ZQI5 -S7~()

EmployerDate

Me",ge Phon"

-

Worl< Phone.· _
__ _ __

Work Address: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Of~irth:

Social Security Number,

Name & Phone Number of nearest relative: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _--:-_ _ _-:-:>',,-::-_ __

"""~'-\.L2.L.O\~L...:::=______ Arresting Agency: _..AB~\2t::..:..2.-\-(\.X..-=:::::.--S.;:.,c<..~-,---,(""",,'
:....=:.....tt..l..-.!._ _

Date of Arrest,' _ ____lo=-.....J\c..:..\

I Your assigned Pre-sentence Investigator will contact you to schedule an interview using the above information. Please have
1 your Pre-sentence Investigation Personal History Questionnaire filled out completely for interview.
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COURT MINUTES
CR-2011-0002386
State of Idaho vs. Juan L Juarez
Hearing type: Sentencing
Hearing date: 5/21/2012
Time: 10:54 am
Judge: Robert J. Elgee
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: ANDREA
Tape Number: DC
Defense Attorney: Daniel Dolan
Prosecutor: Matthew Fredback
Counter #
10.54

Court introduces case, Def. present with counsel, Mr. Dolan, State represented
by Mr. Fredback
Court received and reviewed PSI
Counsel have also reviewed PSI, Mr. Dolan didn't have time to contact the PSI
investigator after receiving report, appears there are several comments re: lack
of contact w / previous employers, advises Court that The Roosevelt Tavern
responded to the PSI investigator via Email
Court views that as a neutral issue, not the Def.'s fault the employers didn't
respond to investigator, notes on PSI the Roosevelt did respond
Counsel only have argument to present, no legal reason why judgment shouldn't
be entered today

10.57

COURT MINUTES 1

State begins argument-this Court heard the court trial in this case, reviews the
incident, Def. was driving North from Shoshone, dispatch was called re: vehicle
driving in oncoming traffic's lane, Officer Pritchard followed Def.'s vehicle and

observed the same kind of driving pattern, Def. stumbled out of his vehicle and
was too drunk to perform PST's, blood test RAC .238, reviews Defo's criminal
history, has a warrant from Nevada that is non-extraditable, Def. just made a
payment on his SCRAM unit, has had SCRAM on since September, State is
concerned with Defo's high RAC and driving pattern on the highway at 8 p.m.
when traffic could be heavy, period of jail is necessary, more than the usual 30
day recommendation, probation acceptable, intensive outpatient treatment, PSI
recommended traditional rider, State believes CAPP program would be more
appropriate, $100 restitution for blood test results, $5000/2500 fine, 3 years'
probation, 3 years prison fixed, 2 years indeterminate, leaves rider program to
the Court's discretion
11.04

Mr. Dolan speaks on behalf of Def.-presented letter to Def. from his employer,
Skipp Merrick, Def. has good job and is a valued employee, surprised with PSI
investigator's recommendation, reviews Def.'s employment history, Def.
obtained substance abuse evaluation from the Walker Center and they
recommend intensive outpatient treatment, eligible for funding through IC 192524, Def. has shown he doesn't need to drink and can remain sober, he is more
of a social drinker, Mr. Dolan is not sure whatthe criteria for a rider program is
anymore, doesn't believe a rider is necessary, Def. is good candidate for
probation, he is entitled to 14 days credit jail previously served, he is prepared
to go to work release today if ordered, Def. has taken accountability for his
actions, he was late on SCRAM payment because he was laid off from Roosevelt
due to slack season, made payment today w / his first paycheck from Merritt, he
has never disputed being intoxicated, court trial was for legal issues only, Def.
hasn't had a chance to go back to Nevada to clear the warrant
Mr. Dolan advises the Court he spoke to Def. previous today about needing an
interpreter, Def. stated he didn't need an interpreter today, it was more
confusing for his to follow the interpreter and his attorney at the last hearing
Court questions Oef., he has understood everything today and doesn't need an
interpreter
State makes correction to PSI, the RAC results were .315
Mr. Dolan agrees the results were in the 3'5, cannot recall the exact number
Oef. spea}r~ on his own behalf, wants to stay here in the Valley, he had a hard
time being here at first because he didn't know anyone at first
Mr. Dolan notes Def.'s brother lives here now and so does his mother

COURT MINUTES 2

11.17

Court questions Def. why his name is different on his paycheck
Def.'s name is Juan Leon Juarez, his employer has his name mixed up on his
paychecks, he gave his employer his SSN
Mr. Dolan notes Def. is a U.S. citizen, his father was U.S. citizen when Def. was
born which makes him a citizen automatically even though Def. was born in
Mexico

11.19

Court enters judgment-has considered the 4 goals of sentencing, enters
restitution order $100, Def. had very high BAC and was very dangerous when
driving while so intoxicated, reviews Def.'s criminal history, this case warrants
more jail time than 30 days based upon the high BAC and dangerous driving
pattern, orders Def. to not drink at all while on probation
Court imposes judgment, $2500/1500 fine, plus court costs, monthly payments
$75 start 9-21-12, 60 days jail in Blaine County jail starting today, gives 14 days
credit for time served, work release authorized. driver's license suspension
absolute 1 year commencing July 7,2012, interlock required July 8, 2013-May
21,2015,3 years' probation with standard terms and conditions in Blaine
County, Def. must meet w / probation officer to review probation terms and sign
up; 3 years prison fixed, 2 years indeterminate, prison suspended and Def.
placed on probation, Court advises Def. he has 42 days from the file date stamp
to appeal decision
Mr. Dolan advises Court the Def. will beappeaHng trial issues to the Supreme
Court, questions if Def. can be appointed a State Appellate PD
Court requires Def. to re-apply for public defender, orders Def. off SCRAM today

11.30

COURT MINUTES 3

Recess

------~-~----
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Jolynn Dmge, Clerk District
Court Blaine County, Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
State of Idaho,
Plaintiff,
Case No. CR-2011-2386

vs.
Juan L. Juarez
SS#
D.O.B.

,
Defendant.

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION
UPON A PLEA OF GUlLTV TO ONE FELONY COUNT,
SUSPENDING SENTENCE AND ORDER OF SUPERVISED PROBATION
I.C.§ 19-2601 (2)

I. INTRODUCTION
1.

The date of sentencing was May 21,2012 (hereinafter called sentencing date).

2.

The State of Idaho was represented by counsel, Matthew Fredback, of the Blaine County
Prosecutor's office.

3.

The defendant Juan Juarez, appeared personally. I.e. § 19-2503.

4.

The defendant was represented by counsel, Daniel Dolan.

5.

Robert J. Elgee, District Judge, presiding.

II. ARRAIGNMENT FOR SENTENCING. I.C. § 19-2510
1.

The defendant Juan Juarez was found guilty, following a court trial, to the charge below:

Crime of: Driving Under the Influence, a felony
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND ORDER OF SUPERVISED PROBATION - 1
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Idaho Code: I.C. §§ 18·8004, 18·8005(6),18·8005(10)
Guilty Verdict - date of: March 9, 2012
2.

The defendant was then asked by the Court whether the defendant had any legal cause to
show why judgment should not be pronounced against the defendant, to which the
defendant responded "No."

IV. SENTENCING DATE PROCEEDINGS
On May 21,2012, the sentencing date, and after the arraignment for sentencing as set
forth in section II "Arraignment for Sentencing" above, the Court proceeded as follows:
1.

Determined that more than two (2) days had elapsed from the plea to the date of
sentencing. I.C. § 19·2501 and I.C.R. Rule 33(a)(1).

2.

Discussed the presentence report and relevant matters with the parties pursuant to I. C. §
20-220 and I.C.R. Rule 32.

3.

Determined victim's rights and restitution issues pursuant to I.C. § 19-5301 and Article 1, §
22 of the Idaho Constitution.

4.

Offered an aggravation and/or mitigation hearing to both parties, including the right to
present evidence pursuant to LC.R. 33(a)(1).

5.

Heard comments and sentencing recommendations of both counsel and asked the
defendant personally if the defendant wished to make a statement and/or to present any
information in mitigation of punishment. I.C.R. Rule 33(a)(1).

6.

The Court made its comments pursuant to I.C. § 19- 2512, and discussed one or more of
the criteria set forth in l. C. § 19-2521.

~

THE SENTENCE IMPOSED

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, as follows:
The Defendant is guilty of the Crime of Driving Under the Influence, a felony, and a
Judgment of Conviction shall enter.

1.

Court costs: The defendant shall pay court costs in the sum of $270.50.

2.

Fine: The defendant is fined the sum of $2,500, with $1,500 suspended, and the
defendant shall pay all costs, fees and fines ordered by this Court. This judgment that the
defendant pay a fine and costs shall constitute a lien in like manner as a judgment for
money in a civil action. I.C. § 19-2518, I.C. § 19-2702.

3.

Penitentiary: The defendant Juan Juarez, shall be committed to the custody of the Idaho
State Board of Correction, Boise, Idaho for a unified sentence (I.C. § 19-2513) of 5 years;
which unified sentence is comprised of a minimum (fixed) period of confinement of 3 years,
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND ORDER OF SUPERVISED PROBATION - 2
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followed by an indeterminate period of custody of 2 years, with the precise time of the
indeterminate portion to be set by said Board according to law, with the total sentence not
to exceed 5 years.
4.

Credit for time served: The defendant is given credit for time previously served on this
crime in the amount of 14 days. I.C, § 18-309.
The credit for time served is calculated as follows:
June 18, 2011 - July 1, 2012 14 days

=

5.

Sentence suspended/terms of supervised probation: Provided however, that the
execution of said prison portion of the sentence is hereby suspended (the costs and fine
portion is not suspended) and the defendant is placed on supervised probation for a period
of 3 years beginning on May 21, 2012 to and under the control of the Idaho State Board of
Correction, (I.C. § 19-2601(5) and I.C. § 20-219), subject to the following terms:

General Terms and Conditions of Probation:
a)

Supervision Level: The defendant shall successfully complete any specialized
supervision level deemed appropriate for the Defendant's needs by the Department of
Probation and Parole.

b)

General Conditions: Abide by the Court Ordered Specific Conditions of Probation
previously signed and attached hereto as Exhibit 1, which exhibit is by this reference
incorporated herein.

c)

Specific Conditions: Abide by the Court Ordered Specific Conditions of Probation
previously signed and attached hereto as Exhibit 2, which exhibit is by this reference
incorporated herein.

Special Terms and Conditions of Probation:
a) Payment of court costs, fines and restitution: The defendant shall begin making
payments towards the court costs, fines and restitution ordered herein on September 21,
2012 in the amount of at least $75.00 per month.
b) County jail time to be presently served: The defendant shall serve 60 day(s) in the county
jail as a term and condition of probation, which shall commence immediately. The credit for
time served previously awarded to the defendant, in the amount of 14 days, shall count
against this jail time. The defendant is granted work release if the defendant otherwise
qualifies under the Sheriffs classification system.
c) Driving License Suspension: The defendant's driver's license shall be suspended
absolutely for a period of one year beginning July 7, 2012.
d) Interlock Device: Following the period of license suspension, the defendant, while operating a
motor vehicle, shall drive only a motor vehicle equipped with a functioning ignition interlock
device. The defendant must use such an interlock device from July 8, 2013 until May 21,
2015.

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND ORDER OF SUPERVISED PROBATION - 3
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VI. ORDER REGARDING RESTITUTION
1.

Restitution to Victim: The Court hereby ORDERS a Judgment of Restitution to be
entered in this case in the sum of $100.00, (I.C. § 19-5304 (victim». A separate written
order of restitution shall be entered. I.C. § 19-5304(2). This amount is payable through the
Clerk of the District Court to be disbursed to the victim(s) in this matter as follows:
Name:

Forensic Services
Lab No. P2011 0980
700 South Stratford Drive, Ste 125
Meridian, Idaho 83642-6202

$100.00

VII. RIGHT TO APPEAULEAVE TO APPEAL INFORMA PAUPERIS
The Right:
The Court advises the defendant, of the Defendant's right to appeal this judgment within
forty two (42) days of the date it is file stamped by the clerk of the court. I.A.R. Rule 14 (a).
In fonna Pauperis:
The Court further advises the defendant of the right of a person who is unable to pay the
costs of an appeal to apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis, meaning the right as an indigent
to proceed without liability for court costs and fees and the right to be represented by a court
appointed attorney at no cost to the defendant. I.C.R. 33(a)(3). I.C. § 19-852(a)(1) and (b)(2).

VIII. ENTRY OF JUDGMENT - RECORD BY CLERK
The Court orders the Judgment and record be entered upon the minutes and that the
record be assembled, prepared and filed by the Clerk of the Court in accordance with I.C. § 192519.

IX. BONDfBAIL
The conditions of bail given in this case having been satisfied, the bail is ordered
exonerated. I.C.R. 46(g).

X. ORDER ON PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORTS
The parties are hereby ordered to return their respective copies of the presentence
investigative reports to the deputy clerk of the court. Use of said report shall thereafter be governed
by I.C.R. 32(h)(1),(2), and(3).

XI. ORDER OF COMMITMENT TO COUNTY SHERIFF
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It is ADJUDGED and ORDERED that the defendant be committed to the custody of the
Sheriff of Blaine County, Idaho, for service of the County Jail time ordered herein as a term and
condition of probation.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

~~~~-(~/-~~{-L-----

DATED: ________

--~-~~:-'I-__::_-:------

SIGNED: _____
Robert J. Elgee, District Judge

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND ORDER OF SUPERVISED PROBATION - 5

-120·

I.C.R. RULE 49 (b)
NOTICE OF ORDER
I, Deputy Clerk for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that on the g-;l.. day of May,
2012, I have filed the original and caused to be served a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing document:
Jim Thomas, Esq.
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
PO Box 756
Hailey, ID 83333

Daniel Dolan, Esq.
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 757
Ketchum, ID 83340
Kevin Wayt
Probation Officer
dist5@idoc.idaho.gov

_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
~and Delivered
_ Ovemight Mail
Fax

~.S.

Mail, Postage Prepaid
_ Hand Delivered
_ Overnight Mail

Fax
_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

~and Delivered
.::-Evernight Mail
~mail

Blaine County Sheriffs Office
Hailey, Id 83333

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
~and Delivered
_ Ovemight Mail

Fax
CGD Sentencing Team
ccdsenten cingd5@idoc.idaho.gov

_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
,#mail

Deputy Clerk
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EXHIBIT 1
COURT ORDERED

GENERAL CONDITIONS OF PROBATION
IMPOSED AT THE REQUEST OF IDAHO DEPT. OF CORRECTION
I.e. §§ 20-219,19-2601(5), and I.C.R. 33(d).
1.

Supervision Level: The defendant's level of super~on, including caseload type and electronic monitoring
shall be determined by the Idaho Dept of Correction....J ~

2.

Laws and Conduct: The defendant shall obey all Illunicipal, county, state and federal laws. The defendant
shall comply with all lawful requests of any agent of the Idaho Dept of Correction. The defendant shall be
completely truthful at all times with any agent or the Idaho Dept of Correction. During any contact with law
enforcement personnel the defendant shall provide their identity, notify the officer(s) that they are under
supervision and provide the name of their supervising officer. The defendant shall notify their supervising
officer of the contact within 24 hours.:S-L

J.

Residence: The defendant shall not change residence without first obtaining permission from an authorized
agent of the Idaho Dept of CorrectionS L..

4.

Reporting: The defendant shall report to his/her supervising officer as directed. The defendant shall provide
truthful and accurate information or documentation whenever requested by the Idaho Dept of

Correction.~
5.

Travel: The defendant shall not leave the State of Idaho or the assigned district without first obtaining
permission from his/her supervising officer....I'L:.

6.

Extradition: If the defendant does leave the State of Idaho, with or without permission, the defendant does hereby
waive extradition to the State of Idaho and will not contest any effort to return the defendant to the State of
Idaho~

7.

Employment/Alternative Plan: The defendant shall seek and maintain gainful, verifiable, full-time
employment. The defendant shall not accept, cause to be terminated from, or change employment without first
obtaining written permission from his/her supervising officer. In lieu of full-time employment, the defendant
may participate in full-time education, a combination of employment and education, vocational program or
other a,l!tve plan based on the offender's specific situation and as approved by his/her supervising
officer.

8.

Alcohol: The defendant shall not purchase, possess, or consume alcoholic beverages in any form. The defendant

shall not, for any reason enter any establishment which sells or dispenses alcoholic beverages by the drink. This
provision is not intended to preclude the defendant from entering restaurants, cafes, or other establishments whose
primary business is the sale of food and non-alcoholic beverages. It is intended to preclude the defendant from
entering bars and taverns. In any event, defendant may not enter such establishments for any purpose other than
food consur~!on or employment reasons, and must leave as soon as food is consumed or employment shift
terminates. ~
9. Controlled Substances: The defendant shall not use or possess any illegal drug or any substance that simulates

the effect of an illegal drug. The defendant shall not use or possess any paraphernalia for the purpose of
ingesting any illegal drug. The defendant shall not use or possess any controlled substances unless lawfully
prescribed for him/her by a licensed physician or dentist. The defendant shall use medications only in the
manner prescribed by their physician or dentist. Y V

EXHIBIT 1
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FirearmslWeapons: The defendant shall not purchase, carry, possess or have control of any firearms, chemical
weapons, electronic weapons, explosives or other dangerous weapons, Other dangerous weapons may include, but
are not limited to: knives with blades over two and one half inches in length, switch-blade knives, brass knuckles,
swords, throwing stars and other martial arts weapons. The defendant shall not reside in any location that contains
fireanns or weapon0 L.

11. Search: The defendant shall consent to the search of his/her person, residence, vehicle, personal property, and
other real property or structures owned or leased by the defendant or for which the defendant is the controlling
authority conducted by any agent of the Idaho Dept of Correction or law enforcement officer. The defendant
waives his/her Foulih Amendment Rights concerning searches, Furthermore, anyone with whom the defendant
lives must also execute such a waiver...;s:.L
12, Cost of Supervision: The defendant shall comply with Idaho Code 20-225, which authorizes the idaho Dept of

Correction to collect a cost of supervision fee, The defendant shall make payments as prescribed in his/her
monthly cost of supervision bill.~
13, Associations: The defendant shall not associate with any person(s) designated by any agent of the Idaho Dept of
,

-\/

Correctlon,~

14, Substance Abuse Testing: The defendant shall submit to any test for alcohol or controlled substances as

requested and directed by any agent of the ldaho Dept of Correction or law enforcement officer. The defendant
may be required to obtain tests at their own expense, If the results of the test jo,dicate an adulterant has been
used to interfere with the results, that test will be deemed to have been positive.~
IS. Evaluation and Program Plan: The defendant shall obtain any treatment evaluation deemed necessary and as

ordered by the Court or any agent of the Idaho Dept of Correction, The defendant shall meaningfully
participate in and successfully complete any treatment, counseling or other programs deemed beneficial and as
directed by the Court or any agent of the Idaho Dept of Co rre2ion , The defendant may be required to attend
treatment, counseling or other programs at their own expense,~

16. Cooperation with Supervision: When home, the defendant shall answer the door for the probation officer. The
defendant shall allow the probation officer to enter their residence, other real property, place of employment and
vehicle for the purpose of visitation, inspections and other supervision functions. The defendant shall not
possess, install or use any monitoring instrument, camera, or other surveillance device to observe or alert them
to the approach of his/her probation officer. The defendant shall not keep any vicious or dangerolls dog or other
animal on or in t.(fcperty that the probation officer perceives as an impediment to accessing the defendant
or their property,
17, Absconding Supervision: The defendant will not leave the state or the assigned district in an effort to abscond

or flee supervision, The defendant shall make himself/herself available for supe@pn and program
palticipation as instructed by the probation officer and will not actively avoid supervision~
18. Court Ordered Financial Obligations: The defendant shall pay all costs, fees, fIDes and restitution in the
amount and manner and to the parties ordered by the Couli. The defendant shall make payments as ordered by
the Court or as designated in a Payment Agreement and Promissory Note to be completed with an agent of the
Idaho Dept of Correction<:YCr
19. Confidential Informant: The defendant shall not act as a confidential informant for law enforcement, except

as allowed in Idaho Dept. of Correction policy and with the written consent of both the Court and the Idaho
Dept. of Correction J L.20, Intrastate/Interstate Violations: If allowed to transfer supervision to another district or state the defendant

agrees to accept any violation allegation documents purportedly submitted by the agency/officer supervising the

EXHIBiT J
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defendant in the receiving district or state as admissible i~TIidence as credible and reliable. The defendant
waives any right to confront the author of such documents.
/
21. Additional Rules: The defendant agrees that other supervision rules may be imposed depending on the district
or specific field office that provides his/her supervision. At all times, these additional rules will be imposed
only after considering the successful supervision of the defendant and the secure operation of the district or
specific field office. All additional rules will be explained to the defendant and provided to him/her, in writing,
by an agent of the Idaho Dept ofCorrection.~
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EXHIBIT 2
COURT ORDERED
SPECIFIC CONDITIONS OF PROBATION
IMPOSED IN ADDrTION TO THE EXHIBIT I GENERAL CONDITIONS

I.e. § 20-221
1. Discretionary county jail time to be
The defendant shall serve not more
county jail at the discretion of the
officer, with the prior approval of
spent in j ail pursuant to an Agent I
absconding
supervision
does
not
discretionary jail time.~L-

served in the future:
than 30 days in the

defendant's probation
the Court. Any time
s Warrant and/or for
count
against
this

2. Polygraph examinations:
The defendant shall
submit to
polygraph examinations at the defendant's own expense when
requested
to
do
so
by
the
defendant's
probation
officer~0

The defendant
shall stipulate to the admission of blood, urine, or breath
test results in the form of a certified affidavit at any
probation hearing following a judicial determination that
live testimonial evidence would otherwise be impractical.
However, the defendant, at the defendant's own expense may
have the lab analysis of the defendant's blood, urine, or
breath performed at an in-state approved lab of the
defendant's
choosing
upon
notifying
the
official
administering
the
test
at
the
time
the
test
is
requested .;:1 L

3. stipulate to the admission of test results:

4 . Modification
of
probation
requirements:
Probation
condi tions are set by the court. The court delegates some
discretion to the agents of the Department of Corrections,
Probation
and
Parole
to
make
or
enforce
probation
requirements. In the event Probation and Parole sets a
condition of probation or requires the defendant to comply
with a condition of probation that is unreasonable or
impossible to perform, Defendant has the right to motion
the
court
to modify
or
revoke
speclIlc
probationary
requi:::-ements. Unless or until any condition is modified by
the court, Defendants are expected comply to their utmost
ability with such conditions as may be set. It is very
unlikely that the standard written conditions of probation
set by the court will be modified . .

:::rlc
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~ {0,

I
.:::1cXA.O
have read, or have had read to me, the
above agreement.
I understand and accept the conditions of
supervision under which I have been released.
I agree to abide
by and conform to them and understand that my failure to do so

maY;::lt~;;;;;i~tion
trfendant

t/

of my

prob~e
' Witness

DJifL~~.

EXHIBIT 2
REV:SED ~/4/2011
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Jolynn D18ge, Clerk District
Court Blaine County, Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUTNY OF BLAINE

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CR-2011-2386
ORDER ON RESTITUTION

vs.
JUAN L. JUAREZ,
Defendant.

THIS MATIER came before the Court for sentencing hearing in the abovecaptioned action. The Court finds that Idaho State Police Forensic Services is a victim
under Idaho Code § 19-5304 and has suffered compensable "economic loss" in the
amount of one hundred dollars ($100.00) as a result of the defendant's criminal
conduct.
The Court HEREBY ORDERS that the Defendant pay to the victim the aforesaid
amount of economic loss as restitution in the above-captioned action to be paid on a
schedule to be determined by the Defendant's probation officer and to be paid in full at
least sixty (60) days prior to the Defendant's release from probation. The Defendant
shall make payments to the Blaine County Clerk of the Court, 201 Second Ave. South,
Suite 110, Hailey, Idaho 83333.
The Clerk of the Court shall thereafter remit restitution payments made by the
Defendant to:
Forensic Services
Lab No. P20 110980
700 South Stratford Drive, Ste 125
Meridian, Idaho 83642-6202

$100.00

ORDER ON RESTITUTION - Page 1
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It is further ordered that this order shall be a civil judgment against the abovenamed defendant and in favor of the aforesaid victim.
SO ORDERED this ~ day of May, 2012.

District~

ORDER ON RESTITUTION - Page 2
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~;r day of May, 2012, I caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method indicated
below, and addressed to each of the following:
Jim J. Thomas
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
201 2nd Ave. South, Ste. 100
Hailey, ID 83333

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Telecopy

3

--.::L U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

Dan Dolan, Esq.
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 757
Ketchum, ID 83340

Hand Delivered
__ Telecopy

---.r U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

Kevin Wayt
Blaine County Felony Probation
Hailey, ID 83333

~ Hand Delivered
_ _ Telecopy

Forensic Services
700 South Stratford Drive, Ste 125
Meridian, ID 93642-6202

~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Telecopy

Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.

l

Case No. ~ Q..-)-o 11

r? ~ 8'&

ADDENDUM TO PROBA nON
CONDITION RE: IGNITION
~~~~----------~
INTERLOCK DEVIC
~,,::zXr:t;

FILED

)

DOB:
DL No.
C.A
)
______________~D=e=re~n=d=an~t~.________)

MAY 3 0 2012
.k>£.ym Drage, Clerk District
Court BlaIne Coon ,ld8ho

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-named defendant shall abide by all of
the special conditions of the Guardian Interlock Responsible Driver Program, as follows:
1.
operate by
installation.

The Defendant will have in interlock system installed in any vehicle they
;-013 and will contact an agent to arrange for

::S-"-A-\'-1.\:

e

,

2.
The Defendant will only operate a vehicle with a functioning interlock
system installed, and will operate no other vehicle during the term of this order unless
specificallv excused by the court by vvritten order.
3.
The Defendant will not adjust, tamper with, alter, or circumvent the
interlock system installed or the electrical wiring to the unit, of the unit, or to the ignition
system, nor remove the unit from the designated vehicle without prior written approval of
this court.
4.
The Defendant will have monitoring checks performed by the installer
approximately every sixty (60) days and is subject to random monitor checks.
5.
The Defendant agrees to abide by the policies and procedures of the Idaho
Ignition Interlock program.
6.
The program shall begin immediately upon installation of the interlock
device and will terminate ro~ ? ~ f
' AJi5.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the cost of this program is to be paid for:

~

Entirely by the defendant.
Entirely by the County Fund established for this purpose. The
county fund is to be reimbursed by the defendant by ________

ADDENDUM TO PROBATIOJ\ CONDITlOJ\ RE. IGNITIO}"; IKTERLOCK DEVICE - 1

--- - 13 O·

Shared equally by the defendant and the county fund. The
Defendant shall pay his one-half of the service directly to the
installer on a monthly basis. The county fund is to be reimbursed
by the defendant by
, _ _.
I DO HEREBY ACKNUWLEDGE THAT I RA. VE READ ALL OF THE
ABOVE TERMS AND AGREE TO ABIDE BY THEM.

(Defendant's Signature)

IT IS ORDERED thii3
_ _ day of

~
(Judge's 'Signature)
Robert J. Elgee, District Judge
R. Ted Israel, Magistrate

TO MAKE AN APPOINTMENT FOR INSTALLATION OF THE
INTERLOCK DEVICE, PLEASE VISIT THE FOLLOWING WEBSITE FOR A
LIST OF PROVIDERS:

http://\\rwvr.itd.idaho.gov/ohs/InstallationSites.htm
Copies delivered to:
~
c..,....-/'

C

~
Dated this

Defendant/Defendant's Attorney
Prosecutor
Department of Transportation
Probation Department

2l\

day of

Deputy Clerk

~

Misdemeanor
Felony
Blaine County misdemeanor probation office: (208) 788-5528
Felony Probation & Par~ffice: (208) 736-3080
unsupervised _ __
Probation supervised {

ADDENDUM TO PROBATION CONDITION RE IGNITIO}': TNTERLOCh DEV1CE -:2
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Jim J. Thomas, ISBN 4415
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
201 2nd Avenue S., Suite 100
Haiiey, Idaho 83333
Telephone: (208) 788-5545
Fa~ (208)788-5554

Jolynn Drage, C r istrict
Court Blaine County, Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

Case No. CR-2011-2386

STATE OF IDAHO,

STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS
COUNT THREE

Plaintiff,
vs.
JUAN L. JUAREZ,
Defendant.

Plaintiff State of Idaho moves the Court pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-3504 and
Idaho Criminal Rule 48(c) for its order dismissing Count Three of the above-captioned
criminal action.
The reasons for the dismissal are: (a) pursuant to a plea agreement between the
parties; and (b) dismissal would serve the ends of justice and the effective
administration of the Court's business.
DATED this

). t.\

day of May, 2012,

Matthew Fredback, ISBN 7262
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT THREE - Page 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ,:36 ~ay of May, 2012, ! caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
Dan Dolan, Esq.
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 757
Ketchum, Idaho 83340

~U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_
_

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

~ecretary

STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT THREE - Page 2
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i FILED ~.~:~~

I MAY 3 0 2012 I
....,... " ' - """ £>sfrlcl
_.POUrt
8J8Ine County, Idaho

I

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

Case No. CR-2011-2386

STATE OF IDAHO,

ORDER GRANTING MOTION
TO DISMISS COUNT THREE

Plaintiff,
vs.
JUAN L. JUAREZ,
Defendant.

The Court, having considered the motion to dismiss, and good cause appearing
therefor, HEREBY ORDERS that Count Three of the above-captioned criminal action be
dismissed.
DATED this

~

A.

oLU

day of May, 2012.

Robert Elf!!
District Judge

*

6

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT THREE- Page 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

,00

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of May, 2012, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
Blaine County Prosecuting
Attorney's Office
201 2nd Avenue S., Suite 100
Hailey, Idaho 83333
,Es.
Law

tJwDC)Lf\'N

33

_/U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
/ Hand Delivered
_
Overnight Mail
_
Telecopy

~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_
_

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT THREE- Page 2
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Fr LED ~. ij. e:2

DANIEL M. DOLAN
Attorney At Law
671 First Avenue North
Post Office Box 757
Ketchum, ID 83340
Telephone: 208-726-3005
Facsimile: 208-726-1187
Idaho State Bar Number 4147
Attorney for Defendant

11'11

JUL 02 2012
JoLynn Drage, Clerk District
Court Blaine Coun ,Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
Juan L. Juarez"
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR 2011 2386
NOTICE OF APPEAL

------------------------~)
TO:

The above named Respondent, STATE OF IDAHO
and their Attorneys, Jim J. Thomas, Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney,
201 2nd Avenue S. Suite 100 and Lawrence G. Wasden, State ofIdaho
office of the Attorney General,700 W. Jefferson Street, Suite 210, P.O.
Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
and the Clerk of the above Entitled Court.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named appellant Juan L. Juarez appeals against the above named respondent

to the Idaho Supreme Court from The Judgement of Conviction entered in the above entitled
action on May 22, 2012, The Honorable Judge Robert J. Elgee presiding.

NOTICE OF APPEAL Juan L. Juarez CR 20112386

Page 1
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....

2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, from the Judgement of

Conviction described in paragraph 1. is an appealable order under and pursuant to Idaho
Appellate Rule (LA.R). 11 (c.)(1), and (LA.R). 11 (c.)(6).

3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeaL which the appellant then intends to assert

in the appeal, provided any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellant from
asserting other issues on appeal, is:
(a)

Did the district court err in finding that the Nevada DUI law was a substantially

conforming criminal violation, as the basis of a prior conviction to enhance the DUJ charge to a
felony were Nevada is not concerned with the alcohol level at the time of driving, but looks to
the alcohol level at the time of the test.

(b)

Did the district court err in finding that the Nevada DUI law was a substantially

conforming criminal violation, as the basis of a prior conviction to enhance the DUI charge to a
felony were Nevada does not allow for a jury trial for a first offense DUI charge

(c)

Did the district court err in finding that the state presented sufficient evidence to establish

defendant's identity as the perpetrator who had previously been convicted of a DUI in Nevada
beyond a reasonable doubt.

(d)

Did the district court err in finding that the state presented sufficient evidence to establish

defendant's identity as the perpetrator who had previously been convicted of a DUI in California
beyond a reasonable doubt.

4.

There is a portion of the record that is sealed. That portion of the record that is sealed is

the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (PSI).

NOTICE OF APPEAL Juan L. Juarez CR 2011 2386

Page 2
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5.

Reporter's Transcript. The appellant requests the preparation of the entire reporter's

standard transcript as defined in LA.R. 25(c). The appellant also requests the preparation of

the additional portions of the reporter's transcript:
(a)

Entry of Guilty Plea Hearing to the DUI portion of the charge held on December 19, 2011

(Court Reporter: Susan Israel, estimation of pages listed on the Register of Actions less than 100
pages);
(b)

States Motion in Limine Hearing held on January 10,2012 (Court Reporter: Susan

Israel, estimation of pages listed on the Register of Actions less than 100 pages);
(c)

Court Trial held March 9, 2012, (Court Reporter: Susan Israel, estimation of pages listed

on the Register of Actions one half day of trial more than 100 pages);

6.

Clerk's Record. The appellant requests the standard clerk's record pursuant to I.A.R.

28(b)(2). The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record, in
addition to those automatically included under LA.R. 28(b)(2):
(a)

Any exhibits, including but not limited to letters or victim impact statements, addendums

to the PSI or other items offered at sentencing hearing or the Rule 35 motion hearing.

7.

I certify:

(a)

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Court Reporter,
Susan Israel, 201 2nd Avenue S., P.O. Box 1379, Hailey Idaho 83333;

(b)

That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the preparation of
the record because the appellant is indigent. (Idaho Code §§ 31-3220, 31-3220A,
LA.R. 24( e»;

(c)

That there is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in a criminal case (1. C.

§§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, LA.R. 23(a)(8»;

NOTICE OF i\.PPEAL Juan L. Juarez CR 2011 2386

Page 3
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....

(d)

That arrangements have been made with Blaine County who will be responsible
for paying for the reporter's transcript, as the client is indigent, Idaho Code §§ 313220, 31-3220A, l.A.R. 24(e);

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to
LA.R

20,,,1/

~

DATED THIs4Lday of §,2012

Daniel M. Dolan
Attorney for Appellant.

NOTICE OF APPEAL Juan L. Juarez CR 2011 2386

-----------.~~.~

....
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DMTIEL M. DOLAN
Attorney At Law
671 First Avenue North
Post Office Box 757
Ketchum, ID 83340
Telephone: 208-726-3005
Facsimile: 208-726-1187
Idaho State Bar Number 4147
Attorney for Defendant

FILED ~~:Z"jC
JUL 02 2012

("

JoLYnn Drag C'I
Court 81' e, lerk Dls/rict
lame Coun . Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
Juan L. Juarez,

)

)
)
)
)
)

)
Defendant-Appellant.

)

Case No. CR 2011 2386
Ex Parte Motion To:
Appoint Counsel on Appeal;
Waive Fees and Costs of Appeal:
Prepare the Transcript and Clerk's
Record at Public Expense

CO MES NO W Juan L. Juarez, the Appellant herein, by and through his court appointed
attorney of record, Daniel M. Dolan, and pursuant to Rules 24(e) and 27(e) and 45.1 of the LA.R.
hereby request that:
A. This Court pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-867, for its order appointing the State Appellate
Public Defender's Office to represent the appellant in all further appellate proceedings and allowing
current counsel for the defendant to withdraw as counsel of record. This motion is brought on the
grounds and for the reasons that the appellant is currently represented by Blaine County Public
Defender, Daniel M. Dolan; the State Appellate Public Defender is authorized by Idaho Code § 19870 to represent the defendant in all felony appellate proceedings; the defendant has been found
indigent; and it is in the interest of justice for them to do so in this case.
The appointment of the State Appellate Public Defender is for the purposes of the appeal
only.
B. The cost to prepare the transcript and clerks record be prepared at public expense.
C. That any and all fees and cost of this appeal be waived.

Motion 10 Appoint Counsel

Page 1
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This motion is based upon the following grounds.
1.

The appellant is an indigent person without funds to retain private counsel.

2.

The Appellant was represented by court appointed counsel in the trial court.

3.

The appellant is an indigent person without funds to pay for the costs of the

preparation of the transcript and clerk's record herein.
4.

The appellant brings this action in good faith

5.

Appellant has attached his affidavit of indigence in support of this motion.

WHEREFORE, appellant respectfully request this court to appoint at attorney to
represent him on appeal, and to waive the cost and fees of this appeal and to have the clerks record
and transcript prepared at public expense,

DATED THIS 2nd

day of Julv, 2012

Attorney for Appellant.

Motion to Appoint Counsel

Page 2
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I

DANIEL M. DOLAN
Attorney At Law
671 First Avenue North
Post Office Box 757
Ketchum, ID 83340
Telephone: 208-726-3005
Facsimile: 208-726-1187
Idaho State Bar Number 4147
Attorney for Defendant

FILED

I

~:.,

!Ql(

JUL D2 2012
JoLynn Drage, C:Drk District
Court Blaine ~'\' Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
Juan L. Juarez,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR 2011 2386
MOTION TO PROCEED
IN FORMA PAUPERIS
AND SUPPORTING
AFFIDAVIT

COMES NOW, the Defendant-Appellant, Juan L. Juarez, by and through his attorney
of record, in the above-entitled matter and moves this Honorable Court for an order of the Court
to proceed in forma pauperis on the grounds he indigent pursuant to Idaho Code §31-3220A.
Said Motion is supp0¥d\by the following Affidavit ofInability to Pay Court Fees.

DATEDthislJdaY~OJb.

_

Daniel M. Dolan
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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AFFIDA VIT OF INABILITY TO PAY
STATE OF IDAHO

County of Blaine,

)
) ss
)

Juan L. Juarez, declares under penalty of perjury, that I am the Petitioner in the above
entitled proceeding; that, in support of my request to proceed without being required to prepay
fees, cost or give security therefor, 1 state that because of my poverty, I am unable to pay the
costs of said proceeding or give security therefor; that I believe I am entitled to relief.
The nature of my action is: an appeal from the Judgement of Conviction.
In further support of this application, I answer the following questions:
1.

I am presently employed.

~

0 No

a:)

a.

lfthe answer is "Yes" my wages per month are approximately

b.

If the answer is "No" list last date of employment and salary:

~ ~"\......
(A;X~

$_-2.

I have received money from the following,sources within the last 12 months:

No

0

business, profession or other self employment

0

rent payments. interest or dividends

$

r-'CJ

0

pensions, annuities or life insurance payments

$

/lJd

0

gifts or inheritances

$

tIc)

0

other sources

$ ,

!18

AFFIDA VIT OF INDIGENCE

L--_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

~

____

~

_____

~_~

__
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3.

The real and personal property I own is: no real property, miscellaneous personal

property such as clothing , --,-~
___/-,/J.C-f'/_"_---i-I
__
~ / _ _. .; ;: , -/-, ~_,'_/-,1-/,;'_/_~_.F_.~_ --.:;:;..::.._.
_ _ _ __

4.

I have a savings account:

0 Yes

5.

I have a checking account:

0 Yes

6.

Balance in inmate trust account

7.

Spouse's income

8.

Affiant's dependents:

~ $~$- - approximately

~
$ none

liley-I£

debt!_~6>-'
"'-"'".~_-r::;--"e;,---A_I:f)_'---,--=uL,~_h-=-o-o-,-,J_",-",-d---,i'F--_T6_~_
tuJ; &in62SC; LCA::AAT r':::;,/lJr:;~ A¢?"O.& tZo /V) 1 'Iv C~

9.

Affiant's

CJ

I 72c/:JO
10.

LO
7

Affiant's monthly expenses:

rent $480.00, utilities &175.00,

h9 '7 i

1:0" "" ~cJ

AFFIDA VII OF n~DIGENCE
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Further, your Affiant states that I am unable to pay the costs of pursuing this action. I
verifY that the statements made in this affidavit are true and correct.

DATED this

Lay

of

~7V

,20IL.

AFFIDAVIT OF INDIGENCE
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D.ANIEL M. DOLAN
Attorney At Law
671 First Avenue North
Post Office Box 757
Ketchum, ID 83340
Telephone: 208-726-3005
Facsimile: 208-726-1187
Idaho State Bar Number 4147
Attorney for Defendant

FILED

~

r1aJloI"P.M...i

[ JUL 1 0 2012

I

Jolynn Dtage, Cleric District
Court BllJlne Counly. Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
Juan L. Juarez,

Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR 2011 2386
ORDER:
APPOINTING ATTORNEY;
WAlVING ALL FEES;
FOR PREPARATION OFTRANSCRlPT
AND CLERK'S RECORD
AT PUBLIC EXPENSE

THIS MATTER having come before this court upon the motion of the appellant,
Juan L. Juarez, and being supported by appellant's affidavit;
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1.

For the purpose of this appeal, Juan L. Juarez, Appellant is found to be indigent.

2.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Daniel M. Dolan, is withdrawn as counsel of

record for the Defendant and the State Appellate Public Defender is hereby appointed to
represent the Appellant, Juan L. Juarez, in the above entitled matters for appellate
purposes.
The appointment of the State Appellate Public Defender is for purposes of the appeal only.

Order Appointing Attorney Juan L. Juarez CR 2011 2386

Page 1
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3.

All fees and cost of this appeal shall be waived.

4.

The preparation of the transcript of proceedings and clerk's record is order to be

prepared at county expense.
DATED TIllS ~ day Of~' 2012

ROb:m:e~

District Judge

Order Appointing Attorney Juan 1. Juarez CR 2011 2386
1_

Page 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

'JUly

,

I hereby certify that on this
(()
Day of
2012, I served a true and
correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method hldicated below, and addressed to
each of the following:

Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
201 2nd Ave South Ste. 100
Hailey, Idaho 83333
208 788-5554

U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

Daniel M. Dolan
P.O. Box 757
Ketchum, Idaho 83340
208726-1187

U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

Susan Israel Blaine County Court Reporter
201 2nd Ave South Ste.
Hailey, Idaho 83333

U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

State of Idaho Office of the Attorney General
P.O. Box 83720-0010
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010

U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

State Appellate Public Defender
3050 N Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100
Boise, Idaho 83703
208-334-2985

U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

Deputy Clerk

Order Appointing Attorney Juan L. Juarez CR 2011 2386

~-
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EXHIBIT LIST

Confidential Exhibit:
Presentence Report dated May 16, 2012.

Exhibits from Preliminary Hearing held September 14, 2011.
State's Exh 1. Toxicology Report dated July 20, 2011.
State's Exh 2. Certified Copies of DUI Conviction from State of Nevada.
State's Exh 3. Certified Copies of Excessive DUI Conviction from State of
California.
Exhibit from Court Trial held January 10, 2012 and March 9, 2012.
State's Exh 1. Certified Copies of DUI Conviction from State of Nevada.
State's Exh 2. Certified Copies of Excessive DUI Conviction from State of
California.
State's Exh 3. Nevada law.
State's Exh 4. Nevada law.
State's Exh 5. California law.
State's Exh 6. ICOP video of stop.
State's Exh 7. Blaine County Sheriff's Office Booking Report dated June 19,
2011.
Dated this ~ day of September, 2012.

Andrea Logan, Deputy Clerk

Exhibit List - 1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
STATE OF IDAHO,

)

Supreme Court No. 40135

)

Plaintiff/Respondent,

)
)

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

)

vs.
JUAN L. JUAREZ,
Defendant/Appellant.

)
)
)
)

-------------)

STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
County of Blaine
)
I, Andrea Logan, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that the
above and foregoing Clerk's Record on Appeal was compiled and bound under my
direction and is a true, full and correct Record of the pleadings and documents as are
automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules as well as those
requested by the Appellant.
I do further certify that all exhibits offered or admitted in the above-entitled
cause and exhibits requested by the Appellant will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the
Supreme Court along with the Clerk's Record on Appeal and the Court Reporter's
Transcript on Appeal.
IN WITNESS WHERE~F, I have h~eunto srt my hand and affixed the seal
of said Court at Hailey, Idaho, this \
day of :::ep)1v1~v ,2012.
JoLynn Drage, Clerk of the Court

~

By
Andrea Logan, Deputy Clerk

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE-1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plai ntiff/Respondent,

)
)

Supreme Court No. 40135

)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

)
)

vs.

)
)
)

JUAN L. JUAREZ,
Defendant!Appellant.

)

--------------------------)
I, Andrea Logan, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record and
Court Reporter's Transcript to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:
Idaho State Appellate Public
Defender's Office
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703

Attorney General's Office
CRIMINAL APPEALS
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010

Attorney for Defendant!Appeliant

Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal
of the said Court this
\ \ day of
,2012.
M b<v

:i:efle

JOLYNN DRAGE, Clerk of the Court

~"----'--

By_ _..........
_ __
Andrea Logan, Deputy Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - 1

